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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is in three chapters, each treating of a 
different aspect of the nature of linguistic meaning. Together, they 
support the thesis that linguistic meaning is a non-naturalistic 
property which we can have reason to ascribe only to the expressions 
of public languages. 
The first chapter argues that meaning facts cannot be shown to be 
naturalistic facts by being shown to be reducible to teleological 
facts, and these in turn to naturalistic facts. Insofar as meaning 
facts can be reduced to teleological facts, it is because 
telelological facts are normative; insofar as teleological facts can 
be reduced to naturalistic facts, it is because they are non- 
normative. Fred Dretske, Ruth Garrett Millikan and Jerry Fodor are 
each criticized for missing this point. 
The second chapter concerns rule-following and meaning scepticism. 
A sceptical argument based on epistemological considerations is set 
out and contrasted with Saul Kripke's argument for the conclusion 
that there is never a fact as to what one means by one's expressions. 
It is argued that the e~istemological argument has broader 
implications than Kripke's. A solution to the sceptical problem 
raised, which relates one's epistemological access to the meanings 
of linguistic expressions to comn~unal uses of the expressions, is 
presented in outline. 
The third chapter develops the solution to the epistemological 
problem raised in the second chapter. The thesis that one's only 
epistemological Pccess to the meanings of expressions is via communal 
use, is defended against two objections. The first objection is that, 
insofar as it can be shown that one cannot nave reason to believe 
t.hat one knows the meanings of the expressions of a language 
independently of knowing a community's uses of the expressions, it 
can also be shown that one cannot have reason to believe that one 
knows the me3 ings of a community's language. The second objection 
is that insofar as one can have reason to believe that one knows the 
meanings of the expressions of a language by knowing its communal 
uses, one can also have reason to believe that one knows them 
independently of any community. Each objection is responded to in 
turn. 
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CHAPTER 1: TELEOLOGY AND MEANING NATURALISM 
Common s e n s e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e r e  are  f a c t s  c o n c e r n i n g  what  t h e  
words  p e o p l e  u t t e r ,  mean.  When I s a y  t h a t  t h e  word ' p a v e m e n t t ,  a s  
my f r i e n d  S m i t h  u s e s  it, means  s i d e w a l k ,  I a p p e a r  t o  be s a y i n g  
s o m e t h i n g  t h a t  i s  e i t h e r  t r u e  o r  f a l s e ,  i n  t h e  way t h a t  I would  be 
i f  I said t h a t  S m i t h ' s  w e i g h t  i s  1 6 0  p o u n d s  o r  t h a t  h i s  car h a s  a 
f l a t  t i r e .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  o n e  c u r r e n t l y  p o p u l a r  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  v i ew,  
however ,  t h i s  common s e n s e  v i e w  c a n  be t r u e  o n l y  i f  f a c t s  a b o u t  
m e a n i n g  are,  i n  a s e n s e  t o  be e l u c i d a t e d  be low,  ' n a t u r a l i s t i c '  f a c t s  
- i f  t h e r e  are f a c t s  a b o u t  m e a n i n g ,  t h e n  t h e s e  f a c t s  mus t  i p s o  f a c t o  
be n a t u r a l i s t i c .  S i n c e  it i s  n o t  o b v i o u s  t h a t  mean ing  is 
n a t u r a l i s t i c 1 ,  it b e h o v e s  a n y o n e  who s u b s c r i b e s  b o t h  t o  t h e  common 
s e n s e  v i e w  t h a t  t h e r e  are f a c t s  a b o u t  m e a n i n g  a n d  t o  t h e  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  v i e w  t h a t  a n y  s u c h  f a c t s  mus t  be n a t u r a l i s t i c ,  t h e n ,  
t o  show j u s t  how m e a n i n g  i s  n a t u r a l i s t i c .  One p o p u l a r  s t r a t e g y  f o r  
t r y i n g  t o  d o  t h i s  i s  t o  t r y  t o  show t h a t  f a c t s  a b o u t  mean ing  r e d u c e  
t o  t e l e o l o g i c a l  f a c t s  o f  some k i n d ,  a n d  t h e n  t o  t r y  t o  show t h a t  
t h e s e  t e l e o l o g i c a l  f a c t s  r e d u c e  t o  n a t u r a l i s t i c  f a c t s 2 .  The a i m  of 
t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  t o  c r i t i c i z e  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  - ' t e l e o l o g i c a l  mean ing  
n a t u r a l i s m f ,  as  w e  c a n  c a l l  it- a n d  i n  s o  d o i n g ,  t o  c a s t  d o u b t  on  
t h e  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  common s e n s e  v i e w  t h a t  t h e r e  are  f a c t s  
   any r e a s o n a b l e  p h i l o s o p h e r s  h a v e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  d e n i e d  t h a t  
m e a n i n g  i s  n a t u r a l i s t i c .  S e e  e s p e c i a l l y  W.V.  Q u i n e ,  Word and O b j e c t .  
Cambr idge ,  Mass.: MIT P r e s s ,  1960 ,  a n d  S a u l  K r i p k e ,  W i t t g e n s t e i n  on  
R u l e s  and P r i v a t e  Language.  Cambr idge ,  Mass. : H a r v a r d ,  1 9 8 2 .  
'1n o r d e r  t o  s i m p l i f y  t h e  e x p o s i t i o n ,  I w i l l  s p e a k  u n c r i t i c a l l y  
i n  wha t  f o l l o w s  as t h o u g h  t h e r e  are m e a n i n g  f a c t s  a n d  t e l e o l o g i c a l  
f a c t s .  I d o  t h i s  s o l e l y  f o r  e x p o s i t o r y  r e a s o n s ,  a n d  d o  n o t  mean i n  
s o  d o i n g  t o  i m p l y  t h a t  I h a v e  a n s w e r e d  t h e  a r g u m e n t s  o f  s c e p t i c s  t o  
t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e r e  are n o  f a c t s  o f  t h e s e  k i n d s .  
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about meaning and the philosophical view that any such facts would 
have to be naturalistic. 
The motivation underlying teleological meaning naturalism is the 
thought that teleological facts are both naturalistic and normative, 
and thus will afford the means to naturalize what is perceived to 
be the normative aspect of meaning. As will be seen below in the 
course of reviewing three represertative theories, however, some 
important proponents of teleological meaning naturalism entirely 
overlook the substantial problem of justifying this motivating 
thought. Instead, they take the central challenge facing them to be 
in demonstrating that meaning facts reduce to teleological facts. 
I will argue that insofar as any teleological fact is normative in 
the relevant sense, it is no more obviously naturalistic than are 
meaning facts. In short, I will argue that insofar 3s the problem 
of naturalizing meaning is in part the problem of naturalizing the 
normative, the strategy of appealing to teleological facts merely 
relocates the problem. 
The first thing to do in what follows will be to elucidate the 
nature of the different kinds of (putative) facts in question 
-meaning facts, naturalistic facts, and teleological facts. It will 
then be possible to enquire as to whether biological science affords 
examples of appropriately normative teleological facts which are 
unproSlematically naturalistic, which would clear the way for the 
teleological meaning naturalist. It will be found that it does not. 
Finally, three representative attempts to reduce meaning-facts to 
naturalistic facts by way of teleological facts, due to Fred 
Dretske, Ruth Garrett Millikan, and Jerry Fodor, respectively, will 
be criticised. 
In order to be able to evaluate the claims of exponents of 
teleological meaning-naturalism, the terms of the discussion mnst 
be clarified, beginning with the kinds of putative facts for which 
a reductive analysis is being sought. 
To see just what kind of facts about meaning are taken to be in 
need of reduction to naturalistic terms, consider Paul Gricef s 
distinction between 'natural' and 'nonnaturalf meaning3. Grice 
suggests that we distinguish between statements such as 
"Those spots mean measles" 
and 
"Those clouds mean that it will rain1', 
on the one hand, and 
"Those three rings on the bell mean that the bus is full" 
and 
"The meaning of the policeman's remark, "It is prohibited to 
drive on the pavement", is that it is prohibited to drive on 
the sidewalk", 
on the other hand (Grice 1989, pp.213-14). As Grice notes, the 
concept of meaning which figures in the first statements, natural 
meaning, is such that x (naturally) means that p only if it is the 
case that p. For example, a certain cluster of dark clouds do not 
mean rain unless it actually will rain. To be sure, it may be that 
clouds of this type usually mean rain, but the very clouds in 
question --the 'token' clouds- do not mean rain in any sense, if it 
does not rain. In contrast, the concept of meaning which appears in 
3~lthough Gricefs terminology is, I think, apt, it should be 
clear that it is not meant to imply any conclusions as to the 
possibility of reducing facts about non-natural meaning to 
naturalistic facts. 
1 2  
t h e  s e c o n d  s t a t e m e n t s ,  n o n - n a t u r a l  mean ing ,  i s  s u c h  t h a t  a  g i v e n  
t o k e n  o f  t h e  s i g n  t y p e  x may mean t h a t  p i s  t h e  case, e v e n  i f  p i s  
n o t  t h e  case. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h o s e  t o k e n  r i n g i n g s  o f  t h e  b e l l  may mean 
t h a t  t h e  b u s  i s  f u l l  e v e n  i f  a m i s t a k e  h a s  b e e n  made, a n d  t h e  b u s  
i s  n o t  f u l l .  The  f i r s t  c o n c e p t ,  n a t u r a l  mean ing ,  c a n  p l a u s i b l y  be 
e x p l i c a t e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  x a n d  p o c c u r r i n g  t o g e t h e r :  
a g i v e n  t o k e n  o f  t h e  t y p e  x n a t u r a l l y  means  t h a t  p, p l a u s i b l y ,  i f  
a n d  o n l y  i f  t o k e n s  o f  t h e  t y p e  x are ( c o n s i d e r a b l y )  more l i k e l y  t o  
a p p e a r  c o n c o m i t a n t l y  w i t h  p f s  b e i n g  t h e  c a s e  t h a n  n o t ,  a n d  p i s  t h e  
case. What i s  a t  i s s u e  i n  wha t  f o l l o w s ,  however ,  i s  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
n o n - n a t u r a l  m e a n i n g .  J u s t  wha t  s o r t  o f  r e l a t i o n  h a s  t o  h o l d  be tween  
a s i g n  t y p e  a n d  a t y p e  o f  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s ,  s u c h  t h a t  a t o k e n  o f  t h e  
s i g n  t y p e  c a n  mean t h a t  t h e  s ta te  o f  a f f a i r s  o b t a i n s ,  e v e n  when t h e  
s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  d o e s  n o t  o b t a i n ?  O r ,  t o  p u t  t h e  p o i n t  i n  terms 
f a v o u r e d  b y  F r e d  D r e t s k e ,  i n  what  r e l a t i o n  mus t  a s i g n  t y p e  s t a n d  
t o  t h e  w o r l d ,  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  t o k e n s  o f  t h e  s i g n  t y p e  c a n  m i s r e p r e s e n t  
t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  w o r l d 4 ?  
One s u g g e s t e d  c o n s t r a i n t  o n  a n s w e r s  t o  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  q u e s t i o n  i s  
t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n  a t  i s s u e  s h o u l d ,  i n  some s e n s e ,  be n o r m a t i v e .  T h a t  
t h i s  i s  t h e  case i s  s u g g e s t e d  b y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  S u p p o s e  t h a t  t h e  
p r e d i c a t e  ' g r e e n '  i n  my i d i o l e c t  means t h e  p r o p e r t y  green. I t  d o e s  
n o t  f o l l o w  t h a t  a l l  t h o s e  t h i n g s  wh ich  I s i n c e r e l y  term ' g r e e n '  w i l l  
b e  g r e e n  - n a t u r a l l y ,  I may make m i s t a k e s .  From t h e  f a c t s  t h a t  I am 
s p e a k i n g  s i n c e r e l y  a n d  t h a t  ' g r e e n r  i n  my i d i o l e c t  means g r e e n ,  
t h e n ,  w e  c a n n o t  c o n c l u d e  a n y t h i n g  d e f i n i t e  a b o u t  wha t  I w i l l  o r  w i l l  
n o t  t e r m  ' g r e e n ' .  I t  a p p e a r s ,  however ,  t h a t  w e  c a n  draw s p e c i f i c  
c o n c l u s i o n s  a b o u t  wha t  I s h o u l d  a n d  s h o u l d  n o t  t e r m  ' g r e e n t  -about  
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what  i t  wou ld  be correct f o r  me t o  t e r m  ' g r e e n t .  T h i s  i s  a p o i n t  
wh ich  S a u l  K r i p k e  e m p h a s i z e s  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  s c e p t i c a l  
p r o b l e m  a b o u t  m e a n i n g  wh ich  h e  a t t r i b u t e s  t o  W i t t g e n s t e i n S .  I n  
o r d e r  f o r  a t h e o r y  o f  m e a n i n g  t o  c o u n t  as  a c a n d i d a t e  f o r  s o l v i n g  
t h i s  p r o b l e m ,  K r i p k e  m a i n t a i n s ,  it m u s t  b e  s u c h  as t o  e n t a i l ,  f o r  
a n y  p r e d i c a t e  'Pf  o f  t h e  l a n g u a g e ,  c o n c l u s i o n s  as  t o  wha t  it would  
be c o r r e c t  t o  t e r m  'I?. The s o - c a l l e d  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  t h e o r y  of 
m e a n i n g ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  f a i l s  i n  t h i s  respect.  T h i s  t h e o r y  s ta tes ,  
r o u g h l y ,  t h a t  f o r  a word i n  a s p e a k e r ' s  i d i o l e c t  t o  mean s o m e t h i n g  
i s  j u s t  f o r  t h e  s p e a k e r  t o  h a v e  a d i s p o s i t i o n  t o  u s e  it i n  c e r t a i n  
ways .  A s  K r i p k e  a r g u e s ,  t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  t h e o r y  f a i l s  i nasmuch  a s  
i t  s a y s  n o t h i n g  a b o u t  w h e t h e r  it would  be c o r r e c t  o r  i n c o r r e c t  f o r  
m e  t o  t e r m  a n y  g i v e n  t h i n g  ' g r e e n ' ,  w h a t e v e r  my l i n g u i s t i c  
d i s p o s i t i o n s .  
A number o f  comments a re  i n  o r d e r  r e g a r d i n g  t h i s  p o i n t .  The f i r s t  
comment c o n c e r n s  t h e  s e n s e  i n  wh ich  n o r m a t i v e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  s u c h  as  
t h a t  o n e  o u g h t  t o  t e r m  P ' s  'Pf  o r  t h a t  o n e  h a s  made a m i s t a k e  i n  
t e r m i n g  a non-P, ' P r ,  follow f r o m  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  \ P r  means P  i n  o n e ' s  
i d i o l e c t .  N o t e ,  t o  b e g i n  w i t h ,  t h a t  t h e r e  are p o s s i b l e  s i t u a t i o n s  
i n  wh ich  o n e  means  P  b y  'PI b u t ,  a l l  t h i n g s  c o n s i d e r e d ,  o n e  o u g h t  
not t o  t e r m  a n y  P ,  ' P I .  Such  a s i t u a t i o n  m i g h t  a r i se ,  f o r  example ,  
i f  t e r m i n g  a p o l i t i c a l  d i s s e n t e r  \a  d i s s e n t e r f  would  h a v e  t h e  
c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h a t  d i s s e n t e r ' s  b e i n g  e x e c u t e d .  I n  s u c h  a s i t u a t i o n ,  
p l a u s i b l y ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  ' d i s s e n t e r '  i n  o n e r  s i d i o l e c t  means 
dissenter, it i s  n o t  t h e  case t h a t  o n e  s h o u l d  t e r m  a n y  d i s s e n t e r  'a 
d i s s e n t e r '  --the norm t h a t  o n e  s h o u l d  t e r m  P ' s  'PI i s  c v e r r i d d e n  by  
5 ~ n  h i s  Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language ( K r i p k e  
1 9 8 2 ) .  S e e  e s p .  p p .  24-32 .  
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a s t r o n g e r ,  m o r a l  norm. I t  seems, t h e n ,  t h a t  n o r m a t i v e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  
f o l l o w  o n l y  'ceteris p a r i b u s f  f r o m  m e a n i n g  f a c t s .  The  s e n s e  i n  which  
t h e  n o r m a t i v e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  f o l l o w  i s ,  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  l i k e  t h e  
s e n s e  i n  w h i c h  it f o l l o w s  f r o m  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  S h a s  p r o m i s e d  t o  d o  
X ,  t h a t  S s h o u l d  d o  X .  Here a g a i n ,  w h e r e a s  t h i s  i s  ce te r i s  p a r i b u s  
t h e  case, t h e r e  c a n  c l e a r l y  be c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  wh ich  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  
i s  o v e r r i d d e n .  Now, i t  i s  n o t  my p u r p o s e  h e r e  t o  t r y  t o  e x p l i c a t e  
t h i s  s e n s e  i n  w h i c h  o n e  f a c t  c a n  f o l l o w  f r o m  a n o t h e r .  I w i s h  o n l y  
t o  o b s e r v e  t h a t ,  i f  it were t o  t u r n  o u t  t h a t  n o  e x p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
r e l a t i o n  c a n  u l t i r n a t l e y  be g i v e n ,  it wou ld  n o t  f o l l o w  s t r a i g h t  away 
t h a t  t h e r e  r e a l l y  i s  n o  s u c h  r e l a t i o n ,  o r  t h a t  it i s  somehow s u s p e c t  
o r  ' n o n - f a c t u a l ' .  T h e r e  are many p r o p e r t i e s  a n d  r e l a t i o n s ,  s u c h  a s  
g o o d n e s s  o r  knowledge ,  wh ich ,  a r g u a b l y ,  a re  i n s u s c e p t i b l e  o f  a  
s a t i s f a c t o r y  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a n a l y s i s ,  b u t  wh ich  we s h o u l d  
n e v e r t h e l e s s  n o t ,  m e r e l y  o n  t h i s  a c c o u n t ,  t a k e  t o  b e  s u s p e c t .  
The  s e c o n d  comment c o n c e r n s  w h e t h e r  a  m e a n i n g  n a t u r a l i s t  m i g h t  
n o t  s i m p l y  c i r c u m v e n t  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  n a t u r a l i z i n g  t h e  n o r m a t i v e  
a s p e c t  o f  m e a n i n g  a l t o g e t h e r .  The n a t u r a l i s t  m i g h t  a r g u e ,  t h a t  i s ,  
t h a t  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  t h e  n o r m a t i v i t y  o f  mean ing  c a n  b e  a c c o u n t e d  
f o r  by  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  s p e a k e r s  a d h e r e  t o  t h e  v e r y  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e  
t h a t ,  ce te r i s  p a r i b u s ,  o n e  s h o u l d  s p e a k  t r u t h f u l l y ,  a n d  h e n c e  n e e d  
n o t  b e  d u e  t o  a n y  n o r m a t i v i t y  i n h e r e n t  i n  m e a n i n g .  Now, w h a t e v e r  t h e  
p r o m i s e  o f  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  g e n e r a l l y ,  i t  i s  n o t  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e  
t e l e o l o g i c a l  m e a n i n g  n a t u r a l i s t .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  t h e  p l a u s i b i l i t y  
o f  t e l e o l o g i c a l  m e a n i n g  n a t u r a l i s m  l i e s  p r e c i s e l y  i n  i t s  ( s u p p o s e d )  
a b i l i t y  t o  a c c o m o d a t e  t h e  n o r m a t i v e  a s p e c t  o f  m e a n i n g .  T h a t  i s ,  t h e  
t e l e o l o g i c a l  m e a n i n g  n a t u r a l i s t ' s  c l a i m  i s  t h a t  what  makes it 
plausible t h a t  t o k e n s  o f  a g i v e n  s i g n  t y p e  ' S f  i n  o r g a n i s m  0's 
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i d l . o l e c t 6  m a n  t h a t  it i s  t h e  case t h a t  K t  i s  t h a t ,  g i v e n  0's 
' d e s i g n ' ,  0 should p r o d u c e  a t o k e n  ' S t  when it i s  t h e  case t h a t  W 
( o r ,  0 makes a mistake i f  it p r o d u c e s  a t o k e n  o f  ' S f  when i t  i s  n o t  
t h e  c a s e  t h a t  W). Roughly s p e a k i n g ,  inasmuch as t h e  ( supposed)  f a c t  
t h a t  0 a n d  t h e  s i g n  t y p e  'St h a v e  c e r t a i n  t e l e o l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  
e n t a i l s  (ceteris p a r i b u s )  t h a t  0 s h o u l d  p r o d u c e  a t o k e n  of  \ S t  when 
i t  i s  t h e  case t h a t  W, a n d  inasmuch a s  ' S f ' s  meaning t h a t  W i s  t h e  
case i n  0's i d i o l e c t  a l s o  e n t a i l s  t h i s ,  it i s  t a k e n  t o  b e  p l a u s i b l e  
t h a t  f o r  0 a n d  \ S t  t o  h a v e  t h e s e  t e l e o l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  i s  j u s t  f o r  
' S t  t o  mean t h a t  W i s  t h e  case i n  0's i d i o l e c t .  T e l e o l o g i c a l  meaning 
n a t u r a l i s t s ,  t h e n ,  h a v e  no i n t e r e s t  i n  d e n y i n g  t h a t  f a c t s  a b o u t  
meaning e n t a i l  (ceteris  p a r i b u s )  n o r m a t i v e  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  
The t h i r d  a n d  l a s t  comment c o n c e r n s  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  n o r m a t i v i t y  
i n  q u e s t i o n .  One m i g h t ,  w i t h  some p l a u s i b i l i t y ,  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  t h e  
s e n s e  i n  which o n e  s h o u l d  (ceter is  p a r i b u s )  t e r m  o n l y  B ' s  'Pt i f  one  
means P by  P a n d  t h e  s e n s e  i n  which o n e  s h o u l d ,  s a y ,  a v o i d  
ha rming  u n n e c e s s a r i l y  o n e t s  n e i g h b o u r s ,  are d i f f e r e n t  s e n s e s .  I n  t h e  
f o r m e r  case, o n e  m i g h t  m a i n t a i n ,  o n e  s h o u l d  d o  t h e  a c t i o n  i n  
q u e s t i o n  b e c a u s e  it i s  o f  i n s t r u m e n t a l  v a l u e ;  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  
b e c a u s e  it i s  o n e ' s  m o r a l  d u t y .  Roughly s p e a k i n g ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  
be tween  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  i n  f a v o u r  o f  d o i n g  what i s  p r a c t i c a l  o r  
e x p e d i e n t ,  a n d  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  i n  f a v o u r  o f  d o i n g  what i s  right. 
And, o n e  m i g h t  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  whereas  t h e  l a t t e r  t y p e  o f  n o r m a t i v i t y  
i s  p r o b l e m a t i c  f o r  t h e  n a t u r a l i s t ,  t h e  f o r m e r  t y p e  i s  n o t .  Thus,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  l i n e  o f  t h o u g h t ,  t h e  v iew t h a t  n a t u r a l i z i n g  
meaning is  made p r o b l e m a t i c  by t h e  need t o  n a t u r a l i z e  t h e  n o r m a t i v e  
d e r i v e s  f r o m  a  c o n f u s i o n  as t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  n o r m a t i v i t y  i n  
60r l a n g a u g e  o f  t h o u g h t ,  as t h e  c a s e  may b e .  
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question. Now, the primary difficulty with this line of thought is 
not with the distinction between 'instrumentalf norms and 'puret 
norms7. The difficulty is, rather, with the claim that there is no 
problem in naturalizing the 'instrumental' normative consequences 
which follow from meaning facts. For, such instrumental normative 
claims do presuppose that the agent subject to the norms has 
interests or goals. For example, insofar as it is the case that an 
agent should avail herself of a l4" wrench, it is because the agent 
has some goal, such as to loosen a L" bolt. P.nd it is these mundane 
interests or goals which, I shall maintain, are insusceptible of 
naturalistic reduction. 
The basic problem, again, is to show that facts about what people 
mean reduce to uncontroversially naturalistic facts. It is 
reasonable to ask, before proceding further, just what 'naturalistic 
factsr, are. Formulating a general answer to this question, however, 
is a substantial project in itself. Fortunat~ly, since the aim here 
is merely to show that teleological meaning naturalism is an 
unworkable strategy, it will be sufficient to give a general 
characterization which includes all those kinds of facts which 
teleological meaning naturalists themselves take to be 
uncontroversially naturalisticB. 
Although meaning naturalists are not typically very voluble on 
the subject, there appears to be agreement that at least the 
following two kinds of facts count as naturalistic. First, there are 
7 I leave open the question as to whether this distinction can 
ultimately be defended. 
'By 'uncontroversially naturalist icf I mean naturalistic and 
not in need of beicg shown to be such. Teleological meaning 
naturalists take meaning facts to be naturalistic, but grant that 
they are not uncontroversially so. 
f a c t s  concerning t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n s  of t h ings .  A s  Nelson Goodman 
i n d i c a t e s ,  t h e r e  a r e  a  wide v a r i e t y  of f a c t s  of t h i s  kind: 
Perhaps we ought t o  no t i ce  a t  t h e  very beginning t h a t  more 
p red i ca t e s  than we sometimes suppose a r e  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  . . . 
To say t h a t  a  t h i n g  i s  hard, q u i t e  a s  much a s  t o  say t h a t  i t  
i s  f l e x i b l e ,  i s  t o  make a  statement about p o t e n t i a l i t y .  I f  a  
f l e x i b l e  ob jec t  i s  one capable of bending under pressure ,  a  
hard ob jec t  i s  one capable af  r e s i s t i n g  abras ion.  And f o r  t h a t  
mat te r ,  a  red  ob jec t  i s  l ikewise  one capable of c e r t a i n  color  
appearances under c e r t a i n  l i g h t s ;  and a  cub ica l  object  i s  one 
capable of f i t t i n g  t r y  squares and measuring instruments i n  
c e r t a i n  ways. (Goodman 1983,  p.40) 
Other examples a r e  t h a t  something has a  given mass o r  charge, t h a t  
it e x e r t s  a  c e r t a i n  g r a v i t a t i o n a l  fo rce ,  o r  simply t h a t  i t  i s  
f r a g i l e  o r  s l i p p e r y .  Inasmuch a s  each of t he se  f a c t s  concerns t h e  
" p o t e n t i a l i t i e s " ,  o r  " t h r e a t s  and promises" which a  given th ing  
holds,  they a r e  a l l  what might be c a l l e d  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  f a c t s .  What 
a l l  of t h e s e  f a c t s  have i n  common, i s  t h a t  i n  each case,  t h a t  t h e  
ob jec t  o r  substance i n  quest ion has t h e  proper ty  i n  quest ion i s  
d i r e c t l y  a s c e r t a i n a b l e  by t e s t i n g  o r  measuring t h e  object  o r  
substance.  NOW, cne way of cashing out what i t  i s  f o r  something t o  
have a  d i s p o s i t i c n  i s  t o  spec i fy  what would be t r u e  of it i f  
condi t ions  had been otherwise.  For example, f o r  something t o  be 
f l e x i b l e  a t  t ime t i s  f o r  it t o  be such t h a t ,  had i t  been subjected 
t o  s u i t a b l e  p ressure  a t  t i t  would have bent9 .  This suggests  t h a t  
we should a l s o  include,  toge ther  with d i s p o s i t i o n a l  f a c t s ,  f a c t s  
zbout what would be t h e  case  i f  condi t ions  were otherwise -?'. . c ; .  , t he  
f a c t s  s t a ~ e d  by counte r fac tua l  condi t iona l s .  
The secoi,d clas:; of f a c t s  which a r e  i~ncon t rove r s i a l l y  
n a t u r a l i s t i c ,  etiologica.:  2c;ct.-  ,, a ~ e  u;!;rke t h e  f i r s t  kind i n  
respec t  of t h e i r  t e s t a b i l i t y .  By ' e t i o l o g i c a l  f a c t s r ,  I mean such 
'~oodman 1983, p.35 -though see  a l s o  Goodman's q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  
on t h i s  po in t ,  pp.36-9. 
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facts as that marsupials evolved in Australasia, that certain 
mountains were formed by volcanic forces, or that a certain painting 
is an original Matisse. In each of these cases, what is in question 
is the causal history of the object. That a fazt such as this 
obtains, evidently, is not ascertainable merely by testing the 
object(s) in question. Tests may often provide very good evidence, 
but will underdetermine whether the fact in question obtains to tf:e 
extent that other causes can give rise to similar objects. 
Nevertheless, although there are perhaps contexts in which the 
factuality of etiological claims might be q~estioned'~, they are 
unproblematically factual from the point of view of the naturalist. 
An example of a class of claims which are not  uncontroversially 
naturalistic is the class of normative claims. Examples of such 
claims are that one ought not to kill, that one ought to keep one's 
promises, and that one should dress warmly in cold weather. 
Arguments which purport to show that such claims do not state 
naturalistic facts, or do not state any facts at all, are 
familiar". Arguments such as these, I take it, have been 
considered to be sufficiently persuasive that it is considered 
incumbent upon anyone who maintains that normative claims state 
naturalistic facts, to show that normative facts reduce to 
uncontroversially naturalistic facts. 
Now, if teleological meaning naturalism is correct, then 
teleological facts must reduce to uncontroversially naturalistic 
1°1.e., where scepticism about the past is an issue. 
"See, for example, Moore' s argument in Princip ia  Ethica .  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903, esp. §§5-14, and J.L. 
Mackiet s argument in his E t h i c s :  Inven t ing  Right and Wrong. New 
York: Penguin, 1977, esp. Ch. 1. 
19 
facts such as of the two kinds just cited. To see whether they do, 
it is important first to get clear on the conception of teleological 
facts at issue. When teleological meaning naturalists speak, say, 
of an organism's brain's going into a certain state as having a 
certain function or purpose, they evidently do not mean that the 
organism's brain's going into the state is part of some grand design 
for the Universe -that it serves some interest beyond the organism's 
(or its genes' or species') own. Putative facts about the Universe's 
design would evidently be less likely to be naturalistic than are 
the meaning facts they are supposed to explicate. Similarly (perhaps 
equivalently), they clearly do not mean that the organism's brain's 
going into the given state is somehow "causedw by some such thing 
as a destined end state of the Universe -that it is the effect of 
some "final cause1'. That is, they evidently do not intend to imply 
that there are causes at work beyond those countenanced by 
contemporary natural science. What teleological meaning naturalists 
apparently do mean in saying that an organism's brain's going into 
a certain state has a certain function, is rather that it (the 
organism's brain's going into the state) subserves the achievement 
of some purpose or aim or goal, or the fulfillment of some need, of 
the organism in question. The functional attributions in question, 
then, are much like, for example, the attribution to the metal fins 
on the back of an audio amplifier of the function of dissipating 
excess heat: serving the function of dissipating excess heat, and 
thereby keeping the amplifier at a suitable operating temperature, 
conduces to the fulfillment of the amplifier's purpose of magnifying 
with minimal distortion an input signal. 
There are two points to be remarked here. First, as has already 
been suggested, teleological facts appear to have normative 
consequences. Thus, for example, from the facts 
(i) that a system S has as its purpose to attain some end 
state E ,  
and 
(ii) that 5 behaves on an occasion in such a way as to make 
the attainment of E unlikely, 
it appears to follow directly that 
(iii) S behaves improperly-that S has failed in its purpose. 
Now, as with the supposed normativity of meaning, one could argue 
that the normative nature of this conclusion arises not from any 
inherent normative character of teleology, but from a suppressed 
premise to the effect that one ought to act so as to fulfill oners 
purposes12. Insofar as the teleological facts in question are taken 
to serve to naturalize the normative aspect of meaning without any 
such additional premise being assumed, however, this view is not 
open to teleological meaning naturalists. 
The second point is that it is essential to distinguish between 
something's having a teleological property, and its merely appearing 
to have a teleological property. That something should appear to 
have a purpose by virtue of its bchaviour, does not entail that it 
does. To illustrate this point, consider a machine which has two 
tracks, tank-style, which propel it, and two light sensors in place 
12~hat is, one could argue that the principle, 'Ceteris 
Paribus, ( x )  (p) [ (x has purpose p and x  acts so as to undermine the 
achievement of p) 4 ( x  acts improperly)lt, if true, is so only in 
virtue of some general normative premise(s), such as 'One ought, 
other things equal, to act so as to fulfill one's purposest. 
o f  e y e s L 3 .  The l i g h t  s e n s o r s  are c r o s s - c o n n e c t e d  t o  t h e  t r a c k  
m o t o r s ,  i n  s u c h  a way t h a t  l i g h t  s h i n i n g  on t h e  l e f t  s e n s o r  
i n c r e a s e s  t h e  s p e e d  c f  t h e  r i g h t  t r a c k ,  a n d  l i g h t  on t h e  r i g h t  
s e n s o r  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  s p e e d  o f  t h e  l e f t  t r a c k .  The r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  i s  
t h a t  t h e  mach ine  t e n d s  t o  steer t o w a r d  l i g h t  s o u r c e s .  When set  i n  
m o t i o n  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  l i g h t  s o u r c e ,  t h e n ,  t h i s  machine  w i l l  
h a v e  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  h a v i n g  as i t s  a im o r  g o a l  t o  r e a c h  t h e  l i g h t .  
T h i s  a p p e a r a n c e ,  however,  i s  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  t h e  mach ine ' s  h a v i n g  
q u i t e  a d i f f e r e n t  p u r p o s e ,  as  would i n t u i t i v e l y  b e  t h e  case i f  it 
had  b e e n  d e s i g n e d  t o  a v o i d  l i g h t  b u t  h a d  been  miswired, o r  no 
p u r p o s e  a t  a l l ,  as would  i n t u i t i v e l y  b e  t h e  c a s e  i f  t h e  machine  
somehow came i n t o  e x i s t e n c e  b y  p u r e l y  random p r o c e s s e s .  T h i s  p o i n t  
a p p l i e s ,  f u r t h e r m o r e ,  t o  s y s t e m s  which e x h i b i t  b e h a v i o u r  much more 
complex t h a n  t h a t  o f  t h e  machine  j u s t  d e s c r i b e d .  It seems e n t i r e l y  
p o s s i b l e  t h a t  a  s y s t e m  s h o u l d  b e h a v e  i n  q u i t e  complex ways which 
a p p e a r  t o  be g o a l - s e e k i n g ,  a n d  y e t  h a v e  no  g o a l  a t  a l l .  Indeed ,  
s c e p t i c s  a b o u t  t e l e o l o g y  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  no sys tem,  no m a t t e r  how 
complex t h e  b e h a v i o u r  e x h i b i t e d ,  h a s  a p u r p o s e  i n  any  o f  t h e  s e n s e s  
j u s t  c o n s i d e r e d 1 4 .  
P r o p o n e n t s  o f  t e l e o l o g i c a l  meaning n a t u r a l i s m  migh t  w e l l  o b j e c t  
t o  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  t h a t  t h e y  n e v e r  s u p p o s e d  t h a t  t h e  t y p e s  o f  
t e l e o l o g i c a l  f a c t s  j u s t  d i s c u s s e d  are c l e a r l y  n a t u r a l i s t i c .  Indeed ,  
t h e y  m i g h t  w e l l  c o n c e d e  t h a t  t h e y  are n o t  n a t u r a l i s t i c .  What t h e y  
had  i n  mind,  t h e y  m i g h t  s a y ,  a r e  f a c t s  a b o u t  s o - c a l l e d  biological 
I 3 ~ h i s  example  i s  drawn f rom from Valentine B r a i t e n b e r g ' s  book 
Vehicles (Cambridge,  Mass. : MIT p r e s s ,  1 9 8 4 ) ,  which d e s c r i b e s  a 
series o f  mach ines  which are meant t o  i l l u m i n a t e  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  
c e r t a i n  common b i o l o g i c a l  phenomena. 
1 4 c f .  W . V .  Q u i n e ,  P u r s u i t  o f  T r u t h .  R e v i s e d  edr n .  Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard ,  1992 .  p .75 .  
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f u n c t i o n s  o r  p u r p o s e s  o r  n e e d s ,  which a r e  n a t u r a l i s t i c .  U n l i k e  t h e  
t e l e o l o g i c a l  f a c t s  d i s c u s s e d  above ,  t h e  s t o r y  g o e s ,  b i o l o g i c a l  
f u n c t i o n s  o r  n e e d s  d o  n o t  make t h e  p r o b l e m a t i c  s u p p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
o r g a n i s m s  i n  q u e s t i o n  h a v e  p u r p o s e s  -al l  t h e y  s u p p o s e  i s  t h a t  t h e  
f u n c t i o n - p o s s e s s i n g  s u b s y s t e m s  ( o r g a n s )  o f  o r g a n i s m s  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  
t h e  o r g a n i s m s '  r e p r o d u c t i v e  s u c c e s s .  The p r o b l e m  which t h i s  r a i s e s  
f o r  t h e  mean ing  n a t u r a l i s t ,  however,  i s  t h a t  it a p p e a r s  t h a t  s u c h  
d e f l a t e d  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  n o t  c a p a b l e  o f  n a t u r a l i z i n g  t h e  n o r m a t i v e  
a s p e c t  o f  meaning15. The c r i t i c i s m  b e i n g  l e v e l l e d  a t  t e l e o l o g i c a l  
meaning n a t u r a l i s t s  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  is ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  t h a t  t h e y  
e q u i v o c a t e  be tween  t h e  two c o n c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  f a c t s  i n  
q u e s t i o n .  When d e f e n d i n g  t h e  n a t u r a l i s t i c  c r e d e n t i a l s  o f  t h e i r  
r e d u c t i o n ,  t h e y  t a k e  t h e  f a c t s  t o  b e  t e l e o l o g i c a l  o n l y  i n  t h i s  
d e f l a t i o n a r y ,   biological^ s e n s e .  The f a c t s  t h e y  i n v o k e  i n  r e d u c i n g  
t h e  n o r m a t i v e  a s p e c t  o f  meaning,  on  t h e  o t h e r  hand,  are, o f  
n e c e s s i t y ,  t e l e o l o g i c a l  i n  t h e  i n f l a t i o n a r y ,  n o r m a t i v e  s e n s e .  
I n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n ,  it w i l l  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  n o t i o n s  o f  
f u n c t i o n  o r  p u r p o s e  which f i g u r e  i n  b i o l o g i c a l  s c i e n c e  d o  n o t  
p r e s u p p o s e  t h a t  i t s  p o s s e s s o r s  are s u b j e c t  t o  norms.  It w i l l  t h e n  
r e m a i n  t o  show t h a t  t e l e o l o g i c a l  meaning n a t u r a l i s t s  r e a l l y  d o  need  
a more ' i n f l a t e d f  n o t i o n  o f  f u n c t i o n  t o  e f f e c t  t h e i r  r e d u c t i o n s .  
I1 
One o b v i o u s  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  some t e l e o l o g i c a l  
f a c t s  a r e  n a t u r a l i s t i c ,  i s  t h a t  i ) s t a t e m e n t s  a b o u t  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  
 gain, t h e  t a r g e t  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  i s  t h e  t h e o r i s t  who g r a n t s  
t h a t  mean ing  i s  n o r m a t i v e .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  one  migh t  a t t e m p t  t o  
n a t u r a l i z e  s e m a n t i c  n o t i o n s  non-normat ive ly  c o n c e i v e d ,  by means o f  
b i o l o g i c a l  f u n c t i o n s  -I r e s e r v e  judgement on  s u c h  a s t r a t e g y  h e r e .  
t h ings  appear t o  be t e l e o l o g i c a l  s tatements,  i i ) s u c h  statements 
sometimes f i g u r e  i n  b io log i ca l  explanat ions ,  and i i i ) b i o h o g i c a l  
explanat ions  a r e  ev iden t ly  n a t u r a l i s t i c .  A s  Robert Cummins  (Cumins 
1 9 7 5 )  has convincingly argued, however, t h e  reasons f o r  th ink ing  
t h a t  t h e  not ion of funct ion appealed t o  i n  b io log i ca l  explanations 
i s  a  genuinely t e l e o l o g i c a l  notion,  a r e  bad reasons, and the re  a r e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  accounts of t h e  notion -one of which Cummins gives- 
which a r e  not t e leo log ica l16 .  Although it should not be surpr i s ing ,  
on r e f l e c t i o n ,  t h a t  b io log i ca l  sc ience does not e n t a i l  t h a t  i t s  
ob j ec t s  of s tudy a r e  sub jec t  t o  norms o r  have ends, it i s  important 
t o  see ,  on t h e  one hand, how t h e  appearance can a r i s e  t h a t  i t  does, 
and on t h e  o the r  hand, how statements about t h e  func t ions  of th ings  
can appear i n  b io log i ca l  explanat ions  without t h e  explanat ionst  ipso 
f a c t o  being t e l e o l o g i c a l .  
An i l l u s t r a t i v e  example of a  statement concerning t h e  funct ion 
of a th ing ,  such a s  might be appealed t o  by a  b i o l o g i s t ,  i s ,  
(1) The func t ion  of t h e  lungs i n  organisms w i t h  lungs i s  t o  
oxygenate t h e  organismst blood. 
What i s  i n  quest ion i s  whether t h i s  b io log i ca l  claim presupposes 
t h a t  t h e  organisms of which t h e  lungs a r e  subsystems have some end 
o r  i d e a l  s t a t e ,  t h e  at tainment of which t h e  lungs con t r ibu te  toward, 
and which would se rve  t o  ground t h e  norrnativity of meaning. Cumins 
i d e n t i f i e s  two assumptions common t o  analyses  of function-ascribing 
s ta tements  which can suggest t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  case'?. These a r e ,  
1 6 ~ o  avoid confusion, i n  what fol lows,  only those  f a c t s  
concerning func t ions  which have t h e  normative consequences discussed 
above, w i l l  be c a l l e d  ' t e l e o l o g i c a l ' .  
1 7 ~ m i n s  argues t h a t  t he se  two assumptions a r e  f a l s e .  A s  my 
concern i s  merely t o  show how they can be misleading, I w i l l  not 
at tempt t o  defend Cwiains' c r i t i c i s m s .  
( A )  The p o i n t  o f  f u n c t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  i n  s c i e n c e  i s  t o  
e x p l a i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  i t e m  ( o r g a n ,  mechanism, p r o c e s s  o r  
w h a t e v e r )  t h a t  i s  f u n c t i o n a l l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e d .  
a n d  
(B) F o r  s o m e t h i n g  t o  p e r f o r m  i t s  f u n c t i o n  i s  f o r  it t o  h a v e  
c e r t a i n  e f f e c t s  o n  a c o n t a i n i n g  s y s t e m ,  which  e f f e c t s  
c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  some a c t i v i t y  o f ,  o r  t h e  
m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  some c o n d i t i o n  i n ,  t h a t  c o n t a i n i n g  s y s t e m .  
(Curnrnins 1975 ,  p . 7 4 1 )  
C o n s i d e r  f i r s t  a s s u m p t i o n  ( A ) .  Where s t a t e m e n t s  s u c h  as  s t a t e m e n t  
(1) are c o n c e r n e d ,  t h e  p l a u s i b i l i t y  of ( A )  i s  a p p a r e n t :  t h e  
a n a t o m i s t ,  upon  d i s c o v e r i n g  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  l u n g s  i n  a wide v a r i e t y  
o f  a n i m a l s ,  w i l l  n a t u r a l l y  wan t  t o  know why t h e y  o c c u r  where  t h e y  
d o .  An a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o r  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  l u n g s  i n  t h e  
a n i m a l s f  o v e r a l l  p h y s i o l o g y  seems  t o  a f f o r d  a n  a n s w e r  - t h e y  a re  
p r e s e n t  b e c a u s e  t h e y  f u l f i l l  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  o x y g e n a t i n g  t h e  b l o o d .  
I t  i s  a f a m i l i a r  p o i n t ,  t h o u g h ,  t h a t  t h e  * b e c a u s e f  h e r e  c a n n o t  b e  
t h e  \ b e c a u s e 1  w h i c h  f i g u r e s  i n  s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d  d e d u c t i v e -  
n o m o l o g i c a l  e x p l a n a t i o n s ,  i n a s m u c h  as s o m e t h i n g  o t h e r  t h a n  l u n g s  
m i g h t  h a v e  f u l f i l l e d  t h i s  f u n c t i o n " .  Some o t h e r  t y p e  o f  
e x p l a n a t i o n  m u s t  be i n  p l a y  h e r e ,  t h e n ,  s u p p o s i n g  t h a t  t h e  l u n g s 1  
f u n c t i o n  d o e s  somehow e x p l a i n  t h e i r  p r e s e n c e .  O ? e  t e m p t i n g  
a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  t o  c o n s t r u e  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o n  t h e  model  o f  
e x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  componen t s  o f  a r t e f a c t s  p r o d u c e d  b y  
r a t i o n a l  a g e n t s ,  a n d  i t  i s  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o n s t r u a l  wh ich  i s  o n e  
s o u r c e  o f  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  f u n c t i o n  a p p e a l e d  t o  i n  
s c i e n c e  i s  t e l e o l o g i c a l .  T h a t  s u c h  a c o n s t r u a l  c a n n o t  be 
c o u n t e n a n c e d  b y  b i o l o g i c a l  s c i e n c e  becomes  a p p a r e n t  when t h i s  
e x p l a n a t o r y  m o d e l  i s  e x a m i n e d .  
 ore s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  o b j e c t i o n  i s  t h a t  f r o m  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
x h a s  a s  i t s  f u n c t i o n  t o  y a n d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  f u n c t i o n  y i s  f u l f i l l e d  
i n  s y s t e m  S f  it d o e s  n o t  f o l l o w  t h a t  x i s  p r e s e n t  i n  S. 
2 5  
Where a r t e f a c t s  are c o n c e r n e d ,  t h e  p o i n t  o f  e x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e i r  c o m p o n e n t s  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  t o  s u p p l y  t h e  
a r t e f ac t ' s  c r e a t o r ' s  r e a s o n  f o r  p u t t i n g  t h e  component  i n  t h e  
a r t e f a c t .  Where a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  some componen t ' s  p r e s e n c e  a p p e a l s  
t o  t h e  componen t f  s f u n c t i o n ,  t h i s  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  b e c a u s e  t h e  
a r t e f a c t  was made t o  d o  s o m e t h i n g  - t o  a c h i e v e  o r  h e l p  a c h i e v e  some 
end- a n d  t o  c i t e  t h e  c o m p o n e n t ' s  f u n c t i o n  i s  t o  s a y  how t h e  
component  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  a r t e f a c t ' s  a c h i e v i n g  i t s  e n d ,  a n d  h e n c e  
t o  g i v e  t h e  c r e a t o r ' s  r e a s o n  f o r  p u t t i n g  i t  t h e r e  ( C f .  Cumrnins 1975 ,  
p . 7 4 6 ) .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i f  I a s k ,  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  c a r b u r e t o r  i n  a car 
e n g i n e ,  'Why i s  t h i s  h e r e ? ' ,  t h e  a n s w e r  w i l l  b e  t h a t  it i s  t h e r e  
( w a s  p u t  t h e r e  b y  t h e  d e s i g n e r )  t o  f u l f i l l  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  m i x i n g  
a i r  w i t h  t h e  g a s o l i n e ,  a n d  h e n c e  t o  p e r m i t  c o m b u s t i o n  a n d  t h e  
r u n n i n g  o f  t h e  e n g i n e .  Where e x p l a n a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  p r e s e n c e  
o f  c o m p o n e n t s  o f  n a t u r a l  s y s t e m s  are c o n c e r n e d ,  i n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e r e  
i s  n o  d e s i g n e r ,  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  whom t o  r a t i o n a l i z e ,  s o  t h i s  k i n d  
o f  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  i n a p p r o p r i a t e .  To be s u r e ,  it i s  s o m e t i m e s  s a i d  
t h a t  'Mother  N a t u r e '  d e s i g n e d  o r g a n i s m s  w i t h  l u n g s  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  
t h e  o x y g e n a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  b l o o d ,  b u t  t h i s  i s  a t  best a l o o s e  m e t a p h o r  
f o r  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  e v o l u t i o n .  I f  t h e  a i m  i s  t o  n a t u r a l i z e  mean ing  
f a c t s  v i a  t e l e o l o g i c a l  f a c t s  s u c h  a s  f a c t s  a b o u t  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  of 
t h i n g s ,  it e v i d e n t l y  w i l l  n o t  be acceptable t o  e x p l i c a t e  t h e  l a t t e r  
m e r e l y  i n  terms o f  'Mother  N a t u r e ' s  i n t e n t i o n s ' .  
I f  a p p e a l s  t o  'Mother  N a t u r e ' s  d e s i g n f  h a v e  a n y  s u b s t a n c e ,  it i s  
c l e a r l y  i n s o f a r  as t h e y  are j u s t  a c o l o u r f u l  way o f  t a l k i n g  a b o u t  
t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  e v o l u t i o n .  To g e t  c lear  o n  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  
e v o l u t i o n  a n d  f u n c t i o n ,  c o n s i d e r  n e x t  a s s u m p t i o n  (B). P r i m a  facie ,  
it i s  p l a u s i b l e  t h a t  s o m e t h i n g  l i k e  t h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  e x p l a i n s  t h e  
r o l e  of  f u n c t i o n a l  e x p l a n a t i o n s  i n  b i o l o g y ,  a n d  t h a t  it d o e s  t h i s  
i n  s u c h  a way as t o  e n t a i l  t h a t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  f u n c t i o n  u s e d  i n  
b i o l o g y  i s  t e l e o l o g i c a l .  C a r e f u l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  however,  shows t h a t  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  ( B )  which  c o n s t r u e  f u n c t i o n s  as t e l e o l o g i c a l  
e i t h e r  f a i l  t o  s p e c i f y  u n i q u e l y  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  o r  e lse  
make u n j u s t i f i e d  a s s u m p t i o n s .  T h i s  becomes a p p a r e n t  i n  a t t e m p t i n g  
t o  e l u c i d a t e  ( B )  . The n a t u r a l  g e n e r a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  f u n c t i o n  a s c r i b i n g  
s t a t e m e n t s  s u g g e s t e d  by (B) is, 
( 2 )  The f u n c t i o n  o f  a n  F i n  a  G i s  f j u s t  i n  c a s e  ( t h e  
c a p a c i t y  f o r )  f i s  a n  e f f e c t  o f  a n  F i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  a G i n  
t h e  u s u a l  way . . .  a n d  t h a t  e f f e c t  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  
p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  a f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t a i n i n g  G. (Cummins 1 9 7 5 ,  
p . 7 5 3 )  
A p p l y i n g  t h i s  t o  l u n g s ,  w e  g e t  
( 3 )  The f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  l u n g s  i n  a n  o r g a n i s m  i s  t o  o x y g e n a t e  
t h e  o r g a n i s m f  s b l o o d  j u s t  i n  c a s e  o x y g e n a t i n g  t h e  b l o o d  i s  a n  
e f f e c t  o f  l u n g s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  a n  o r g a n i s m  i n  t h e  u s u a l  way, 
a n d  o x y g e n a t i n g  t h e  b l o o d  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  a 
f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  o r g a n i s m .  
T h i s  l o o k s  l i k e  a  p r o m i s i n g  b e g i n n i n g ,  e x c e p t  t h a t  it makes t h e  
t r u t h  of  (1) c o n t i n g e n t  upon w h e t h e r  t h e r e  i s  some f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  
o r g a n i s m ,  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  which i s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  by  t h e  
o x y g e n a t i o n  o f  t h e  b l o o d .  A s  t h i n g s  s t a n d ,  t h e n ,  ( 2 )  y i e l d s  a n  
a n a l y s i s  of t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  l u n g s  i n  terms o f  some u n s p e c i f i e d  
f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  o r g a n i s m  as a  whole,  a n d  h e n c e  m e r e l y  s h i f t s  t h e  
p r o b l e m  o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  i n  q u e s t i o n .  
T h e r e  are two o p t i o n s  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h i s .  
The f i r s t  s u g g e s t i o n  f o r  r e c t i f y i n g  ( 2 )  i s  t o  modi fy  i t  by 
d r o p p i n g  t h e  r e f e r e n ~ d  t o  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t a i n i n g  s y s t e m :  
(2 ' )  The f u n c t i o n  o f  a n  F i n  a G i s  f j u s t  i n  case ( t h e  
c a p a c i t y  f o r )  f i s  a n  e f f e c t  of a n  F i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  a  G i n  
t h e  u s u a l  way. 
The p r o b l e m  w i t h  t h i s  s u g g e s t i o n  i s  t h a t  F ' s  w i l l  i n v a r i a b l y  h a v e  
e f f e c t s  w h i c h  are  n o t  i n  a n y  i n t u i t i v e  s e n s e  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n .  An 
e x a m p l e  w h e r e  l u n g s  are c o n c e r n e d  i s  t h e  small  a i r  movements  i n  t h e  
r e g i o n  o f  t h e  n o s t r i l s  w h i c h  t h e y  p r o d u c e .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  (2'1, it i s  
p a r t  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  l u n g s  t o  p r o d u c e  t h e  small a i r  movements 
wh ich  t h e y  h a p p e n  t o  p r o d u c e ,  a n d  t h i s  i s  i n t u i t i v e l y  n o t  p l a u s i b l e .  
I n d e e d ,  t h e  p o i n t  o f  s p e c i f y i n g  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  F which  i s  i t s  
f u n c t i o n  i s  t h a t  e f f e c t  wh ich  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  some f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  
c o n t a i n i n g  G, was p r e c i s e l y  t o  r u l e - o u t  s u c h  i n c i d e n t a l  e f f e c t s  as  
t h e  s m a l l  a i r  movements  c a u s e d  b y  t h e  l u n g s .  ( 2 ' ) ,  t h e n ,  i s  n o t  t h e  
s o l u t i o n .  The  s e c o n d  s u g g e s t i o n  f o r  r e c t i f y i n g  ( 2 )  i s  somehow t o  
s p e c i f y  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t a i n i n g  s y s t e m .  A s u g g e s t i o n  a l o n g  
t h e s e  l i n e s  f o r  b i o l o g i c a l  o r g a n i s m s  wh ich  Cummins c o n s i d e r s ,  a n d  
wh ich  s u r e l y  u n d e r l i e s  t h e  t h i n k i n g  o f  many p e o p l e  on  t h e  s u b j e c t ,  
i s  t h a t  t h e  r e l e v a n t  f u n c t i o n  o f  a n  o r g a n i s m  i s  t o  s u s t a i n  o r  
i n c r e a s e  i t s  speciesf n u m b e r s .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  
2  The  f u n c t i o n  o f  a n  F i n  a G i s  f' j u s t  i n  case ( t h e  
c a p a c i t y  f o r )  f i s  a n  e f f e c t  o f  a n  F i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  a G i n  
t h e  u s u a l  way a n d  f c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  o r g a n i s m ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  
s u s t a i n  o r  augmen t  i t s  speciesf numbers  ( C f .  Curnrnins 1975 ,  
p . 7 5 5 ) .  
S i n c e  t h e  l u n g s  o x y g e n a t i n g  a n  o r g a n i s m ' s  b l o o d  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  
o r g a n i s m ' s  s t a y i n g  a l i v e  a n d  h e a l t h y ,  wh ich  i n  t u r n  e n h a n c e s  i t s  
a b i l i t y  t o  augmen t  i t s  s p e c i e s  numbers ,  ( 2 ' )  y i e l d s  (I), a s  
d e s i r e d .  2 t h e n ,  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  a n  acceptable e x p l i c a t i o n  o f  
a s s u r r ~ p t i o n  ( B )  . 
Despite i t s  a p p a r e n t  a c c e p - L a b i l i t y ,  2  i s  p o t e n t i a l l y  
m i s l e a d i n g .  One m i g h t  t r y  t o  d e f e n d  (2") o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  it i s  
e x t e n s i o n a l l y  c o r r e c t  -i .e . ,  t h a t  t h o s e  c a p a c i t i e s  o f  s u b s y s t e m s  o f  
o r g a n i s m s  w h i c h  (3'') s p e c i f i e s  as t h e i r  f u n c t i o n s ,  are  i n d e e d  t h e  
c a p a c i t i e s  which b i o l o g i s t s  c l a i m  are t h e i r  f u n c t i o n s .  One p rob lem 
w i t h  t h i s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  as Cummins o b s e r v e s ,  i s  t h a t  it f a i l s  
e n t i r e l y  t o  t e l l  u s  why f i s  t a k e n  t o  be t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  F. A s  h e  
s a y s ,  c o n c e r n i n g  what amounts  t o  t h i s  s u g g e s t i o n ,  
. . . [  i t ]  would a t  most  t e l l  u s  which e f f e c t s  are p i c k e d  o u t  a s  
f u n c t i o n s :  i t  would p r o v i d e  no  h i n t  as t o  why t h e s e  e f f e c t s  
are p i c k e d  o u t  a s  i c u n c t i o n s .  W e  know why e v o l u t i o n a r y  
b i o l o g i s t s  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  e f f e c t s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  a n  
o r g a n i s m f  s c a p a c i t y  t o  m a i n t a i n  i t s  s p e c i e s ,  b u t  why c a l l  them 
f u n c t i o n s ?  (Cummins 1975,  p. 750)  . 
Now, as f a r  as  t h e  p r e s e n t  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  c o n c e r n e d ,  i f  o n e  were t o  
b a l k  a t  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m ,  a n d  a s s e r t  t h a t  2  i s  t h e  c o r r e c t  
a n a l y s i s  s i m p l y  i n  v i r t u e  o f  i t s  e x t e n s i o n a l  adequacy ,  t h e r e  n e e d  
n o t  be a n y  o b j e c t i o n .  By i t s e l f ,  2  i s  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  t h e  
s u p p o s i t i o n  t h a t  o r g a n i s m s  h a v e  no  aims o r  p u r p o s e s  a n d  t h a t  t h e i r  
s u b s y s t e m s t  h a v i n g  f u n c t i o n s  e n t a i l s  no n o r m a t i v e  c o n s e q u e n c e s ,  
which i s  a l l  t h a t  i s  b e i n g  c l a i m e d  h e r e .  I n s o f a r  a s  (2") is  t a k e n  
t o  i n d i c a t e  why t h e  r e l e v a n t  c a p a c i t i e s  o f  s u b s y s t e m s  o f  o r g a n i s m s  
are  t a k e n  t o  be f u n c t i o n s ,  however,  it depends  on a n  u n j u s t i f i e d  
t e l e o l o g i c a l  a s s u m p t i o n  ~ i z . ,  t h a t  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o r  a i m  o r  p u r p o s e  
o f  a n  o r g a n i s m  i s  t o  s u s t a i n  o r  i n c r e a s e  i t s  s p e c i e s t  numbers .  I t  
i s  t h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  which y i e l d s  (2") f rom ( 2 ) .  E v i d e n t l y ,  however,  
t h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  i s  n o t  j u s t i f i e d  by e v o l u t i o n a r y  t h e o r y :  
e v o l u t i o n a r y  t h e o r y  makes no a s s u m p t i o n s  a n d  d raws  no c o n c l u s i o n s  
a b o u t  a i m s  o r  p u r p o s e s  w h a t s o e v e r .  What t h e  t h e o r v  o f  e v o l u t i o n  s s y s  
i s ,  t o  a  f i r s t  a p p r o x i m a t i o n ,  no  more t h a n  t h a t  i f  t h e  p r o p e n s i t y  
o f  l u n g s  t o  o x y g e n a t e  b l o o d  i s  more c o n d u c i v e  t o  s u r v i v a l  t h a n  n o t ,  
t h e n ,  among c r e a t u r e s  o t h e r w i s e  i d e n t i c a l ,  t h o s e  w i t h  l u n g s  w i l l  
p r o l i f e r a t e  a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  t h o s e  w i t h o u t .  Any a s s u m p t i o n  t o  t h e  
e f f e c t  t h a t  it i s  a n  o r g a n i s m ' s  a i m  o r  p u r p o s e  t o  s u r v i v e  i s  
e v i d e n t l y  e x t r a n e o u s  t o  b i o l o g y .  
T h i s  p o i n t ,  it s h o u l d  be n o t e d ,  i s  n o t  a f f e c t e d  if o n e  t a k e s  
n a t u r a l  s e l e c t i o n  t o  ac t  s o l e l y  or p r i m a r i l y  a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  g e n e s ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  o r g a n i s m s  a n d  s p e c i e s I 9 .  Genes ,  
e v i d e n t l y ,  n o  more  h a v e  t h e  s o r t s  o f  a i m s  o r  p u r p o s e s  o r  g o a l s  which  
wou ld  f i x  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f ,  s a y ,  o r g a n s  o r  c e l l  s t r u c t u r e s  o r  
p r o t e i n s ,  a n d  t h e r e b y  d e t e r m i n e  norms f o r  t h e i r  b e h a v i o u r ,  t h a n  d o  
o r g a n i s m s .  To imbue  complex  p r o t e i n s  j o s t l e d  a b o u t  i n  c e l l  n u c l e i i  
w i t h  p u r p o s e s ,  a n d  t o  regard, s a y ,  a s i t e  o n  a g i v e n  r e p l i c a t e d  DNA 
m o l e c u l e  w h i c h  d o e s  n o t  m a t c h  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  s i t e  o n  t h e  m o l e c u l e  
f r o m  w h i c h  it was repl icated,  as a m i s t a k e ,  i s  c l e a r l y  n o  more  t h a n  
t o  a d o p t  a f a c o n  de p a r l e r ,  a l b e i t  o n e  p o s s i b l y  w i t h  c o n s i d e r b l e  
h e u r i s t i c  v a l u e .  
G i v e n  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i t h  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n s  r e v i e w e d  s o  f a r ,  
Cummins recommends r e j e c t i n g  ( A )  a n d  ( B )  i n  f a v o u r  o f  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  
a c c o u n t  o f  f u n c t i o n s  as  t h e y  o c c u r  i n  s c i e n t i f i c  e x p l a n a t i o n s .  
C u m i n s f  s u g g e s t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  f u n c t i o n a l  e x p l a n a t i o n s  
i n  n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e  i s  t o  e x p l a i n  g i v e n  c a p a c i t i e s  o f  c o n t a i n i n g  
s y s t e m s ,  r e l a t i v e  t o  a n a l y s e s  o f  t h e  c o n t a i n i n g  s y s t e m s  i n t o  
s u b s y s t e m s .  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  a f u n c t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i . o n  e x p l a i n s  how 
it i s  t h a t  a g i v e n  c o n t a i n i n g  s y s t e m  h a s  a g i v e n  c a p a c i t y ,  b y  
a p p e a l i n g  t o  t h e  c a p a c i t i e s  o f  i t s  component  s u b s y s t e m s ,  where  t h e  
c a p a c i t i e s  o f  t h e  s u b s y s t e m s  a p p e a l e d  t o  are t a k e n  t o  be t h e i r  
f u n c t i o n s  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s .  I n  C u m i n s '  words  
[ s u b s y s t e m ]  x f u n c t i o n s  a s  a 0 i n  [ c o n t a i n i n g  s y s t e m ]  s ( o r :  
t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  x i n  s i s  t o  @) r e l a t i v e  t o  a n  a n a l y t i c a l  
a c c o u n t  A o f  s's c a p a c i t y  t o  9 j u s t  i n  c a s e  x i s  c a p a b l e  o f  0- 
i n g  i n  s a n d  A a p p r o p r i a t e l y  a n d  a d e q u a t e l y  a c c o u n t s  f o r  s f s  
c a p a c i t y  t o  8 b y ,  i n  p a r t ,  a p p e a l i n g  t o  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  x t o  
@ i n  s .  ( C u m i n s  1 9 7 5 ,  p . 7 6 2 )  
l g ~ o r  a n  e x p o s i t i o n  o f  t h i s  v i e w ,  see, f o r  example ,  R i c h a r d  
Dawkins The Selfish Gene. O x f o r d :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 7 6 .  
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I f  t h i s  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  f u n c t i o n a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  i n  s c i e n c e  i s  c o r r e c t ,  
t h e n  what  b i o l o g i c a l  f u n c t i o n  a b o d i l y  o r g a n  h a s  i s  r e l a t i v e  t o  
b i o l o g i s t s t  e x p l a n a t o r y  p u r p o s e s ,  a n d  n o t  t o  any  p u t a t i v e  p u r p o s e s  
o f  t h e  o r g a n i s m  o r  o r g a n  i n  q u e s t i o n .  F o r  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  what i s  
i n t e r e s t i n g  a b o u t  t h i s  a c c o u n t  i s  t h a t  it i n  no way e n t a i l s  t h a t  t h e  
s y s t e m  i n  q u e s t i o n  h a s  a p u r p o s e  o r  e n d  o r  g o a l .  I n s o f a r  as a  non- 
t e l e o l o g i c a l  a c c o u n t  o f  b i o l o g i c a l  f u n c t i o n s  i s  t o  b e  p r e f e r r e d  t o  
a  t e l e o l o g i c a l  one ,  g i v e n  c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  whe ther  t e l e o l o g i c a l  f a c t s  
are n a t u r a l i s t i c ,  t h i s  a c c o u n t  i s  prima facie p r e f e r r a b l e  t o  any 
t e l e o l o g i c a l  a c c o u n t .  Any p r o p o n e n t  o f  t h e  v iew t h a t  b i o l o g i c a l  
f u n c t i o n s  are t e l e o l o g i c a l ,  t h e n ,  h a s  a t  l e a s t  t h e  burden  o f  showing 
t h i s  a c c o u n t  o f  Curriminsf t o  b e  f a l s e .  
I n  t h e  r e m a i n d e r  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  I p r o p o s e  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h r e e  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  examples  o f  t e l e o l o g i c a l  meaning n a t u r a l i s m .  I w i l l  
a r g u e  t h a t  none o f  t h e s e  makes a c o n v i n c i n g  c a s e  t h a t  t h e  
t e l e o l o g i c a l  f a c t s  r e q u i r e d  are n a t u r a l i s t i c ,  a n d  hence  t h a t  e a c h  
f a i l s .  
The f i r s t  example  o f  t e l e o l o g i c a l  meaning n a t u r a l i s m  t o  be 
c o n s i d e r e d  i s  d u e  t o  F r e d  D r e t s k e .  I n  h i s  p a p e r  ' M i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n '  
a n d  i n  h i s  E x p l a i n i n g  B e h a v i o r ,  D r e t s k e  sets o u t  a t h e o r y  o f  what 
it i s  f o r  s o m e t h i n g  -a b r a i n  s ta te  o f  some a n i m a l ,  say- t o  mean t h a t .  
t h e  w o r l d  i s  a  c e r t a i n  way. The t h e o r y  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  b e  a  
n a t u r a l i s t i c  t h e o r y  which s o l v e s  c e r t a i n  u n d e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
p r o b l e m s .  A s  w i l l  be s e e n ,  t h o u g h ,  f o r  p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e s ,  what i s  
i n t e r e s t i n g  a b o u t  D r e t s k e ' s  e x p o s i t i o n  i s  n o t  p r i m a r i l y  h i s  t h e o r y  
b u t  r a t h e r  h i s  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  p rob lem which t h e  t h e o r y  i s  
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s u p p o s e d  t o  s o l v e :  h e  t a k e s  t h e  p r o b l e m  t o  be i n  r e d u c i n g  mean ing  
f a c t s  t o  t e l e o l o g i c a l  f ac t s ,  a n d  d o e s  n o t  address t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  
r e d u c i n g t e l e o l o g i c a l  f a c t s t o  u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l l y  n a t u r a l i s t i c  f a c t s .  
The  basic  t a s k  w h i c h  D r e t s k e  se ts  i s  t o  e x p l a i n  how it i s  
p o s s i b l e  " f o r  p h y s i c a l  s y s t e m s  t o  misrepresent t h e  s ta te  o f  t h e i r  
s u r r o u n d i n g s "  ( D r e t s k e  1986,  p . 1 2 9 ) .  B e f o r e  s e t t i n g  o u t  a n d  
e v a l u a t i n g  D r e t s k e t s  p r o p o s a l ,  t w o  comments a re  i n  o r d e r .  F i r s t ,  
D r e t s k e  f o c u s s e s  o n  m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  
b e c a u s e  it i s  t h a t  r e l a t i o n  w h i c h  h o l d s  b e t w e e n  a s i g n  t o k e n  a n d  a 
s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  e v e n  t h o u g h  t h e  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  may n o t  o b t a i n ,  
wh ich  i s  a t  i s s u e .  As was o b s e r v e d  i n  s e c t i o n  I a b o v e ,  t h e  n o t i o n  
o f  m e a n i n g  a t  i s s u e  h e r e  i s  t h a t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  which  a  t o k e n  o f  a  
s i g n  t y p e  c a n  mean t h a t  a c e r t a i n  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  o b t a i n s  e v e n  when 
t h e  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  d o e s  n o t  o b t a i n  - i .e. ,  c a n  m i s r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
s t a t e  o f  t h e  w o r l d  ( D r e t s k e  1 9 8 8 ,  p p . 6 4 ,  5 ) .  
The  s e c o n d  comment i s  t h a t ,  as  D r e t s k e  o b s e r v e s ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  
t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  h e r e  b e t w e e n  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  p o w e r s  o f  s u c h  
t h i n g s  a s  maps a n d  s i g n p o s t s ,  wh ich  are p a r a s i t i c  upon t h e  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  p o w e r s  o f  i n t e n t i o n a l '  a g e n t s ,  a n d  t h e  u n d e r i v e d  o r  
' i n t r i n s i c f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  p o w e r s  o f  a' c e r t a i n  p r i v i l e g e d  se t  o f  
s i g n s  ( D r e t s k e  1988 ,  p p . 6 4 ,  5 ) .  Where maps a n d  s i g n ? o s t s  a r e  
c o n c e r n e d ,  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  p o w e r s  are  e v i d e n t l y  p a r a s i t i c  o n  
t h o s e  o f  i n t e n t i o n a l  a g e n t s ,  i nasmuch  as it i s  o n l y  b e c a u s e  
i n t e n t i o n a l  a g e n t s  a s s i g n  t h e m  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  r e p r e s e n t i n g  
s o m e t h i n g ,  t h a t  t h e y  a re  a n y t h i n g  more  t h a n  mere c o l o u r f u l  b i t s  o f  
paper o r  wood o r  w h a t e v e r .  Assuming,  however ,  t h a t  n o t  a l l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  p o w e r s  c a n  be pa r a s i t i c  i n  t h i s  way, o n  p a i n  o f  
i n f i n i t e  regress, t h e r e  mus t  b e  some s i g n s  whose r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  
powers  are i n t r i n s i c .  The p rob lem a t  hand i s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  how it i s  
t h a t  p h y s i c a l  s y s t e m s  c a n  h a v e  t h i s  i n t r i n s i c  power t o  r e p r e s e n t  a n d  
m i s r e p r e s e n t  t h e  w o r l d .  A s  D r e t s k e  s a y s ,  " [ w l h a t  w e  a r e  a f t e r  i s  
n a t u r e ' s  way of making a m i s t a k e ,  t h e  p l a c e  where t h e  
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  buck s t o p s . 1 1  ( D r e t s k e  1986, p . 1 3 1 ) .  
The f i r s t  s t e p  i n  D r e t s k e f s  a c c o u n t  i s  t o  draw a d i s t i n c t i o n  
be tween  what  h e  c a l l s  " n a t u r a l "  a n d  " f u n c t i o n a l "  m e a n i n g - h e n c e f o r t h  
'meaning,' a n d  'meaning,', r e s p e c t i v e l y .  D r e t s k e '  s n o t i o n  of  n a t u r a l  
meaning is ,  as h e  acknowledges ,  j u s t  t h e  o n e  a l r e a d y  e n c o u n t e r e d ,  
d u e  t o  Grice: a t o k e n  o f  a  n a t u r a l  s i g n  c a n  mean, t h a t  some s ta te  
o f  a f f a i r s  o b t a i n s ,  o n l y  i f  t h e  s ta te  o f  a f f a i r s  a c t u a l l y  o b t a i n s .  
Thus d a r k  c l o u d s  mean, t h a t  it w i l l  r a i n ,  o n l y  i f  it r e a l l y  w i l l  
r a i n .  I n s o f a r  as  meaning, i s  a r e l a t i o n  which d o e s  n o t  h o l d  between 
a t o k e n  n a t u r a l  s i g n  a n d  some s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  i f  t h e  s t a t e  o f  
a f f a i r s  d o e s  n o t  o b t a i n ,  it w i l l  n o t  s u f f i c e  t o  g i v e  a n  a c c o u n t  of  
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  Thus D r e t s k e  i n t r o d u c e s  meaning,, which he  
d e f i n e s  a s  f o l l o w s :  
d's b e i n g  G means, t h a t  w i s  F = d f s  f u n c t i o n  i s  t o  i n d i c a t e  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  w, a n d  t h e  way it p e r f o r m s  t h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s ,  
i n  p a r t ,  b y  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  w i s  F by  i t s  (d 's)  b e i n g  G. 
( D r e t s k e  1986,  p . 1 3 3 )  
F o r  example ,  t h e  a l c o h o l  i n  a the rmomete r  b e i n g  a t  t h e  h e i g h t  of  t h e  
"0 "C" mark means, t h a t  t h e  a m b i e n t  t e m p e r a t u r e  i s  0 O C ,  p r o v i d e d  
t h a t  it i s  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  the rmomete r  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  ambien t  
t e m p e r a t u r e ,  a n d  t h e  the rmomete r  d o e s  t h i s ,  i n  p a r t ,  by h a v i n g  i t s  
a l c o h o l  a t  t h e  h e i g h t  o f  t h e  "0 O C "  mark when t h e  t e m p e r a t u r e  i s  Q 
O C .  The c r u c i a l  p o i n t  h e r e  i s  t h a t  it r e m a i n s  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  t h e  
t h e r m o m e t e r ' s  a l c o h o l r s  b e i n g  a t  t h i s  h e i g h t  means, t h a t  i t  i s  0 O C ,  
e v e n  i f  t h e  the rmomete r  i s  somehow d e f e c t i v e  a n d  t h i s  happens  when 
t h e  t e m p e r a t u r e  i s  n o t  0 O C ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  thermometer  c o n t i n u e s  
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to have as its function to indicate the temperature. In short, the 
thermometer can misrepresent the state of the world. 
The problem posed by the definition of meaning,, as Dretske 
acknowledges, is to give a naturalistic account of what it is for 
d to have the function of indicating the condition of w. To 
illustrate what he takes to be the difficulty in solving this 
problem, Dretske proposes, and then criticizes, a relatively simple 
trial theory2'. His trial suggestion is that, in some cases at 
least, the function of some subsystem (organ) of an organism is to 
fulfill that information-gathering role which it has fulfilled in 
the course of the evolution of the organism, whereby the organism 
has been able to satisfy some 'biological needf. A biological need, 
here, is, "some thing or condition without which [the organism] 
could not survive" (Dretske 1986, p. 135) . To illustrate how this 
theory is supposed to work, Dretske gives an example. 
The example involves a certain type of marine bacteria found in 
the Northern Hemisphere. These bacteria have organelles called 
'magnetosomesf, which are magnetized and hence line-up with the 
prevalent (ge0)magneti.c lines of force. Provided that the bacteria 
are in the Northern hemisphere, the effect of this behaviour of 
their magnetosomes is to orient the bacterial cells such that they 
propel themselves away fromthe oxygen-rich water surface and toward 
the oxygen-poor depths. Since these bacteria cannot survive in the 
presence of oxygen, this is conducive to their survival. As Dretske 
observes, it may be tempting here, given the suggested theory, tc 
infer that it is the function of the magnetosomes to indicate the 
20~retske xplicitly compares this trial theory to the theory 
of Fodorfs which will be discussed below (Dretske 1986, p.136). 
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direction of relatively oxygen-poor water. According to this 
suggestion, then, a magnetosomers (dfs) being aligned in a given 
direction (being G) means, that the water ( w )  is relatively oxygen- 
poor in the given direction (is F), inasmuch it would be the 
function of the magnetosome's alignment to indicate the direction 
of oxygen-poor water. Thus, if the magnetosome should be aliyned 
such that the water is not oxygen-poor ahead (as would happen if the 
bacterium were displaced to the Southern hemisphere), then the 
magnetosome misrepresents the environment to the bacterial cell in 
which it resides. 
It has already been seen, in section I1 above, that the theory 
of what it is for a subsystem to have a function illustrated by this 
example, is inadequate to the naturalist's purposes. On the one 
hand, suppose that the organism's 'needsf, and hence also the 
organism's subsystem's functions, are taken to be genuinely 
teleological -i .e., that they presuppose that the organism has some 
end which it is aiming to fulfill, such that if the organism or its 
subsystem behaves so as to undermine the fulfillment of the end, it 
errs. In the present case, to suppose this is to suppose that the 
bacteria in question have it as their aim to avoid oxygen rich 
waters. It must be asked, supposing this, just which naturalistic 
facts entail that the bacteria have the aim of avoiding oxygen rich 
waters. Dretske says, without further explanation, that an organism 
has a need of something if having the thing is a precondition for 
its survival. Evidently, however, this is true, given the suggested 
sense of 'needf, only if some value is placed on survival -if 
survival is a matter of indifference, then the preconditions for 
survival can hardly be called 'needsf in the given sense. As long 
as an organism is regarded merely as a complex organic system, 
capa3ie of being in various states of which some correspond to its 
being alive, others dead, as biological science recommends, there 
is no question of its having aims or needs in the suggested sense. 
In short, the criticisms which were made in section I1 of proposal 
(2") apply here -the account goes through only if ultimately, the 
natural but pot naturalistic assumption is made that organisms have 
it as their aim to survive. On the other hand, suppose that the 
needs and functions here are not teleological in the relevant sense. 
The problem in this case will be that the grounds for taking d's 
being G when w is not F to be a misrepresentation, will be lost. If 
it is not in any sense the aim or purpose of magnetosomes to 
indicate the direction of oxygen-poor water (or whatever), then a 
given magnetosomers being oriented away from the oxygen-poor water 
is at most merely an occurence of an improbable (although 
statistically predictable) event. Intuitively, something more is 
needed to make it a misrepresentation -a misrepresentation is a 
mistake, a failure to represent properly2'. Dretsket s terminology 
at the beginning of 'Misrepresentation' reflects this thought: 
"Epistemology is concerned with knowledge: how do we manage to 
get things right? There is a deeper question: how do we manage 
to get things wrong? How is it possible for physical systems 
to misrepresent the state of their surroundings?" (Dret ske 
1986, p.129) , 
To misrepresent the state of one's environment is to get things 
wrong. Getting things wrong, though, requires having interests or 
values, and that a bacterium or human has these is not implied by 
biology. 
2 1 ~ n  the course of evaluating Fodor's theory, below, the 
suggestion will be evaluated that, notwithstanding this intuition, 
nothing more is needed for representation. 
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The p r o b l e m  which D r s t s k e  f i n d s  w i t h  h i s  t r i a l  t h e o r y  i s  n o t  t h e  
p r o b l e m  j u s t  r e h e a r s e d .  The d i f f i c u l t y  which h e  f i n d s ,  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  no p r i n c i p l e d  r e a s o n  f o r  c h o o s i n g ,  a s  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  
magnetosomes,  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  d i ~ e c t i o n  o f  oxygen-poor water. Why 
n o t ,  D r e t s k e  s a y s ,  t a k e  it t o  be t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  
geomagne t i c  n o r t h ,  o r  e v e n  j u s t  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  n o r t h  i n  t h e  l o c a l  
m a g n e t i c  f i e l d  (which m i g h t  b e  c a u s e d  by a  b a r  m a g n e t ) ?  Given t h e  
e n v i r o n m e n t  i n  which t h e  bacteria  e v o l v e d ,  t h e  magnetosomesl h a v i n g  
b e e n  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  a n y  o f  t h e s e  t h i n g s  would have  conduced t o  t h e  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  i t s  k i n d .  But ,  D r e t s k e  o b s e r v e s ,  which f u n c t i o n  t h e  
magnetosome h a s  a f f e c t s  c r u c i a l l y  what it  r e p r e s e n t s .  Suppose t h a t  
a  b a c t e r i u m  i s  d i s p l a c e d  t o  t h e  S o u t h e r n  Hemisphere .  I f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  
o f  i t s  magnetosome i s  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  oxygen-poor 
water, t h e n  t h e  magnetosome m i s r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  b a c t e r i u m ' s  
e n v i r o n m e n t  when it p o i n t s  n o r t h ,  whereas  i f  i t s  f u n c t i o n  i s  t o  
i n d i c a t e  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  geomagne t i c  n o r t h ,  it c o r r e c t l y  r e p r e s e n t s  
t h e  b a c t e r i u m f  s e n v i r o n m e n t .  Accord ing  t o  D r e t s k e ,  t h e  u p s h o t  o f  
t h i s  i s  t h a t  t h e  basic e v o l u t i o n a r y  a c c o u n t  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  l e a v e s  
i n d e t e r m i n a t e  what  t h e  s i g n  i n  q u e s t i o n  means,.  
I n s o f a r  a s  D r e t s k e  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  t h e  b a s i c  e v o l u t i o n a r y  
p r o p e r t i e s  j u s t  c o n s i d e r e d  o f  a n  o r g a n  o r  s u b s y s t e m  o f  a n  o rgan i sm,  
do  n o t  e n t a i l  t h a t  it h a s  a n y  p a r t i c u l a r  f u n c t i o n ,  h i s  p o s i t i o n  
a p p e a r s  t o  be c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  t h e s i s  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  t h a t  
t e l e o l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  are n o t  r e d u c i b l e  t o  n a t u r a l i s t i c  
p r o p e r t i e s .  T h i s ,  however,  i s  n o t  D r e t s k e r  s u l t i m a t e  v iew.  Al though 
h e  d o e s  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  where c e r t a i n  s i m p l e  o r g a n i s m s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  
b a c t e r i a  j u s t  c o n s i d e r e d ,  a r e  c o n c e r n e d ,  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  of  t h e i r  
o r g a n s  i s  i n d e t e r m i n a t e ,  h e  a r g u e s  t h a t  where more complex o rgan i sms  
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are  c o n c e r n e d ,  t h e r e  a re  n a t u r a l i s t i c  p r o p e r t i e s  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  
e v o l u t i o n a r y  p r o p e r t i e s  a l r e a d y  d i s c u s s e d  w h i c h  f i x  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  
o f  t h e  o r g a n i s m s f  i n t e r n a l  o r g a n s  o r  s u b s y s t e m s .  The  r e l e v a n t  
q u e s t i o n  h e r e  1s w h e t h e r  D r e t s k e ,  i n  t r y i n g  t o  s o l v e  t h e  
i n d e t e r m i n a c y  p r o b l e m ,  a l s o  s u c c e e d s  i n  a n s w e r i n g  t h e  k i n d  o f  
o b j e c t i o n  raised j u s t  a b o v e .  
D r e t s k e f s  p r o p o s a l  i s  t h a t  wha t  i s  n e e d e d  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  t h e  
f u n c t i o n  o f  a n  o r g a n  o r  s u b s y s t e m  s h o u l d  be f i x e d ,  i s  f i r s t ,  t h a t  
t h e r e  be r e d u n d a n t  mechan i sms  b y  wh ich  t h e  s u b s y s t e m r s  b e i n g  i n  a 
c e r t a i n  s t a t e  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  r e l e v a n t  s t a t e  o f  t h e  w o r l d ,  a n d  s e c o n d ,  
t h a t  t h e  i n d i c a t i o n  r e l a t i o n  wh ich  h o l d s  b e t w e e n  t h e  g i v e n  s t a t e  o f  
t h e  s u b s y s t e m  a n d  t h e  w o r l d ,  be a c q u i r e d  as  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  
a s s o c i a t i v e  l e a r n i n g .  The f i r s t  o f  t h e s e  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  more  
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  i s  t h a t  f o r  d t o  h a v e  as i t s  f u n c t i o n  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  
s t a t e  o f  w, t h e r e  m u s t  be more  t h a n  o n e  ' r o u t e f  by  wh ich  t h e  s t a t e  
o f  d i n d i c a t e s  t h e  s t a t e  o f  w. A d a p t i n g  s l i g h t l y  D r e t s k e f s  
i l l u s t a t i v e  e x a m p l e  o f  t h i s ,  i m a g i n e  a n  o r g a n i s m  which  h a s  e v o l v e d  
t o  a v o i d  a c e r t a i n  k i n d  o f  p l a n t .  The  o r g a n i s m  h a s  a  b r a i n  mechanism 
which  g o e s  i n t o  a c e r t a i n  s t a t e  e i ther  when t h e  o r g a n i s m ' s  s e n s o r y  
o r g a n s  are s t i m u l a t e d  b y  (wha t  smells l i k e )  t h e  p l a n t ' s  b u d s  i n  t h e  
s p r i n g t i m e  o r  (wha t  l o o k s  l i k e )  t h e  p l a n t ' s  l e a v e s  i n  t h e  
summer t ime .  S i n c e  t h e  mechan i sm ' s  b e i n g  i n  t h e  g i v e n  s t a t e  i s  a 
r e l i ab l e  i n d i c a t o r  o f  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  p l a n t  b u t  n o t  e i t h e r  o f  
t h e  b u d s  o r  o f  t h e  l e a v e s  a l o n e  ( s i n c e ,  d e p e n d i n g  on  t h e  s e a s o n ,  
e i t h e r  t h e  l e a v e s  o r  t h e  b u d s  w i l l  b e  a b s e n t ) ,  D r e t s k e  c o n c l u d e s  
--with o n e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n -  t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  
mechan i sm t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o r  a b s e n s e  o f  t h e  p l a n t .  The 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  wh ich  i s  t h e  s e c o n d  p a r t  o f  D r e t s k e r s  p r o p o s a l ,  i s  
r e q u i r e d  t o  p r e c l u d e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  
mechanismf s b e i n g  i n  t h e  g i v e n  s ta te  i s  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  d i s j u n c t i v e  
p r o p e r t y  o f  h a v i n g  a c e r t a i n  s m e l l  or l o o k i n g  a c e r t a i n  way. The 
a d d i t i o n a l  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  t h a t  t h e  s ta te  must  come t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  s ta te  o f  t h e  w o r l d  t h r o u g h  a s s o c i a t i v e  l e a r n i n g ,  s e r v e s  t o  
select  as t h e  s ta te  r e p r e s e n t e d ,  t h e  common c a u s e  o f  t h e  a v o i d a n c e  
b e h a v i o u r ,  o f  which t h e  s m e l l  a n d  l o o k  a r e  mere symptoms. 
The q u e s t i o n  a t  hand,  a g a i n ,  i s  w h e t h e r  D r e t s k e  c o n v i n c i n g l y  
d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  it i s  t h e  funct ion o f  t h e  g i v e n  o r g a n  o r  s u b s y s t e m  
t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  g i v e n  s t a t e  o f  t h e  w o r l d ,  i f  t h e  two s t a n d  i n  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  n a t u r a l i s t i c  r e l a t i o n  t o  o n e  a n o t h e r .  I d o  n o t  see t h a t  
h e  d o e s .  Of t h e  n a t u r a l i s t i c  p r o p e r t i e s  a p p e a l e d  t o ,  I do  n o t  see 
t h a t  a n y  e n t a i l s  t h a t  e i t h e r  t h e  o r g a n  o r  subsys tem,  o r  t h e  
c o n t a i n i n g  s y s t e m  ( o r g a n i s m ) ,  h a s  a n y  end ,  g o a l ,  f u n c t i o n  o r  p u r p o s e  
a t  a l l .  T h a t  a s u b s y s t e m  d comes, as a  r e s u l t  o f  a s s o c i a t i v e  
l e a r n i n g  o v e r  t i m e ,  t o  go  i n t o  s t a t e  G when w i s  F, i n  no way 
e n t a i l s  t h a t  it i s  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  d t o  be i n  G when w i s  F -d might  
w e l l  h a v e  no p u r p o s e  a t  a l l .  Nor do  matters change  i f  d i n d i c a t e s  
t h e  s t a t e  o f  w v i a  more t h a n  o n e  i n f o r m a t i o n a l  r o u t e ,  a s  i n  t h e  
example  o f  t h e  p l a n t - a v o i d i n g  o r g a n i s m  a b o v e .  Tha t  w t s  b e i n g  F 
s h o u l d  i n d u c e  d t o  become G v i a  more t h a n  o n e  c a u s a l  pathway d o e s  
n o t  i n  any  o b v i o u s  way e n t a i l  t h a t  it i s  d f s  p u r p o s e  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  
s t a t e  o f  w. 
The p r o b l e m  w i t h  D r e t s k e ' s  a c c o u n t  i s  e v i d e n t .  A f t e r  h a v i n g  
r e j e c t e d  t h e  b a s i c  t r i a l  t h e o r y  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  which he  i n i t i a l l y  
c o n s i d e r s ,  D r e t s k e  c o n s t r u e s  t h e  p rob lem t h u s :  
" . . . t h e  s t i c k y  q u e s t i o n  i s :  given t h a t  a s y s t e m  n e e d s  F, a n d  
given t h a t  mechanism M e n a b l e s  t h e  o r g a n i s m  t o  d e t e c t ,  
i d e n t i f y  cr r e c o g n i z e  F, how d o e s  t h e  mechanism c a r r y  o u t  t h i s  
f u n c t i o n ?  Does it d o  s o  by  r e p r e s e n t i n g  nearby Fs a s  nearby 
Fs o r  d o e s  i t ,  p e r h a p s ,  r e p r e s e n t  t h e m  m e r e l y  a s  nearby Gs, 
t r u s t i n g  t o  n a t u r e  ( t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  F a n d  G) f o r  t h e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  i t s  n e e d s ? "  ( D r e t s k e  1 9 8 6 ,  p. 1 3 9 .  D r e t s k e '  s 
e m p h a s e s )  
A s t i c k i e r  q u e s t i o n  t h a n  t h i s ,  I h a v e  b e e n  a r g u i n g ,  i s  w h e t h e r  f a c t s  
a b o u t  a t h i n g ' s  n e e d s  a r e  n a t u r a l i s t i c  f a c t s ,  a n d  h e n c e  c a n  be 
a c c e p t e d  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  a n a t u r a l i s t i c  t h e o r y  --whether  it  c a n  
be " g i v e n u  t h a t  a s y s t e m  n e e d s  F. I f  s u c h  f a c t s  a re  n a t u r a l i s t i c ,  
a s  D r e t s k e  a s s u m e s ,  t h e n ,  p l a u s i b l y ,  s o  a l s o  are  f a c t s  a b o u t  t h e  
f u n c t i o n s  o f  o r g a n i s m s f  s u b s y s t e m s ,  s i n c e ,  p l a u s i b l y ,  n e e d s  f i x  
f u n c t i o n s .  N o  r e a s o n  h a s  b e e n  g i v e n ,  however ,  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  f a c t s  
a b o u t  n e e d s  are n a t u r a l i s t i c ,  a n d  w e  h a v e  g o o d  r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  t n e y  are n o t .  
T h a t  D r e t s k e  f a i l s  t o  t a k e  s u f f i c i e n t  a c c o u n t  o f  t h i s  i s s u e ,  i s  
e v i d e n t  f r o m  a d i s c u s s i o n  b e t w e e n  R u t h  Garrett  M i l l i k a n  a n d  h im i n  
a symposium o n  h i s  Explaining Behavior which  a p p e a r e d  i n  1990 
( D r e t s k e  1 9 9 0  a n d  M i l l i k a n  1 9 9 0 a )  . M i l l i k a n  c r i t i c i z e s  D r e t s k e ,  
somewhat  as  I h a v e  h e r e ,  f o r  f a i l i n g  t o  g i v e  a n  a d e q u a t e  a c c o u n t  o f  
wha t  it  i s  f o r  s o m e t h i n g  t o  h a v e  a f u n c t i o n .  S h e  comments t h a t  
" D r e t s k e  q u i t e  s t u d i o u s l y  a v o i d s  c o m m i t t i n g  h i m s e l f  t o  a n y  
p a r t i c u l a r  n o t i o n  o f  ( i n t r i n s i c )  f u n c t i o n w  ( M i l l i k a n  1 9 9 0 a ,  p . 8 0 9 ) .  
D r e t s k e f s  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s  i s  t o  a c k n o w l e d g e  o p e n l y  t h a t  M i l l i k a n  
i s  r i g h t ;  t h a t  h e  d o e s  n o t  a t t e m p t  t o  s p e c i f y  i n  d e t a i l  what  mus t  
b e  t h e  case i n  o r d e r  f o r  s o m e t h i n g  t o  h a v e  a f u n c t i o n .  H i s  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  h i s  s i l e n c e  o n  t h i s  matter i s  t h a t  h e  c o n s i d e r s  
t h i s  n o t i o n  t o  be j u s t  o n e  among many -he c i t e s  c a u s a l i t y ,  
s e l e c t i o n ,  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  a n d  l e a r n i n g ,  among o t h e r s -  wh ich  it i s  
b e y o n d  t h e  p u r v i e w  o f  h i s  work t o  a n a l y s e .  D r e t s k e  g o e s  on  t o  s a y ,  
" a l l  I n e e d  i s  some p r o c e s s  i n  wh ich  a n  i n d i c a t o r  a c q u i r e s  a s p e c i a l  
s t a t u s  ( c a l l  i t  wha t  you w i l l ) ,  a s t a t u s  i n  wh ich  t h e r e  i s ,  among 
t h e  many t h i n g s  it i n d i c a t e s ,  some one  t h i n g  it i s  now supposed t o  
i n d i c a t e . "  ( D r e t s k e  1990,  p . 8 2 4 .  D r e t s k e f s  e m p h a s i s ) .  D r e t s k e f s  
l o c u t i o n  h e r e  i s  t e l l i n g .  The p r i m a r y  s e n s e  i n  which w e  u n d e r s t a n d  
s o m e t h i n g ' s  b e i n g  s u p p o s e d  t o  do such-and-such,  s u r e l y ,  i s  i n  i t s  
b e i n g  s u p p o s e d  by someone t o  d o  such-and-such.  Tha t  a n  i n d i c a t o r  i s  
s u p p o s e d  by some i n t e n t i o n a l  a g e n t  t o  i n d i c a t e  someth ing ,  however, 
i s  h a r d l y  t h e  s o r t  o f  n a t u r a l i s t i c  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  i n d i c a t o r  which 
D r e t s k e  n e e d s  f o r  h i s  a c c o u n t .  The whole p 3 i n t  of  h i s  a c c o u n t  of  
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  i n d e e d ,  was t o  e x p l a i n  how it i s  t h a t  s t a t e s  of 
p h y s i c a l  s y s t e m s  c a n  m i s r e p r e s e n t  t h e  wor ld ,  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  any 
i n t e n t i o n a l  a g e n t ' s  s u p p o s i t i o n s .  Now, D r e t s k e  would u n d o u b t e d l y  
p r o t e s t  t h a t  by " supposed  t o " ,  h e  d i d  n o t  mean lgsupposed b y  a n  
i n t e n t i o n a l  a g e n t  t o " .  The p r e s e n t  p o i n t ,  however,  i s  t h a t  i n  t h i s  
c a s e ,  what  D r e t s k e  owes u s ,  b u t  d o e s  n o t  p r o v i d e ,  i s  p r e c i s e l y  a n  
a c c o u n t  o f  what  " supposed  t o "  d o e s  mean, i n  t h i s  case. 
A second ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  p e r s p i c u o u s  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  t h e  s t r a t e g y  
which I am c r i t i c i z i n g  i s  a f f o r d e d  by  Ruth Garrett M i l l i k a n f s  u s e  
o f  " p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n s "  i n  t r y i n g  t o  n a t u r a l i s e  meaning a n d  r u l e -  
f o l l o w i n g 2 2 .  I n  a p a p e r  r e s p o n d i n g  t o  S a u l  K r i p k e f s  r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  
s c e p t i c i s m  ( M i l l i k a n  1 9 9 0 b ) ,  M i l l i k a n  p r o p o s e s  t o  concede  K r i p k e ' s  
p o i n t ,  c i t e d  i n  s e c t i o n  I above,  t h a t  r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  i s  n o r m a t i v e ,  
a n d  y e t  s t i l l  t o  show t h a t  it i s  n a t u r a l i s t i c .  She  s a y s ,  
The p r o b l e m  i s  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e  normative e l e m e n t  t h a t  i s  
i n v o l v e d  when o n e  means t o  f o l l o w  a r u l e ,  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e r e  
b e i n g  a standard f rom which t h e  f a c t s ,  o r  o n e f  s d i s p o s i t i o n s ,  
c a n  d i v e r g e .  ( p . 3 2 9 .  M i l l i k a n f s  e m p h a s e s ) .  
She c o n t i n u e s ,  
22Although some migh t  a r g u e  whe ther  t h e  i s s u e  i s  t h e  same where 
r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  i s  c o n c e r n e d  a n d  where l i n g u i s t i c  meaning i s  
c o n c e r n e d ,  it i s  c l e a r  f rom t h e  t e x t  t h a t  M i l l i k a n ,  l i k e  Kr ipke ,  
t a k e s  it t h a t  t h e y  are .  
In t h e  case  of meaning, t h e  normative element seems t o  be 
t h e  same a s  t h e  purposive element: t o  mean t o  follow a c e r t a i n  
r u l e  i s  t o  have a s  a  purpose t o  fol low it.  Whether my ac tua l  
d i s p o s i t i o n s  a r e  " r i gh t "  o r  Ifwrong" depends on whether they 
accord with what I have purposed. The pos s ib l e  divergence of 
f a c t  from a  s tandard i s ,  i n  t h i s  case,  simply t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  
acnieve a  purpose. ( p .  329) 
Her s t r a t e g y ,  then,  i s  t o  reduce fol lowing a r u l e  o r  using a word 
meaningfully t o  having c e r t a i n  purposes, where t he se  purposes 
u l t ima te ly  reduce t o  ' b io log ica l  purposesf ,  o r  what she c a l l s  
"proper funct ions"  (p .330) .  A s  w i l l  become evident ,  t h e r e  i s  an 
equivocation i n  Mil l ikan 's  account between a  notion of proper 
funct ion which i s  genuinely n a t u r a l i s t i c ,  but impotent f o r  her 
r e d u c t i v i s t  aims, and a  notion which i s  s u i t a b l e  f o r  her aims, but 
i s  not n a t u r a l i s t i c .  
Mil l ikan o r i g i n a l l y  s e t  out her account of t h e  notion of "proper 
func t ionf f  i n  her Language,  Though t  and O t h e r  B i o l o g i c a l  C a t e g o r i e s  
(Mill ikan 1984. See Ch.1, esp .  p . 2 8 ) .  A s  t h e  exact  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  
q u i t e  involved, however, and a s  it i s  given i n  terms which a r e  
themselves t echn ica l  terms introduced by Mill ikan,  we w i l l  s e t t l e  
f o r  a  paraphrase o f fe red  i n  a  l a t e r  paper:  
Pu t t i ng  t h ings  very roughly, f o r  a n  i tem A t o  have a  funct ion 
F a s  a "proper func t ionf f ,  it i s  necessary (and c lose  t o  
s u f f i c i e n t )  t h a t  one of t he se  two condi t ions  should hold. (1) 
A o r ig ina t ed  a s  a  f lreproduction" ( t o  g ive  one example, a s  a 
copy, o r  a  copy of a  copy) of some p r i o r  item o r  items t h a t ,  
due i n  p a r t  t o  possession of t h e  p rope r t i e s  reproduced, have 
a c t u a l l y  performed F i n  t h e  p a s t ,  and A e x i s t s  because 
( causa l l y  h i s t o r i c a l l y  because) of t h i s  o r  t he se  performances. 
( 2 )  A o r i g i n a t e d  a s  t h e  product of some p r i o r  device t h a t ,  
given i t s  circumstances, had performance of F a s  a  proper 
func t ion  and t h a t ,  under those  circumstances, normally caused 
F t o  be performed by means  of producing an item l i k e  A,, 
(Mill ikan 1989, p .288 ) .  
One po in t  worth not ing concerning t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,  i s  t h a t  i t  
de f ines  t h e  proper funct ion of A i n  terms of t h e  f u n c t i o n  of F, and 
hence by presen t  s tandards  i s  not an uncontrovers ia l ly  n a t u r a l i s t i c  
d e f i n t i o n .  S i n c e ,  however,  n o t h i n g  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  l o s t  i f  " t h e  
p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  a c t i a  F" i s  s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  "a f u n c t i o n  F" i n  t h e  
f i r s t  s e n t e n c e  o f  t h i s  p a s s a g e ,  g i v i n g  
I 1  
. . . f o r  a n  i t e m  A t o  h a v e  t h e  performance o f  ac t ion  F a s  a  
" p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n " ,  it i s  n e c e s s a r y  ( a n d  c l o s e  t o  s u f f i c i e n t )  
11 t h a t  . . . , 
a n d  s i n c e  p e r f o r m i n g  a n  a c t i o n  i s  a  n a t u r a l i s t i c  matter, I w i l l  t a k e  
M i l l i k a n  t o  h a v e  meant no  more t h a n  t h i s .  T h i s  h a v i n g  b e e n  s a i d ,  
what i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a b o u t  p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n s  i s  t h a t  a n  i t e m  A ' s  
h a v i n g  o n e  i s  s o l e l y  a m a t t e r  o f  A ' s  c a u s a l  o r i g i n s ,  a n d  of  t h e  
a c t i o n s  p e r f o r m e d  b y  A's  a n c e s t o r s 2 3 .  
The d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  " p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n w  as f a r  
a s  M i l l i k a n ' s  n a t u r a l i s t i c  p r o j e c t  i s  c o n c e r n e d ,  i s  t h a t  it w i l l  b e  
o f  no h e l p  i n  n a t u r a l i z i n g  t h e  n o r m a t i v e  a s p e c t  o f  meaning.  I f  A ' s  
h a v i n g  a  p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n  i s  s o l e l y  a m a t t e r  o f  i t s  h a v i n g  a c e r t a i n  
t y p e  o f  e t i o l o g y ,  t h e n  A's  h a v i n g  a  p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n  e n t a i l s  no 
n o r m a t i v e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  - t h a t  s o m e t h i n g  i s  d e s c e n d e d  i n  c e r t a i n  ways 
f rom a n c e s t o r s  o f  a c e r t a i n  k i n d ,  d o e s  n o t  e n t a i l  t h a t  t h e  t h i n g  
ought t o  do  a n y t h i n g  a t  a l l .  To see t h i s  more c l e a r l y ,  we can  
c o n s i d e r ,  i r o n i c a l l y ,  a c r i t i c i s m  which M i l l i k a n  h e r s e l f  d i r e c t s  
a g a i n s t  a r i v a l  a c c o u n t  o f  f u n c t i o n s ,  t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n  o r  c a p a c i t y -  
b a s e d  a c c o u n t .  
M i l l i k a n  d e f e n d s  h e r  v iew a g a i n s t  a c c o u n t s  which r e d u c e  h a v i n g  
a p u r p o s e  o r  f u n c t i o n  t o  h a v i n g  c e r t a i n  c u r r e n t  d i s p o s i t i o n s  o r  
c a p a c i t i e s ,  by  a r g u i n g  t h a t  h a v i n g  s u c h  d i s p ~ s i t i o n s  o r  c a p a c i t i e s  
i s  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  n o t  h a v i n g  any  p u r p o s e  o r  f u n c t i o n  a t  a l l .  
M i l l i k a n  t a k e s  it upon h e r s e l f  t o  c r i t i c i z e  t h e  d i s p o s t i o n / c a p a c i t y  
2 3 ~ h e s e  comments c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  d e f i n i t j . o n  o f  " p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n "  
a p p l y  a l s o  t o  M i l l i k a n ' s  o r i g i n a l  d e f i n i t i o n  i n  M i l l i k a n  1 9 8 4 .  
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a c c o u n t  o f  f u n c t i o n  b e c a u s e  it i s  a r i v a l  t o  h e r  e t i o l o g i c a l  
a c c o u n t ,  a n d  m o r e o v e r  o n e  wh ich  d o e s  n o t  h a v e  a c e r t a i n  c o u n t e r -  
i n t u i t i v e  i m p l i c a t i o n  w h i c h  t h e  e t i o l o g i c a l  a c c o u n t  d o e s  h a v e .  The 
c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e  i m p l i c a t i o n  i n  q u e s t i o n  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  
o n  t h e  e t i o l o g i c a l  a c c o u n t ,  f o r  t w o  o b j e c t s  --two ( a p p a r e n t )  h e a r t s  
o r  c a r b u r e t o r s  o r  can -opene r s -  t o  be p h y s i c a l l y  i d e n t i c a l ,  a n d  y e t  
f o r  o n e  t o  h a v e  a p u r p o s e  o r  f u n c t i o n  a n d  t h e  o t h e r  n o t .  Thus ,  
s u p p o s e  t h a t ,  b y  a n  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  f r e a k  o f  n a t u r e ,  a p e r f e c t  
d u p l i c a t e  o f  me s p o n t a n e o u s l y  came i n t o  b e i n g ,  ex nihilo, as it were 
( C f .  M i l l i k a n  1989 ,  p . 2 9 2 ) .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  M i l l i k a n ' s  e t i o l o g i c a l  
a c c o u n t ,  t h e  \ h e a r t r  i n  t h i s  d u p l i c a t e  wou ld  n o t  h a v e  a s  i t s  
f u n c t i o n  t o  pump my d u p l i c a t e f s  b l o o d  -it would  n o t  h a v e  a n y  
f u n c t i o n  o r  p u r p o s e  a t  a l l ,  s i n c e  it wou ld  n o t  h a v e  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
c a u s a l  h i s t o r y .  On t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n / c a p a c i t y  a c c o u n t ,  b y  c o n t r a s t ,  
my d u p l i c a t e  wou ld  be i d e n t i c a l  t o  me i n  r e s p e c t  o f  f u n c t i o n a l  
p r o p e r t i e s .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  it i s  i n t u i t i v e  t h a t  my p h y s i c a l  
d u p l i c a t e  s h o u l d  be my t e l e o l o g i c a l  d u p l i c a t e ,  t h e n ,  t h e  
d i s p o s i t i o n a l / c a p a c i t y  v i e w  i s  prima facie more  p l a u s i b l e  t h a n  
M i l l i k a n f s  e t i o l o g i c a l  v i e w .  
M i l l i k a n f s  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s  i s  t o  b i t e  t h e  b u l l e t ,  a n d  m a i n t a i n  
t h a t  my d o u b l e ' s  h e a r t  h a s  n o  f u n c t i o n .  S h e  c l a i m s  t h a t  w e  s h o u l d  
n o t  be f o o l e d  b y  t h e  s u p e r f i c i a l  s i m i l a r i t y  b e t w e e n  my d o u b l e  a n d  
m e ;  b y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t s  o r g a n s  h a v e  a l l  o f  t h e  s i g n s  o f  h a v i n g  
p u r p o s e s .  The  r e a s o n  why w e  m i g h t  be f o o l e d ,  s h e  s u g g e s t s ,  i s  t h a t  
n o t h i n g  c l o s e  t o  s u c h  a d u p l i c a t e  i s  e v e r  e n c o u n t e r e d  i n  r e a l i t y .  
N o t h i n g  wh ich  w e  m i g h t  e n c o u n t e r  i n  t h e  n o r m a l  c o u r s e  o f  e v e n t s  
w h i c h  h a s  t h e  p r e c i s e  p h y s i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f ,  s a y ,  a h e a r t  e n s c o n c e d  
i n  a body ,  f a i l s  t o  h a v e  t h e  r e q u i s i t e  e t i o l o g y  f o r  it t o  h a v e  as  
i t s  f u n c t i o n ,  t o  pump b l o o d .  Any d i s p o s i t i o n s  o r  capacities which 
a p h y s i c a l  s y s t e m  m i g h t  have ,  t h e n ,  are "marks o f  p u r p o s i v e n e s s " ,  
b u t  t h a t ' s  a l l  t h e y  a r e .  M i l l i k a n  comments, 
[ T h e r e  d o  n o t ]  i n  f a c t  e x i s t  c o m p l i c a t e d  g o a l - d i r e c t e d  items, 
o r  i t e m s  d i s p l a y i n g  c o m p l i c a t e d  n e g a t i v e  f e e d b a c k  mechanisms,  
o r  i tems t h a t  d o  a n y t h i n g  l i k e  " r e g i s t e r i n g 1 '  s i t u a t i o n s ,  o r  
items w i t h  i n t e r e s t i n g  Cummins f u n c t i o n s ,  t h a t  d o  n o t  i n  f a c t  
h a v e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n s .  Having t h e  r i g h t  s o r t s  o f  
c u r r e n t  p r o p e r t i e s  a n d  d i s p o s i t i o n s  i s  i n  p o i n t  o f  f a c t ,  i n  
o u r  w o r l d ,  a n  i n f a l l i b l e  i n d e x  o f  h a v i n g  p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n s .  I f  
you l i k e ,  it i s  c r i t e r i a l  -as  c r i t e r i a l ,  s a y ,  a s  t h e  r e d  o f  
t h e  l i t m u s  paper i s  o f  a c i d i t y .  But  it i s  n o t  t u r n i n g  l i t m u s  
p a p e r  r e d  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  a c i d i t y ,  n o r  i s  it h a v i n g  t h e  r i g h t  
s o r t  o f  c u r r e n t  p r o p e r t i e s  a n d  d i s p o s i t i o n s  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  
a t h i n g ' s  h a v i n g  a p u r p o s e .  To t h e  d e g r e e  t h a t  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  
c o n t e m p o r a r y  d e s c r i p t i o n s  i n  t e r m s  o f  c u r r e n t  p r o p e r t i e s  o r  
d i s p o s i t i o n s  i s  s u c c e s s f u l ,  e a c h  d e s c r i b e s  o n l y  a mark o f  
p u r p o s i v e n e s s ,  n o t  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  s t r u c t u r e .  ( M i l l i k a n  1989,  
p . 2 9 3 .  M i l l i k a n '  s emphases )  . 2 4  
T h i s  c e r t a i n l y  seems c o r r e c t .  A l though  it may o f t e n  be t h e  c a s e  t h a t  
o b j e c t s  which  hava a  c e r t a i n  f u n c t i o n  a l s o  h a v e  c e r t a i n  complex 
d i s p o s i t i o n a l  p r o p e r t i e s ,  some o b j e c t ' s  h a v i n g  t h e s e  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  
p r o p e r t i e s  i s  n o t  what c o n s t i t u t e s  i t s  h a v i n g  t h e  f u n c t i o n  t h a t  it 
d o e s .  I t  i s  e n t i r e l y  c o h e r e n t  t o  s u p p o s e  t h a t  a n  o b j e c t  h a s  t h e s e  
d i s p o s i t i o n a l  p r o p e r t i e s ,  b u t  h a s  no  f u n c t i o n  o r  p u r p o s e  - in  t h e  
s e n s e  o f  h a v i n g  a n  a i m  o r  g o a l -  a t  a l l .  
The r u b  h e r e ,  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no r e a s o n  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  i s  a n y  d i f f e r e n t  where  M i l l i k a n f s  e t i o l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  
are c o n c e r n e d .  Thus,  s u p p o s e  t h a t  some o b j e c t  x ( e . g . ,  a  h e a r t  o r  
t h y r o i d  g l a n d )  w i t h  p r o p e r t y  P ( e . g . ,  a  c e r t a i n  m e c h a n i c a l  o r  
b i o l o g i c a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n ) ,  came t o  e x i s t  i n  v i r t u e  o f  t h e r e  h a v i n g  
b e e n  i n  t h e  p a s t  some o b j e c t  o r  o b j e c t s  w i t h  p r o p e r t y  P which t e n d e d  
t o  b e h a v e  i n  a  c e r t a i n  way b ( e . g . ,  t o  c i r c u l a t e  b l o o d  o r  t o  s e c r e t e  
2 4 ~ n  t h i s  p a s s a g e ,  M i l l i k a n  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  a s s u m i n g  t h a t  " h a v i n g  
a p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n "  a n d  " h a v i n g  a p u r p o s e "  a r e  synonymous. S i n c e  t h i s  
i s  j u s t  what  i s  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  I t a k e  t h i s  t o  b e  a n  o v e r s i g h t  on h e r  
p a r t .  
4 5  
c e r t a i n  h o r m o n e s ) ,  where  it was t h i s  b e h a v i o u r  o f  x 's  a n t e c e d e n t s  
which,  i n  pa r t ,  c a u s e d  x t o  come t o  b e .  To a f i r s t  a p p r o x i m a t i o n ,  
t h i s ,  f o r  M i l l i k a n ,  i s  a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  x's h a v i n g  i t  a s  
i t s  f u n c t i o n  t o  b e h a v e  i n  way b. But why s h o u l d  t h i s  b e  s o ?  It i s  
e n t i r e l y  c o h e r e n t  t h a t  x s h o u l d  h a v e  t h e  e t i o l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  
it d o e s ,  a n d  y e t  h a v e  no f u n c t i o n  a t  a l l ,  i f  it i s  b e i n g  assumed 
t h a t  h a v i n g  a f u n c t i o n  i s  a matter o f  h a v i n g  a  r o l e  i n  t h e  
f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  some g o a l .  T h e r e  s i m p l y  i s  n o t  a n y  p r i m a  f a c i e  
c o n c e p t u a l  r e l a t i o n  be tween  h a v i n g  a c e r t a i n  c a u s a l  h i s t o r y ,  a n d  
h a v i n g  a c e r t a i n  g o a l ,  which  j u s t i f i e s  M i l l i k a n '  s a s s e r t i o n  o f  t h e i r  
e q u i v a l e n c e .  T h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  i n  t h e  e t i o l o g i c a l  a c c o u n t ,  i n d e e d ,  
which impugns t h e  t e n a b i l i t y  o f  s c e p t i c i s m  a b o u t  t e l e o l o g i c a l  
p r o p e r t i e s  i n  g e n e r a l .  T h i s  p o i n t  i s  r e i n f o r c e d  b y  t h e  v e r y  
e v o l u t i o n a r y  t h e o r y  which i n s p i r e d  t h e  e t i o l o g i c a l  a c c o u n t  i n  t h e  
f i r s t  p l a c e .  Darwin ' s  g r e a t  a c h i e v e m e n t ,  p r e s u m a b l y ,  was t o  show 
t h a t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  l i f e  on e a r t h  c a n  be e x p l a i n e d  w i t h o u t  
a p p e a l i n g  t o  a n y  p u t a t i v e  t e l e o l o g i c a l  f a c t s  o r  p r i n c i p l e s  - t h a t  t h e  
p h y s i c a l  laws a n d  f a c t s  acknowledged  by t h e  b a s i c  p h y s i c a l  s c i e n c e s  
are s u f f i c i e n t  t o  e x p l a i n  how w e  g o t  h e r e .  The t h e o r y  of  e v o l u t i o n ,  
t h e n ,  i s  e n t i r e l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  s c e p t i c i s m  a b o u t  t e l e o l o g i c a l  
p r o p e r t i e s ,  a n d  h e n c e  w i t h  t h e  v iew t h a t  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  of 
e t i o l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  i s  n o t  a  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  
p o s s e s s i o n  of  t e l e o l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s .  I n s o f a r  a s  t h i s  i s  s o ,  
M i l l i k a n ' s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n s  a n d  p u r p o s e s  c a n n o t  
be c o r r e c t .  I t  i s  o f  c o u r s e  a n  o p t i o n  f o r  M i l l i k a n  t o  deny t h a t  
f a c t s  a b o u t  p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n s  o r  ' p u r p o s e s t ,  a s  s h e  u n d e r s t a n d s  them, 
are r e a l l y  t e l e o l o g i c a l ,  a n d  e n t a i l  a n y  n o r m a t i v e  c o n s e q u e n c e s .  I f  
s h e  f o l l o w s  t h i s  r o u t e ,  however,  t h e n  p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n s  w i l l  b e  o f  
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no use in accounting for the normative aspect of meaning, which she 
has acceded to. 
The last proposal to consider is due to Jerry Fodor. Fodorf s 
paper 'Psychosemanticsf (Fodor 1984a)'~ sets out an unabashedly 
teleological theory of meaning, which is at the same time clearly 
supposed to be a naturalistic theory. It is worth noting that Fodor 
published this paper, at the request of an arithologist, only after 
he had already renounced the theory set forth in it26. The reason 
for going to the bother of criticizing it is that, as the 
anthologist notes27, the theory has a measure of currency among 
some philosophers, despite Fodorfs reservations. 
'Psychosemanticsf takes as its starting point that a certain 
theory of mind, which Fodor calls 'The Representational Theory of 
Mindf, or RTM, is true. This theory is broadly characterisable in 
terms of two hypotheses. The first is that token propositional 
attitudes, such as token believings that p, are relations between 
individuals and token mental representations, where these 
representations are sentences constructed out of an internal system 
of symbols -a 'language of thoughtf. The second hypothesis is that 
mental processes, such as the drawing of inferences, are just 
computational operations on sentences of this language of thought, 
where this is possible in virtue of the syntactic properties of the 
symbols. Fodor does not purport in 'Psychosemantics' to defend this 
theory: his project is, rather, to give the framework for a theory 
 his paper should not be confused with Fodor's book of the 
same name (Fodor 1 9 8 7 ) .  
26~ee the editorf s note, Fodor 1984a, p.312. 
o f  m e a n i n g  f o r  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  t h o u g h t  o n  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  o n e .  
G i v e n  t h a t  t h e  m i n d / b r a i n s  o f  c o g n i t i v e  a g e n t s  are p o p u l a t e d  w i t h  
s t r i n g s  o f  s y m b o l s ,  as RTM a s s u m e s ,  t h e  c h a l l e n g e  i s  t o  g i v e  a n  
a c c o u n t  o f  how t h e s e  symbo l  s t r i n g s  come t o  h a v e  t h e  t r u t h  
c o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h  t h e y  are s u p p o s e d  t o .  T h a t  is ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s ,  
wha t  makes  t h e s e  symbo l  s t r i n g s  representations? As F o d o r  o b s e r v e s  
( F o d o r  1 9 8 4 a ,  p . 3 1 7 ) ,  t h e r e  are a n y  number o f  m a p p i n g s  f r o m  m e n t a l  
s y m b o l s  o n t o  s ta tes  o f  a f f a i r s  i n  a g e n t s f  e n v i r o n m e n t s .  The  p r o b l e m  
i s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  what  i s  special t o  t h e  mapp ing  wh ich  t a k e s  s y m b o l s  
o n t o  t h e i r  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n s ,  wh ich  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  i t  f r o m  a n y  o t h e r ,  
a r b i t r a r y  mapp ing ,  a n d  makes  t h e  symbo l  s t r i n g s  t r u e  o f  what  t h e y  
are r e s p e c t i v e l y  mapped o n t o :  
. . .  t h e r e  i s  s o m e t h i n g  special a b o u t  t h e  s o r t  o f  symbol-wor ld  
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  t h a t  t r u t h  d e f i n i t i o n s  s p e c i f y ;  s o m e t h i n g  t h a t  
shrnuth [ i . e .  a n y  o t h e r ,  a r b i t r a r i l y  c h o s e n ]  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  
d o e s n ' t  h a v e ;  s o m e t h i n g  i n  v i r t u e  o f  w h i c h  f a c t s  a b o u t  t h e i r  
t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n s  i l l u m i n a t e  t h e  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  s y m b o l s  i n  a  
way t h a t  f a c t s  a b o u t  t h e i r  shrnuth c o n d i t i o n s  d o  n o t .  Well, 
- 
y e s ;  b u t  wha t  c o u l d  t h i s  m y s t e r y  i n g r e d i e n t  b e ?  ( F o d o r  1 9 8 4 a ,  
p . 3 1 7 ) .  
The  o n l y  c o n s t r a i n t  wh ich  F o d o r  e x p l i c i t l y  makes  o n  a n y  t h e o r y  
s p e c i f y i n g  t h i s  r e l a t i o n ,  i s  t h a t  it c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  r e l a t i o n  
' M e n t a l  symbo l  M h a s  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  S f  i n  n o n - s e m a n t i c  a n d  non- 
i n t e n t i o n a l  t e r m s  --the p o i n t  o f  t h e  t h e o r y  i s  n o t  m e r e l y  t o  
c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  t r u t h  r e l a t i o n  i n  some o t h e r  s e m a n t i c  o r  
i n t e n t i o n a l  t e r m s .  G iven  F o d o r ' s  aim o f  d e m y s t i f y i n g  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
t h e  r e l a t i o n  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  t h o u g h ,  a n  a c c o u n t  wh ich  e x p l i c a t e s  i t  i n  
t e r m s  o f  a n  e q u a l l y  o p a q u e  o r  m y s t e r i o u s  n o t i o n  o f  t e l e o l o g y  would  
e v i d e n t l y  n o t  b e  a d e q u a t e  e i t h e r .  What i s  e v i d e n t l y  b e i n g  s o u g h t  i s  
a n a t u r a l i s t i c  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  RTM, some c o g n i t i v e  a g e n t  0's h a v i n g  a b e l i e f  t h a t  
S c o n s i s t s  i n  0's s t a n d i n g  i n  some r e l a t i o n  R* t o  some m e n t a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  M whose  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  i s  S .  F o r  h e u r i s t i c  p u r p o s e s ,  
F o d o r  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  w e  i m a g i n e  t h a t  f o r  0 t o  bear R* t o  M i s  j u s t  
f o r  0 t o  h a v e  a t o k e n  o f  t h e  m e n t a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  M i n  a c e r t a i n  
memory s l o t  i n  i t s  b r a i n ,  a s l o t  wh ich  F o d o r  c a l l s  t h e  "yes-box".  
Thus ,  i f  M h a s  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  S a n d  0 h a s  a t o k e n  o f  M i n  i t s  y e s -  
box ,  t h e n  0 b e l i e v e s  t h a t  S .  Now, t o  g e t  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  what  makes 
S t h e  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  o f  M, F o d o r  makes  a n  a s s u m p t i o n  wh ich  h e  
c h a r a c t e r i z e s  as t e l e o l o g i c a l .  T h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  i s  t h a t ,  among t h e  
v a r i o u s  c o g n i t i v e  mechan i sms  wh ich  e i t h e r  add o r  remove t o k e n  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  t o  o r  f r o m  t h e  yes-box,  t h e r e  i s  a s u b s e t  whose 
function i s  t o  a d d  o r  remove  t h e m .  F o d o r f s  t h e o r y  i s  t h a t  it i s  t h e  
n o r m a l  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e s e  mechan i sms  wh ich  f i x  t h e  t r u t h  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  m e n t a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s .  More e x a c t l y ,  
The t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  o f  0's m e n t a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  M i s  S i f f  
(when 0's c o g n i t i v e  mechan i sms  are f u n c t i o n i n g  n o r m a l l y ,  a 
t o k e n  o f  M i s  p u t  i n t o  0's yes-box i f f  S o b t a i n s 2 ' ) .  
The k e y  i s s u e  h e r e  i s  wha t  it i s  f o r  a c o g n i t i v e  mechanism t o  
' f u n c t i o n  n o r m a l l y t .  F o d o r  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  " f o r  h e u r i s t i c  a n d  
e x p o s i t o r y  p u r p o s e s " ,  we c a n  a s sume  t h a t  a c o g n i t i v e  mechanismf  s 
n o r m a l  f u n c t i o n  i s  t o  such-and-such ,  i f  it was by  d o i n g  such-and-  
s u c h  t h a t  t h e  c o g n i t i v e  mechanism g a v e  t o  0's a n c e s t o r s  a  
s e l e c t i o n a l  a d v a n t a g e  ( F o d o r  1984a ,  p p . 3 2 3 ,  4 ) .  The idea,  t h e n ,  i s  
t h a t  wha t  makes  S t h e  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  o f  M i s  t h a t  t o k e n s  o f  M b e i n g  
 odor p u t s  t h i s  p o i n t  i n  terms o f  " e n t r y  c o n d i t i o n s v t ,  where  
" t h e  e n t r y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  . . .  M i s  t h a t  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  s u c h  t h a t ,  
when f u n c t i o n i n g  n o r m a l l y ,  ( t h e  c o g n i t i v e  s y s t e m  b r i n g s  i t  a b o u t  
t h a t  M i s  i n  t h e  y e s  b o x )  i f f  ( t h e  e n t r y  c o n d i t i o n  i s  s a t i s f i e d ) "  
( p . 3 2 4 ) .  
p u t  i n t o  t h e  yes-box when S o b t a i n e d  conduced  t o  t h e  s u r v i v a l  a n d  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of O f  s a n c e s t o r s 2 9 .  
An example  which i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  i d e a  i s  t h e  u b i q u i t o u s  c a s e  o f  
t h e  f r o g ' s  v i s u a l  s y s t e m .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  n e u r o b i o l o g i s t s ,  when a b l a c k  
s p o t  s u b t e n d i n g  a n  a n g l e  be tween  l o  a n d  3" a p p e a r s  i n  a  f r o g r  s 
v i s u a l  f i e l d ,  c e r t a i n  g r o u p s  o f  n e u r o n s  i n  t h e  f r o g ' s  b r a i n  are 
c a u s e d  t o  a l t e r  t h e i r  p a t t e r n  o f  e l e c t r i c a l  a c t i v i t y  ( L e t t v i n  e t  
a l . ,  1 9 5 9 ) .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  RTM, when t h i s  o c c u r s ,  what happens  i s  t h a t  
t h e s e  n e u r o n s  c a u s e  a t o k e n  m e n t a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  -MF, c a l l  it- t o  
b e  p u t  i n t o  t h e  f r o g ' s  yes-box.  The t h e o r y  a b o v e  c l a i m s  t h a t  t h e  
t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  o f  MF i s  t h a t  t h e r e f  s a  f l y  a b o u t  i f f  [when t h e s e  
g r o u p s  o f  n e u r o n s  i n  t h e  f r o g ' s  b r a i n  are f u n c t i o n i n g  n o r m a l l y  
- i . e . ,  f u n c t i o n i n g  i n  t h a t  way which,  i n  t h e  f r o g ' s  a n c e s t o r s ,  gave  
them a s e l e c t i o n a l  advan tage-  MF i s  p u t  i n t o  t h e  yes-box i f f  t h e r e ' s  
a f l y  a b o u t ]  . 
The f o r e g o i n g  i s  a  v e r y  b r i e f  e x p o s i t i o n  o f  F o d o r ' s  t h e o r y ,  one  
which l e a v e s  o u t  a number o f  i m p o r t a n t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .  The p r e c i s e  
d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  t h e o r y ,  however,  are n o t  a t  i s s u e  h e r e .  What i s  a t  
i s s u e  i s  w h e t h e r  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  f u n c t i o n  which f i g u r e s  i n  i t  i s  
r e a l l y  n a t u r a l i s t i c ,  a n d  i f  i t  is ,  w h e t h e r  it i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
r e d u c e  mean ing  f a c t s  i n  t h e  manner Fodor  s u p p o s e s .  Given t h a t  h e  
" d i s l i k e  [ s ]  v u l g a r i z e d  Darwinism i n t e n s e l y "  (Fodor  1984a,  p .  3 2 3 ) '  
a n d  h e n c e  a p p e a l s  t o  e v o l u t i o n  o n l y  as  a  h e u r i s t i c ,  o n e  migh t  e x p e c t  
Fodor  t o  s a y  more a b o u t  what i n  g e n e r a l  makes it t h e  c a s e  t h a t  a n  
o r g a n i s m  h a s  t h e  t e l e o l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  which would c o n f e r  upon i t s  
2 9 ~ o d o r f s  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  t h e  a p p e a l  t o  e v o l u t i o n  t o  f i x  
f u n c t i o n s  i s  m e r e l y  h e u r i s t i c ,  i s  d u e  i n  part  t o  h i s  n o t  w a n t i n g  t h e  
t r u t h  o f  h i s  a c c o u n t  t o  rest  on t h e  t r u t h  o f  e v o l u t i o n a r y  b i o l o g y ,  
a s  w e l l  as t o  h i s  d i s t a s t e  f o r  what h e  c a l l s  " v u l g a r i z e d  Darwinism".  
c o g n i t i v e  s y s t e m s  normal  f u n c t i o n s .  On t h i s  p o i n t ,  however, Fodor 
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s a y s  m e r e l y  t h a t  h e  assumes  t h a t  " t h e  t r u t h  ( / f a l s i t y )  o f  
t e l e o l o g i c a l  a s c r i p t i o n s  h a s  s o m e t h i n g  t o  d o  w i t h  t h e  t r u t h  
( / f a l s i t y )  of  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s " ,  b u t  a d m i t s  t h a t  h e  
d o e s n ' t  know j u s t  which  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s  t h e s e  are (Fodor  1984a,  
p . 3 2 3 ) .  H i s  u n e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  p r o f f e r e d  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  
e v o l u t i o n a r y  a c c o u n t  o f  t e l e o l o g y ,  t h e n ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s  are " f a c t s  a b o u t  n a t u r a l  s e l e c t i o n ;  f a c t s  o f  t h e  
t y p e  selection wouldn't have applied in the way it did but that . 
. ." ( p . 3 2 3 ,  F o d o r f  s e m p h a s i s  a n d  e l l i p s i s ) .  The normal  f u n c t i o n s  
of  c o g n i t i v e  s y s t e m s ,  l i k e w i s e ,  are s p e c i f i e d  i n  terms o f  
. . .  f o r  t h e  c o g n i t i v e  s y s t e m  o f  a n  o r g a n i s m  t o  b e  f u n c t i o n i n g  
n o r m a l l y  i s  f o r  i t  t o  b e  t r u e  o f  t h a t  s y s t e m  t h a t  it would d o  
such-and-such i f  it were t h e  c a s e  t h a t  so-and-so . . .  (Fodor  
1984a ,  p . 3 2 3 )  . 
The g e n e r a l  f o r m  o f  t h e  p r o p o s a l ,  t h e n ,  i s ,  
[ C o g n i t i v e  s y s t e m  S i s  f u n c t i o n i n g  n o r m a l l y  i f f  S would d o  x 
i f  it were t h e  case t h a t  y] i f f  [ s e l e c t i o n  wouldn ' t  h a v e  
a p p l i e d  i n  t h e  way it d id  ( i . . ,  g i v i n g  u s  o r g a n i s m s  w i t h  
c o g n i t i v e  s y s t e m  S) b u t  t h a t  S d i d  x when i t  was t h e  c a s e  t h a t  
Y I 
Now, a l t h o u g h  Fodor  c a l l s  t h e  f a c t s  a b o u t  normal  f u n c t i o n s  i n  
q u e s t i o n  h e r e  " t e l e ~ l o g i c a l : ~ ,  t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  i n  t h i s  p rogram f o r  
e x p l i c a t i n g  what n o r m a l  f u n c t i o n s  a n d  t e l e o l o g i c a l  f a c t s  g e n e r a l l y  
a r e ,  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  p o s s e s s o r s  o f  normal  f u n c t i o n s  h a v e  aims, and  
t h a t  t h e y  a r e  l i a b l e  t o  n o r m a t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n .  Prima facie, t h e n ,  it 
a p p e a r s  t h a t  F o d o r ' s  s t r a t e g y  i s  n o t  t o  a p p e a l  t o  a g e n u i n e l y  
t e l e o l o g i c a l  n o t i o n  of  f u n c t i o n  t o  t r y  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e  n o r m a t i v e  
n a t u r e  o f  meaning,  b u t  r a t h e r  t o  t r y  t o  g i v e  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  meaning 
i n  e n t i r e l y  non-normat ive  terms. T h a t  i s ,  it l o o k s  f rom t h i s  p a s s a g e  
as t h o u g h  Fodor  i s  n o t  making t h e  p r o b l e m a t i c  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  D r e t s k e  
a n d  M i l l i k a n ,  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a n o t i o n  o f  f u n c t i o n  which i s  
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  n a t u r a l i s t i c  a n d  n o r m a t i v e .  I n  f a c t ,  however, it i s  
clear f rom F o d o r f s  own, l a te r  c r i t i c i sm o f  t h i s  a c c o u n t  o f  meaning,  
t h a t  h e  d o e s  i n t e n d  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  normal  f u n c t i o n  h e r e  t o  be 
t e l e o l o g i c a l  i n  t h e  s t r o n g  s e n s e .  As h e  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  t h e  a c c o u n t  
i n  h i s  book P s y c h o s e m a n t i c s ,  t h e  t h e o r y  j u s t  summarized h o l d s  t h a t  
f o r  a c o g n i t i v e  s y s t e m  t o  be f u n c t i o n i n g  n o r m a l l y  i s  f o r  it t o  be 
f u n c t i o n i n g  as it i s  "supposed  t o "  -i.e., as  it would i n  "op t imal"  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  He g o e s  s o  f a r  as  t o  s a y ,  
The t e l e o l o g y  s t o r y  p e r h a p s  s t r i k e s  o n e  as p l a u s i b l e  i n  t h a t  
i t  u n d e r s t a n d s  o n e  n o r m a t i v e  notion-truth-in terms o f  
a n o t h e r  n o r m a t i v e  n o t i o n - o p t i m a l i t y .  (Fodor  1987,  ~ . 1 0 6 ) ~ '  
The n o t i o n  o f  t e l e o l o g y  j u s t  c i t e d ,  t h e n ,  i s  e v i d e n t l y  n o t  a  
n a t u r a l i s t i c a l l y  i n n o c e n t  n o t i o n  a c c o r d i n g  t o  which t e l e o l o g i c a l  
f a c t s  h a v e  no n o r m a t i v e  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  
The fo rm o f  t h e  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  t h e o r y  t h u s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  s h o u l d  
b e  f a m i l i a r  by now. F o d o r f s  b a s i c  claim i s  t h a t ,  g i v e n  a  s u i t a b l e  
e v o l u t i o n a r y  h i s t o r y ,  ( c o g n i t i v e  s y s t e m  S  i s  f u n c t i o n i n g  n o r m a l l y )  
i f f  (S  would do  x if it were t h e  c a s e  t h a t  y ) ,  f o r  a c e r t a i n  x a n d  
y. Now, i f  S  were n o t  a n  e v o l v e d  sys tem,  t h e n ,  g i v e n  t h a t  x a n d  y 
a r e  m e r e l y  t h e  i n i t i a t i n g  o f  c e r t a i n  b r a i n  p r o c e s s e s  a n d  t h e  
o b t a i n i n g  o f  c e r t a i n  p h y s i c a l  f a c t s  a b o u t  t h e  wor ld ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
n e i t h e r  S t s  d o i n g  x when it i s  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  y n o r  S t s  d o i n g  x when 
i t  i s  t h e  case t h a t  not-y, would have  n o r m a t i v e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  any 
k i n d .  Bu t ,  a s  h a s  b e e n  s e e n ,  n e i t h e r  h a v i n g  a n  e v o l u t i o n a r y  h i s t o r y ,  
n o r  h a v i n g  a  c a u s a l  r o l e  i n  t h e  o n g o i n g  c o u r s e  o f  e v o l u t i o n ,  have 
 or f u r t h e r  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  f u n c t i o n  h e r e  i s  
meant t o  be t e l e o l o q i c a l  i n  t h e  s t r o n g  s e n s e ,  see h i s  
con temporaneous  p a p e r  ' ~ e m a n t i c s ,  Wiscons in  s tyief  (Fodor  1984b,  e s p  . 
p . 2 4 7 )  
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any normative implications either, by themselves. Presunably, then, 
'cognitive system S is functioning normallyf is not in any way 
normative either. But 'functioning normallyf is meant to be 
equivalent to 'functioning as it is supposed tof -i . e . ,  'optimallyf- 
which is taken to have normative implications. Evidently, the 
normativity in question is being 'smuggled inf, rather than deriving 
from the naturalistic facts at issue. The conclusion, then, is that 
the source of the attractiveness of teleological meaning naturalism, 
that it reduces the apparent normativity of meaning to the putative 
naturalistic normativity of 'normal functionsf, is specious -there 
was never any normativity in nature to begin with. 
Part of the reason for belabouring this point by going after this 
long-since rejected theory of Fodor's, is that although this 
criticism, if it is fair, is fundamental to what is wrong with 
teleological meaning naturalism, it is not the criticism which Fodor 
makes. Indeed, he even says that he is "not sure that this 
teleology/oprimality account is false..." (Fodor 1987, p.105), 
whereas if the criticisms above are valid, it must be false. Fodorf s 
criticism is, rather, that it appears that "there is no guarantee 
that the kind of optimality that teleology reconstructs has much to 
do with the kind of optimality that the explication of 'truthf 
requires" (p.106). The view that meaning naturalism is compatible 
with the thesis that meaning facts are normative, then, is left 
unscathed by Fodor's criticism. 
As already mentioned, an alternative approach, which Fodor might 
have taken, is to take the so-called teleological facts mentioned 
in the account not to be teleological in the sense described in 
Section I above -i.e., to take them not to presuppose that the 
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o r g a n i s m s  i n  q u e s t i o n  h a v e  a n y  e n d  o r  g o a l ,  r e l a t i v e  t o  which 
b e h a v i o u r  c a n  be e v a l u a t e d  as  r i g h t  o r  wrong.  On t h i s  c o n s t r u a l ,  t h e  
m a t t e r  of w h e t h e r  p r o p e r t i e s  s u c h  as h a v i n g  a  g o a l  o r  p u r p o s e  a r e  
n a t u r a l i s t i c  i s  n o t  r e a l l y  germane t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  problem,  a f t e r  
a l l ,  inasmuch  as t h e  f u n c t i o n s  a p p e a l e d  t o  n e e d  n o t  be t e l e o l o g i c a l  
i n  t h e  s e n s e  o f  b e i n g  s u b o r d i n a t e  t o  a g o a l  o r  p u r p o s e .  A l l  t h a t ' s  
r e a l l y  needed ,  on t h i s  v iew,  i s  t h a t  t h o s e  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s  i n  terms 
o f  which o n e  would a n a l y s e  t h e  g i v e n  t e l e o l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s ,  are 
t r u e  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  c o g n i t i v e  mechanisms.  Thus, w h a t ' s  r e a l l y  a t  
i s s u e  where  mean ing  n a t u r a l i s m  i s  c o n c e r n e d ,  i s  whe the r  meaning 
p r o p e r t i e s  c a n  be a n a l y s e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e s e  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s .  
I t  was r e m a r k e d  a t  t h e  o u t s e t  o f  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  Fodor ,  t h a t  
h e  r e n o u n c e d  t h e  t e l e o l o g i c a l  t h e o r y  se t  f o r t h  i n  ' P s y c h o s e m a n t i c s t  
e v e n  b e f o r e  h e  permitted t h e  p a p e r  t o  be p u b l i s h e d .  The v iew i n  
f a v o u r  o f  which  h e  r e j e c t e d  t h e  t e l e o l o g i c a l  t h e o r y  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  j u s t  s u g g e s t e d  - t h a t  t h e  meaning r e l a t i o n  c a n  b e  
r e d u c e d  d i r e c t l y  t o  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  w i t h o u t  a n y  a p p e a l  t o  
t e l e o l o g y  ( S e e  Fodor  1 9 9 0 b ) .  I t  i s  w o r t h  c o n c l u d i n g  t h i s  c h a p t e r  b y  
c o n s i d e r i n g  how t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  a p p r o a c h  f a r e s ,  i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  
c o n c e p t i o n  se t  o u t  i n  ' P s y c h o s e m a n t i c s f  o f  what  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  
mean ing  i s  s u p p o s e d  t o  a c c o m p l i s h .  A s  it t u r n s  o u t ,  Fodor  f i n d s  t h a t  
t e l e o l o g y  c a n ' t  b e  e schewed  a s  e a s i l y  as  o n e  m i g h t  t h i n k .  
I n  ' P s y c h o s e m a n t i c s ~ ,  Fodor  e m p h a s i z e s  t h a t ,  i n  t r y i n g  t o  g i v e  
a n a t u r a l i s t i c  a c c o u n t  o f  meaning,  h e  i s  n o t  m e r e l y  t r y i n g  t o  g i v e ,  
i n  n a t u r a l i s t i c  terms, n e c e s s a r y  a n d  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  i t s  
b e i n g  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  S  i s  t h e  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  o f  M.  R a t h e r ,  h i s  a im 
i s  t o  t r y  somehow t o  explain,  i n  n a t u r a l i s t i c  terms, how it i s  t h a t  
p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  o r  s t a t e s  o f  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  c a n  h a v e  t r u t h  
c o n d i t i o n s  a t  all. As h e  s a y s ,  
. . . f o r  e a c h  m e n t a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  M, S i s  t h e  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  
o f  M i f f  S  i s  t h e  e n t r y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  M .  O r  r a t h e r ,  s o m e t h i n g  
s t r o n g e r :  what  m a k e s  S  t h e  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  ?il - t h e  precise 
f a c t  i n  v i r t u e  o f  which S  c o u n t s  a s  t h e  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  M- 
i s  t h a t  S s a t i s f y  t h e  e n t r y  c o n d i t i o n 3 '  f o r  M .  (Fodor  1984a,  
p .  326 .  F o d o r f  s e m p h a s i s )  . 
The s u g g e s t i o n  h e r e  i s  t h a t  it i s  n o t  m e r e l y  t h e  c a s e  t h a t ,  a s  a  
m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  S i s  t h e  e n t r y  c o n d i t i o n  o f  M i f f  S i s  t h e  t r u t h  
c o n d i t i o n  o f  M, b u t  r a t h e r  t h a t  S f s  b e i n g  t h e  e n t r y  c o n d i t i o n  o f  M 
somehow e x p l a i n s  why S i s  t h e  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  o f  M.  T h a t  i s ,  Sf  s 
b e i n g  t h e  e n t r y  c o n d i t i o n  o f  M i s  F o d o r f  s "mys te ry  i n g r e d i e n t 1 l 3 *  
which a c c o u n t s  f o r  why, arlong a l l  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  s t a t e s  of  a f f a i r s  
i n  t h e  w o r l d  t o  which M i s  r e l a t e d ,  S i s  t h e  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  of  M .  
The p o i n t  i s  p u t  a g a i n  t o w a r d  t h e  e n d  o f   psychose em antic sf: 
A f t e r  a l l ,  t h e  p r o j e c t  i s  n o t  t o  a n a l y z e  'S i s  t h e  t r u t h  
c o n d i t i o n  o f  M f .  I f  t h a t  h a d  been  t h e  p r o j e c t ,  w e  would have  
h a d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n d u c t i v e  g r o u n d s  f o r  g i v i n g  u p  a t  t h e  o n s e t .  
A n a l y s e s  a r e  what  c l o s e  o u t  o f  town; s u r e l y  i t  i s  t h e  l e s s o n  
o f  modern p h i l o s o p h y  t h a t  i n t e r e s t i n g  i d e a s  d o n ' t  g e t  
a n a l y z e d .  No, t h e  p o i n t  was r a t h e r  t o  show how i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  m e n t a l  symbols  s h o u l d  h a v e  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n s  even  though ,  
s i n c e  t h e r e  are no a g e n t s  who employ them, t h e i r  s e m a n t i c i t y  
c a n n o t  t r a c e  b a c k  t o  t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  o f  anybodyf s 
p r o p o s i t i o n a l  a t t i t u d e s .  (Fodor  1984a,  p . 3 3 3 .  F o d o r ' s  
emphases .  ) 
I n  s h o r t ,  what Fodor  i s  a f t e r  i s  some se t  of  n a t u r a l i s t i c  c o n d i t i o n s  
which i n  some s e n s e  ' add u p f  t o  some s ta te  of  a f f a i r s f  b e i n g  t h e  
t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n  o f  some symbol .  
Now, w h a t e v e r  t h e i r  s h o r t c o m i n g s ,  t e l e o l o g i c a l  t h e o r i e s  have  a t  
l e a s t  some prima facie a p p e a l  a s  a  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h i s  p rob lem.  Roughly 
s p e a k i n g ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e s e  t h e o r i e s ,  t h e  "mys te ry  i n g r e d i e n t "  
3 1 ~ f .  f o o t n o t e  2 8 .  
3 2 ~ f .  t h e  p a s s a g e  c i t e d  above ,  f rom Fodor  1984a,  p . 3 1 7 .  
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which makes a m e n t a l  symbol M a c a n d i d a t e  f o r  b e i n g  t r u e  i s  t h a t  it 
h a s  t h e  p u r p o s e  of  i n d i c a t i n g ,  t o  a c e r t a i n  g o a l - s e e k i n g  c o g n i t i v e  
s y s t e m ,  t h a t  t h e  w o r l d  i s  i n  a c e r t a i n  s t a t e ,  which i s  p e r h a p s  
p l a u s i b l e .  Moreover ,  a s  h a s  b e e n  seeil, t e l e o l o g i c a l  t h e o r i e s  a p p e a r ,  
a t  least  i n i t i a l l y ,  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  e x p l a i n  c o n v i n c i n g l y  how it i s  
t h a t  a m e n t a l  symbol  c a n  m i s r e p r e p r e s e n t  t h e  wor ld :  i f  s y s t e m  X h a s  
a s  i t s  ( o n l y )  p u r p o s e  t o  b r i n g  it a b o u t  t h a t  Y,  t h e n  it f o l l o w s  t h a t  
a n y  b e h a v i o u r  o f  X ' s  which d e c r e a s e s  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  Y f s  coming 
t o  o b t a i n  i s  a mistake o r  error. M i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ,  p e r h a p s ,  are 
j u s t  e r r o r s  o f  t h i s  k i n d .  
The t e l e o l o g i c a l  c o n s t r u a l  o f  F o d o r ' s  ' P s y c h o s e m a n t i c s f  a c c o u n t  
of  mean ing  h a s  a t  leas t  t h i s  much i n t u i t i v e  p l a u s i b i l i t y ,  t h e n ,  a s  
a  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  n a t u r a l i z i n g  meaning a s  it h a s  j u s t  
b e e n  c o n s t r u e d .  But  what o f  t h e  t h e o r y  which i s  b e i n g  p r o p o s e d  a s  
a n  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  which  would o b v i a t e  t h e  c h a r g e  o f  b e i n g  non- 
n a t u r a l i s t i c  s i m p l y  b y  d r o p p i n g  a p p e a l  t o  t e l e o l o g y  a l t o g e t h e r ?  On 
t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  a c c o u n t ,  t h e  " m y s t e r y  i n g r e d i e n t w  which makes a  
m e n t a l  symbol a c a n d i d a t e  f o r  b e i n g  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r l d  
i s  m e r e l y  i t s  s t a n d i n g  i n  a  c e r t a i n  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
w o r l d .  But  d o e s  t h i s  a c c o u n t  show "how it i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  m e n t a l  
symbols  s h o u l d  h a v e  t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n s ? "  I t  i s  n o t  o b v i o u s  t o  m e  t h a t  
a p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t  o r  s t a t e ,  m e r e l y  by h a v i n g  i t s  t o k e n  o c c u r r e n c e s  
i n  a c e r t a i n  way c o u n t e r f a c t u a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  some o t h e r  p h y s i c a l  
o b j e c t ' s  o c c u r r e n c e s ,  t h e r e b y  p o s s e s s e s  truth conditions. More t o  
t h e  p o i n t ,  Fodor  h i m s e l f  a p p e a r s  t o  have  d o u b t s  on t h i s  p o i n t ,  a s  
i s  e v i d e n t  f r o m  h i s  e v a l u a t i v e  comments on  h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  t h e o r y .  
A t  t h e  c l o s e  o f  'What i s  a  Theory  o f  C o n t e n t ,  11' (Fodor  1990b), 
Fodor  a s k s ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  w h e t h e r ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  some m e n t a l  symbolf  s 
s t a n d i n g  i n  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  r e l a t i o n s  t o  t h e  wor ld ,  
a d d s  u p  t o  i t s  h a v i n g  c o n t e n t ;  w h e t h e r  t h e  a c c o u n t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
" s o l v e  B r e n t a n o t  s problem1133. One o b j e c t i o n  t o  a p o s i t i v e  answer  t o  
t h i s  q u e s t i o n  f o r  which Fodor  a d m i t s  some sympathy,  i s  t h a t  " w e  want 
more" t h a n  m e r e l y  t h a t  some m e n t a l  symbol s t a n d s  in a  c e r t a i n  
c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  r e l a t i o n  t o  some s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s .  A s  h e  s a y s ,  
" .  . .we want  it t o  t u r n  o u t  t h a t  some ways o f  u s i n g  symbols  a r e  
wrong. Where, i n  t h e  p i c t u r e  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  t h a t  we've been  
c o n s t r u c t i n g  [ i . e . ,  t h e  n o n - t e l e o l o g i c a l ,  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  
p i c t u r e ] ,  d o e s  t h e  i d e a  get a  f o o t h o l d  t h a t  t h e r e  are 
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ;  a n d  t h a t  t h e y  are t h i n g s  t o  b e  a v o i d e d ? "  
(Fodor  1990b,  p .  1 2 8 )  
S i n c e  Fodor  h a s  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  o n e  o f  t h e  v i r t u e s  o f  t h e  t e l e o l o g i c a l  
t h e o r y  i s  t h a t  " i t ' s  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  i n t u i t i o n  t h a t  e r r o r s  a r e  
c a s e s  where  something has  gone wrong" (Fodor  1990a,  p .  64), h e  o u g h t  
t o  h a v e  s o m e t h i n g  t o  s a y  a b o u t  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  
t h e o r y  t o  a d d r e s s  t h e  i n t u i t i o n .  Well, what d o e s  h e  s a y ?  A s  it 
h a p p e n s ,  what  Fodor  s u g g e s t s  i n  t h e  end,  a d m i t t e d l y  w i t h  some 
t r e p i d a t i o n ,  i s  t h a t  what  i s  n e e d e d  t o  meet t h e  i n t u i t i o n s  i s  some 
m a r r i a g e  o f  h i s  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  a c c o u n t  w i t h  s u i t a b l e  t e l e o l o g i c a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  I n  o t h e r  words ,  h e  t h i n k s  t h a t  ( p e r h a p s )  w e  w i l l  
n e e d  t e l e o l o g y  a f t e r  a l l ,  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  
The m o r a l  o f  t h i s  l e n g t h y  d i g r e s s i o n  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  
s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  Fodor  d o e s n ' t  r e a l l y  n e e d  a n y  t e l e o l o g y  i n  h i s  
a c c o u n t ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  p u r p o s i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  c o g n i t i v e  mechanisms 
a p p e a l e d  t o  i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  t h e o r y  p l a y s  a s u b s t a n t i v e  r o l e  i n  t h e  
3 3 S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  what  Fodor  a s k s  i s ,  I * .  . . d o e s  i n £  o r m a t i o n  and  
r o b u s t n e s s  e q u a l  c o n t e n t ?  A r e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  r o b u s t n e s s  a l l  you 
n e e d  f o r  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ? "  (Fodor  1990b,  p .  1 2 8 )  . What Fodor  a r g u e s  
i n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  i s  t h a t  a n y  s i g n  M s t a n d i n g  i n  t h e  g i v e n  
c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  r e l a t i o n  t o  some s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  S conveys  
i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  S, a n d  d o e s  s o  " r o b u s t l y " ,  i .e . ,  ( r o u g h l y )  i n  s u c h  
a way t h a t  t o k e n s  o f  M c a n  b e  v a r i o u s L y  c a u s e d  ( C f .  Fodor 1990b,  
p . 9 1 ) .  
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t h e o r y ,  a n d  c a n n o t  be d i s p e n s e d  w i t h  u n l e s s  cot . lpensatory  m e a s u r e s  
are t a k e n .  And, s i n c e  Fodor  g i v e s  no  a c c o u n t  of how t h e  t e l e o l o g i c a l  
p r o p e r t i e s  i n  q u e s t i o n  a r e  a n y  more n a t u r a l i s t i c  t h a n  t h e  meaning 
p r o p e r t i e s  t h e y  are s u p p o s e d  t o  e x p l i c a t e ,  I c o n c l u d e  t h a t  h e  f a i l s  
t o  n a t u r a l i z e  meaning,  o r  e v e n  t o  g i v e  a n y  h o p e  t h a t  t h e  p r o j e c t  i s  
p r a c t i c a b l e .  
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CHAPTER 2: TWO CONCEPTIONS OF THE PROBLEM ABOUT RULE-FOLLOWING 
In chapter VI, 538 of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
(Wittgenstein 1978), Wittgenstein comments 
"How can one follow a rule?" That is what I should like to 
ask. 
Now Wittgenstein does not ask, and nor have philosophers generally 
asked, "How can one climb a flight of stairs?" or "How can one eat 
an apple?", so one might wonder just why the activity of following 
a rule, in contrast to these other activities, should be thought 
problematic. One possible reason is that it appears to be the case 
that which rule a person is following on an occasion is 
underdetermined by any fact or facts about her and her surroundings. 
This is the problematic aspect of rule-following which Saul Kripke 
discusses in his Wittgenstein on Rules an Private Language (Kriplre 
1 9 8 2 )  . A second possible reason is that it appears to be the case 
that in order to be able to follow a rule, one must be able to 
justify continuing it in one way as opposed to another, but it turns 
out that one cannot. This problem is suggested by some of 
Wittgensteints remarks, and it is entertained, although ultimate1.y 
not pursued, by Kripke as well. The difference between these two 
conceptions of what makes following a rule problematic, I will 
argue, is substantial. What emerges when the difference is 
elucidated is that whereas the first problem about rule-following 
is a problem only for defenders of the view that facts about rule- 
following reduce to some other kind of facts, the second problem is 
a problem for anyone who maintains that she follows rules. 
This chapter is in three parts. In the first part, the two 
arguments just adumbrated for the conclusion that one cannot follow 
6 0  
a r u l e ,  w i l l  be set  o u t .  As it may be t e m p t i n g  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  them i s  m e r e l y  c o s m e t i c ,  t h i s  w i l l  be done  i n  
some d e t a i l .  I n  t h e  s e c o n d  p a r t ,  t h e  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  t o  be a f o l l o w e r  
o f  a r u l e  i s  j u s t  t o  h a v e  a c e r t a i n  set o f  d i s p o s i t i o n s  w i l l  be 
c o n s i d e r e d ,  a n d  t h e  r e f u t a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  p r o p o s a l  s u g g e s t e d  by t h e  
two  a r g u m e n t s ,  c o n t r a s t e d .  The d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  r e f u t a t i o n s  
w i l l  s e r v e  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  
t w o  c o n c e p t i o n s  o f  wha t  i s  p r o b l e m a t i c  a b o u t  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e .  I n  
t h e  f i n a l  p a r t ,  a b r i e f  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  p o s e d  
b y  t h e  l a t t e r  a r g u m e n t  w i l l  be s k e t c h e d .  
I 
W e  b e g i n  b y  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  a r g u m e n t  f o r  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  
f a c t s  u n d e r d e t e r m i n e  wh ich  r u l e  a p e r s o n  i s  f o l l o w i ~ g .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  
a r g u m e n t  as it w i l l  be f o r m u l a t e d  h e r e  i s  drawn f r o m  t h e  a r g u m e n t  
w h i c h  S a u l  K r i p k e  g i v e s  i n  h i s  Wittgenstein on Rules and Private 
Language ( K r i p k e  1982 ,  p .  7 f f ) ,  i t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  i n  s m a l l  ways .  The 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  m i n o r  d i v e r g e n c e s  w i l l  be c o n s i d e r e d  b e l o w .  The 
a r g u m e n t  c a n  be b r o k e n  i n t o  t w o  s t e p s .  F i r s t ,  c o n s i d e r  some 
a r b i t r a r y  r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  a c t i v i t y  wh ich  o u r  f r i e n d  J o n e s  h a s  
a p p a r e n t l y  p u r s u e d  on  many o c c a s i o n s  i n  t h e  p a s t ,  s u c h  as  c o u n t i n g  
b y  t w o s  - i . e . ,  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  r u l e  d e s c r i b e d  by  t h e  f o r m u l a  
a,+, = a, + 2 (a, = 2 ) .  A s  w i t h  a n y  r u l e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  J o n e s  w i l l  
n e c e s s a r i l y  h a v e  f o l l o w e d  it o n l y  f i n i t e l y  f a r  t o  d a t e .  F o r  t h e  s a k e  
o f  a r g u m e n t ,  t h e n ,  s u p p o s e  t h a t  h e  h a s  n o t  h i t h e r t o  c o n t e m p l a t e d  a n y  
i n s t a n c e  o f  t h e  r u l e  g r e a t e r  t h a n  a, = 20004.  Nex t ,  c o n s i d e r  a 
p e c u l i a r  a c t i v i t y  wh ich ,  f o r  c o n v e n i e n c e ,  w e  c a n  a s s i g n  t h e  name 
' c o u n t i n g *  b y  t w o s ' ,  wh ich  i s  d e s c r i b e d  b y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f o r m u l a :  
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a,,, = a, + 2  i f  a, i s  less t h a n  20004,  b u t  a,,, - a, + 4  o t h e r w i s e .  
Someone who w a s  c o u n t i n g *  b y  t w o s ,  t h e n ,  wou ld  w r i t e  ' I . .  .19998,  
20000,  20002 ,  20004,  20008,  20012,  . . ." ( C f .  W i t t g e n s t e i n  1978 ,  
p . 3 6 )  . W e  are led t o  a s k  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  q u e s t i o n :  G iven  t h a t  i n  t h e  
p a s t ,  w h e n e v e r  J o n e s  e n g a g e d  i n  t h e  a c t i v i t y  wh ich  w e  would  c a l l  
' c o u n t i n g  b y  t w o s ' ,  h i s  b e h a v i o u r  was i n  f a c t  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  h i s  
h a v i n g  b e e n  c o u n t i n g  b y  t w o s  a n d  w i t h  h i s  h a v i n g  b e e n  counting* b y  
t w o s ,  wha t  f u r t h e r  f a c t  i s  t h e r e  a b o u t  h im o r  h i s  e n v i r o n m e n t  which  
makes  it t h e  case t h a t  h e  w a s  d o i n g  t h e  f o r m e r  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  
l a t t e r  ( o r  v i c e - v e r s a ) ,  a n d  as a r e s u l t  o f  wh ich  h e  s h o u l d  f o l l o w  
20004 w i t h  20006 r a t h e r  t h a n  20008 ( o r  v i c e - v e r s a ) ,  t o  a c c o r d  w i t h  
h i s  p a s t  i n t e n t i o n s ? '  
The  s e c o n d  s t e p  o f  t h e  a r g u m e n t  i s  a n  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  what  a re  
p r e s u m e d  t o  be a l l  f u r t h e r  f a c t s  a b o u t  J o n e s  wh ich ,  c o u p l e d  w i t h  h i s  
a c t u a l  b e h a v i o u r ,  m i g h t  d e t e r m i n e  wh ich  o f  t h e  two  r u l e s  h e  h a s  b e e n  
f o l l o w i n g .  I n  e a c h  case, a n  a r g u m e n t  i s  g i v e n  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  
g i v e n  f a c t  d o e s  n o t  s u f f i c e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  wh ich  r u l e  J o n e s  h a s  b e e n  
f o l l o w i n g .  Among t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  wh ich  K r i p k e  w e i g h s  a n d  r e j e c t s  a re  
f a c t s  a b o u t  J o n e s f  d i s p o s i t i o n s ,  f a c t s  a b o u t  a n y  m e n t a l  e x p e r i e n c e s  
o r  i m a g e s  w h i c h  J o n e s  may h a v e  h a d ,  a n d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  
s i m p l i c i t y .  The  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  a r g u m e n t  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  f a c t  
a s  t o  w h i c h  r u l e  J o n e s  h a s  b e e n  f o l l o w i n g .  If t h i s  i s  s o ,  t h e n ,  
s i n c e  p e c u l i a r  r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  h y p o t h e s e s  s u c h  as t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  
J o n e s  h a s  b e e n  ' c o u n t i n g * ' ,  c a n  a l w a y s  be c o n t r i v e d ,  a n d  s i n c e  t h e  
' ~ r i p k e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  c o n s t r u c t s  t h i s  a r g u m e n t  i n  terms o f  h i s  
own p a s t  b e h a v i o u r  a n d  t h e  r u l e  f o r  g i v i n g  x p l u s  y, on t h e  o n e  
h a n d ,  a n d  t h e  r u l e  f o r  g i v i n g  x ' quus '  y o n  t h e  o t h e r ,  whe re  z = x 
q u u s  y i f f  (x, y < 57 a n d  z = x + y, o r  x, y 2 57 a n d  z - 5 )  
( K r i p k e  1 9 8 2 ,  p . 9 ) .  The  a r g u m e n t  h a s  b e e n  r e f o r m u l a t e d  h e r e  t o  
i l l u m i n a t e  t h e  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  t h e  s e c o n d  a r g u m e n t ,  d e v e l o p e d  b e l o w .  
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argument can be genera l ized  t o  anyone, i t  follows t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
never a  f a c t  a s  t o  which r u l e  a  person i s  following on an occasion.  
The argument i s  presented here  i n  terms of rule-following,  but 
it can be extended t o  apply t o  meaning something by an expression.  
F i r s t ,  suppose t h a t  it i s  given t h a t ,  when Jones says,  on a n  
occasion, e . g . ,  "That' s green", t h e r e  i s  a  f a c t  a s  t o  what i t  i s  
t h a t  Jones i s  using t h e  p red i ca t e  'green1 t o  descr ibe .  T h i s  
supposi t ion has no obvious analogue i n  t h e  rule-following case,  but 
inasmuch a s  denying i t  can only he lp  t h e  s cep t i c ,  t h e r e  can be no 
ob jec t ion  t o  making i t  here .  Next, consider t h e  s e t  of a l l  th ings  
which Jones has here tofore  used t h e  p red ica te  'greent t o  descr ibe ,  
and consider t h e  proper ty  of being grue2  - i . e . ,  t h e  property of 
being green and observed before  some f u t u r e  da te ,  o r  blue and not 
observed before  t h e  date3.  In a manner analogous t o  Jones1 pas t  
counting behaviour, h i s  uses  t o  d a t e  of t h e  p red ica te  'green' t o  
descr ibe  t h ings ,  considered alone,  a r e  cons i s ten t  with h i s  having 
meant g r e e n  by it and a l s o  with h i s  having meant g r u e  by it, s ince  
a l l  o b j e c t s  encountered t o  da te  which have had one property w i l l  
have had t h e  o t h e r .  And, a s  was t h e  case with rule-following, a case 
can be made t h a t  no f u r t h e r  f a c t  about Jones determines which of t h e  
two p r o p e r t i e s  he meant. 
Since it i s  not p r imar i ly  my purpose t o  evaluate  t h i s  s c e p t i c a l  
argument but  r a t h e r ,  t o  con t r a s t  it w i t h  a  second, r e l a t e d  argument, 
I w i l l  not go through Kripke's arguments aga ins t  each of t he  
2 ~ e e  Goodman 1983, p .74.  
3 ~ f .  Kripke's example, t h a t  my uses of t h e  word ' t ab le '  a r e  
cons i s t en t  w i t h  my having meant by it t h e  property of being a  t a b l e  
o r  t h e  p roper ty  of being a tabair, where something i s  a  t a b a i r  iZf 
it i s  a  t a b l e  and not a t  t h e  base of t h e  E i f f e l  Tower or  i s  a  cha i r  
and i s  a t  t h e  base of t h e  E i f f e l  Tower. (Kripke 1 9 8 2 ,  p .19)  
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s u g g e s t i o n s  as  t o  wha t  f i x e s  wh ich  r u l e  J o n e s  h a s  b e e n  f o l l o w i n g  o r  
wha t  J o n e s  means  b y  a g i v e n  p r e d i c a t e 4 .  C o n c e r n i n g  K r i p k e ' s  g e n e r a l  
s t r a t e g y ,  however ,  t h e r e  i s  a p o i n t  w o r t h  n o t i n g  h e r e .  Bo th  C o l i n  
McGinn a n d  P a u l  B o g h o s s i a n  r i g h t l y  c r i t i c i z e  K r i p k e  f o r  a s s u m i n g  
more  o r  less u n c r i t i c a l l y  t h a t  f a c t s  a b o u t  r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  a n d  
m e a n i n g ,  i f  s u c h  t h e r e  be, m u s t  r e d u c e  t o  some o t h e r  k i n d  o f  f a c t s  
a n d ,  m o r e o v e r ,  t h a t  t h e s e  f a c t s  m u s t  be non- seman t i c ,  non- 
i n t e n t i o n a l  f a c t s  (see McGinn 1984 ,  p .150-1,  a n d  B o g h o s s i a n  1989 ,  
p p . 5 4 0 ) .  A s  McGinn s a y s ,  " [ K r i p k e ' s ]  s c e p t i c  i s  i n  e f f e c t  demanding  
a n  a n s w e r  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  'what  d o e s  m e a n i n g / r e f e r e n c e  c o n s i s t  i n ? '  
wh ich  d o e s  n o t  j u s t  h e l p  i t s e l f  t o  t h e  n o t i o n s  o f  m e a n i n g  a n d  
r e f e r e n c e "  (McGinn 1984 ,  p .  1 5 1 )  . A d m i t t e d l y ,  K r i p k e  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t o  f o l l o w  a g i v e n  r u l e  o r  mean s o m e t h i n g  by  a g i v e n  
word  i s  t o  b e  i n  a n  i r r e d u c i b l e ,  " s u i  g e n e r i s "  s t a t e ,  a n d  e v e n  g o e s  
s o  f a r  as t o  c o n c e d e  t h a t  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  case "may 
i n  a s e n s e  be i r r e f u t a b l e "  ( K r i p k e  1 9 8 2 ,  p . 5 1 ) .  A s  b o t h  McGinn a n d  
B o g h o s s i a n  o b s e r v e ,  however ,  K r i p k e ' s  c u r s o r y  d i s m i s s a l  o f  t h i s  
s u g g e s t i o n  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  i t  l e a v e s  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  mean ing  
" c o m p l e t e l y  m y s t e r i o u s " ,  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  show t h a t  it i s  f a l s e .  
And, i f  t h e r e  a r e  i r r e d u c i b l e  f a c t s  o f  t h e  f o r m  ' J o n e s  i s  f o l l o w i n g  
t h e  r u l e  ' a d d  two", t h e n ,  p r o v i d e d  some s u c h  f a c t  i s  t r u e  o f  J o n e s ,  
K r i p k e  d o e s  n o t  get  h i s  c o n c l u s i o n .  F o r  f u t u r e  r e f e r e n c e ,  c a l l  t h e  
t h e s i s  t h a t  f a c t s  a b o u t  r u l e - Z o l l o w i n g  a n d  mean ing ,  i f  t h e r e  a r e  
a n y ,  m u s t  be r e d u c i b l e  t o  f a c t s  o f  some o t h e r  k i n d ,  t h e  ' R e d u c t i v i s t  
T h e s i s ' .  W h a t e v e r  i t s  p l a u s i b i l i t y ,  it i s  c l e a r l y  a s u b s t a n t i v e  
t h e s i s  which  i s  assumed t o  h o l d  t r u e  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  s t e p  o f  t h e  a r g u m e n t .  
4 ~ h e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  i t  i s  f a c t s  a b o u t  J o n e s t  d i s p o s i t i o n s ,  
however ,  w i l l  be t a k e n  u p  i n  S e c t i o n  11, b e l o w .  
F o r  f u t u r e  r e f e r e n c e ,  t h i s  a r g u m e n t  c a n  be e n c a p s u l a t e d  t h u s :  
(1) S i n c e  i ) t h e r e  a re  a l w a y s  d i f f e r e n t  r u l e s  which  are  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a n y  g i v e n  ( a p p a r e n t )  r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  b e h a v i o u r  
o f  a n y  p e r s o n ,  a n d  ii) a s s u m i n g  t h a t  f a c t s  a b o u t  r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  
mus t  r e d u c e  t o  some c t h e r  k i n d  o f  f a c t s ,  t h e n ,  s i n c e  i i i ) t h e r e  
a re  n o  o t h e r  f a c t s  a b o u t  a n y  p e r s o n  wh ich  d e t e r m i n e s  wh ich ,  
among t h e s e  v a r i o u s  d i f f e r e n t  r u l e s ,  s h e  o r  h e  h a s  b e e n  
f o l l o w i n g ,  it f o l l o w s  t h a t  i v ) t h e r e  i s  n e v e r  a n y  f a c t  a s  t o  
wh ich  r u l e  a p e r s o n  i s  f o l l o w i n g  on  a n  o c c a s i o n .  
T h e r e  a re  two a s p e c t s  o f  a r g u m e n t  (1) which  are  w o r t h  t a k i n g  n o t e  
o f .  The  f i r s t  i s  t h a t  i t  c o n c e r n s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  f a c t s  a b o u t  r u l e -  
f o l l o w i n g  o r  m e a n i n g .  The c h a l l e n g e  p o s e d  b y  t h e  ' c o u n t i n g * '  a n d  
' g r u e f  s c e n a r i o s  i s  t o  come u p  w i t h  some a c c o u n t  o f  what  f o l l o w i n g  
o n e  r u l e  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n o t h e r ,  o r  m e a n i n g  o n e  p r o p e r t y  r a t h e r  t h a n  
a n o t h e r ,  c o n s i s t s  i n  -what f a c t  o r  f a c t s  a b o u t  J o n e s  c o n s t i t - u t e  h i s  
b e i n g  a f o l l o w e r  o f  o n e  r u l e  as  o p p o s e d  t o  a n o t h e r  o r  h i s  mean ing  
o n e  p r o p e r t y  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  a n o t h e r .  I n  t h i s  respect, i t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  
f r ~ m  a n  a r g u m e n t  c o n c e r n i n g  o u r  justification f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  
J o n e s  i s  f o l l o w i n g  o n e  r u l e  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n o t h e r ,  o r  f r o m  a n  argurnent  
c o n c e r n i n g  J o n e s '  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  h e  i s  f o l l o w i n g  
o n e  r u l e  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n o t h e r 5 .  One c o u l d ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  g i v e  a n  
a c c o u n t  o f  what  f a c t s  c o n s t i t u t e  J o n e s '  f o l l o w i n g  o n e  r u l e  a s  
o p p o s e d  t o  a n o t h e r ,  a n d  y e t  f a i l  t o  g i v e  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  what 
j u s t i f i e s  a n y o n e  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  J o n e s  i s  f o l l o w i n g  o n e  r u l e  a s  
o p p o s e d  t o  a n o t h e r .  The s o r t  o f  a c c o u n t  o f  m e a n i n g  b r i e f l y  o u t l i n e d  
b y  P a u l  B o g h o s s i a n  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  'The R u l e - F o l l o w i n g  
C o n s i d e r a t i o n s f ,  wh ich  h e  c a l l s  ' r o b u s t  rea l i smf ,  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  
p o i n t .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  a c c o u n t ,  " j u d g e m e n t s  a b o u t  mean ing  a r e  
f a c t u a l ,  i r r e d u c i b l e ,  a n d  j u d g e m e n t - i n d e p e n d e n t "  ( p . 5 4 7 ) .  T h a t  
' ~ c G i n n  makes  t h i s  p o i n t  i n  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  p resen t  
a r g u m e n t  -he c a l l s  i t s  c o n c l u s i o n  "a c o n s t i t u t a t i v e  o r  m e t a p h y s i c a l  
c l z i m " ,  a n d  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  i t  f r o m  a n  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  a r g u m e n t  a l s o  
s u g g e s t e d  b y  K r i p k e  (McGinn 1 9 8 4 ,  p .  1 4 9 )  . 
someone means such-and-such by a given word, on this view, is not 
a matter of some non-semantic, non-intentional meaning-constituting 
facts being true of her, nor is it a matter of her being judged to 
mean such-and-such by some well-placed interpreter(s1 -it is, 
rather, a matter simply of a certain irreducible meaning factf s 
being true of her. What Boghossian is proposing, in effect, is that 
the Reductivist Thesis is false, and that meaning facts are sui 
generis -a view which, as remarked just above, Kripke perfunctorily 
dismisses. Given that the sort of meaning-properties which this view 
posits do not, by hypothesis, reduce to any properties which our 
(commonly acknowledged) perceptual faculties are attuned to detect, 
the basic theory will leave the epistemological questions just 
noted, unanswered. 
It may be remarked here that whereas argument (1) has this 
noteworthy aspect ~ i z . ,  that it concerns the existence of facts 
about rule-following and not matters of justification- the argument 
which Kripke gives in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 
does not. Thus, whereas Kripke does maintain that his argument 
concerns what fact makes it the case that, in the past, he was 
following such-and-such rule, he also asks what justifies him in 
going on as he does. Kripke says, 
. . .the challenge posed by the sceptic takes two forms. First, 
he questions whether there is any fact that I meant plus, not 
quus, that will answer his sceptical challenge. Second, he 
questions whether I have any reason to be so confident that 
now I should answer '125' rather than '5' [to the question 
"What is 68 + 5 7 ? " ] .  (Kripke 1982, p.11) 
Later in his exposition, Kripke construes the second form of the 
sceptic's challenge in more clearly epistemological terms, as a 
demand for justification for giving one answer rather than the other 
(see, e.g., p . 1 5 ) .  Kripke, then appears to be concerned with more 
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t h a n  j u s t  wha t  f a c t  makes  it t h e  case t h a t  o n e  r u l e  as  o p p o s e d  t o  
a n o t h e r  i s  b e i n g  f o l l o w e d .  
T h i s  p o i n t  a b o u t  K r i p k e f s  e x p o s i t i o n  mus t  be g r a n t e d .  The 
p r i n c i p a l  a i m  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  t h o u g h ,  i s  t o  show t h a t  what  K r i p k e  
t a k e s  t o  be t w o  f o r m s  o f  o n e  a r g u m e n t ,  are  i n  f a c t  two  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
d i f f e r e n t  a r g u m e n t s .  
The  s e c o n d  n o t e w o r t h y  a s p e c t  o f  a r g u m e n t  (1) c o n c e r n s  t h e  
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  m e a n i n g  t h e o r i s t  ( t u r n e d  
s c e p t i c ) .  Rough ly  s p e a k i n g ,  t h e  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  h e  h a s  a t h i r d - p e r s o n ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  a f i r s t  p e r s o n ,  p e r s p e c t i v e  o n  t h e  p r o b l e m .  I n  
f o r m u l a t i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n  p o s e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  s t e p  o f  t h e  a r g u m e n t ,  
t h e  m e a n i n g  t h e o r i s t  c o n t r a s t s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t h a t  J o n e s  h a s  b e e n  
c o u n t i n g  b y  t w o s  a n d  t h a t  J o n e s  h a s  b e e n  c o u n t i n g *  by  t w o s .  And, i n  
t h e  s e c o n d  s t e p  o f  t h e  a r g u m e n t ,  t h e  m e a n i n g  t h e o r i s t  e v a l u a t e s  
v a r i o u s  c a n d i d a t e  f a c t s  t o  see w h e t h e r  t h e y  d e t e r m i n e  wh ich ,  i f  
e i t h e r ,  o f  t h e s e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o b t a i n s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  be able  t o  
d e t e r m i n e  w h i c h  p o s s i b i l i t y  o b t a i n s ,  t h e  t h e o r i s t  mus t  know what  t h e  
two  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  are  -he mus t  know, t h a t  i s ,  what  it i s  t o  c o u n t  
a n d  wha t  it i s  t o  c o u n t * ,  b y  t w o s .  I f  h e  d i d  n o t  know t h i s ,  h e  c o u l d  
n o t  h o p e  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  j u d g e  w h e t h e r  a g i v e n  f a c t  d e t e r m i n e s  t h a t  
J o n e s  h a s  b e e n  d o i n g  t h e  o n e  as o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  o t h e r .  I n  t h i s  
r e s p e c t ,  t h e  m e a n i n g  t h e o r i s t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  J o n e s ,  h i s  o b j e c t  
o f  s t u d y .  J o n e s ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  may t u r n  o u t  t o  h a v e  b e e n  n e i t h e r  
c o u n t i n g  n o r  c o u n t i n g * ,  n o r  t o  h a v e  b e e n  f o l l o w i n g  a n y  o t h e r  r u l e .  
I n  t h i s  case, J o n e s  n e e d  n o t  know e i t h e r  what  it i s  t o  c o u n t  o r  t o  
c o u n t * .  I t  may t u r n  o u t ,  i n d e e d ,  t h a t  J o n e s  h a s  no  i n t e n t i o n a l  
s t a t e s  a t  a l l ,  a n d  h e n c e  d o e s  n o t  know a n y t h i n g .  C l e a r l y ,  t h e n ,  
t h e r e  i s  a n  a symmet ry  b e t w e e n  t h e  mean ing  t h e o r i s t ' s  p o s s i b l e  
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e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  s tates a n d  J o n e s f  s .  It s h o u l d  be n o t e d  t h a t ,  i f  t h e  
m e a n i n g  t h e o r i s t  a r r i v e s  a t  t h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  -- that  J o n e s  h a s  n c  
i n t e n t i o n a l  states- t h e n  t h e  i n i t i a l  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  h e  knows what  
it i s  t o  c o u n t  a n d  t o  c o u n t * ,  m u s t  be q u e s t i o n e d .  F o r ,  a r g u m e n t  (1) 
p u t s  n o  c o n s t r a i n t s  o n  J o n e s f  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  whence i t s  c o n c l u s i o n  
i s  n o t  a f f e c t e d  i f  i t  i s  as sumed  t h a t  J o n e s  a n d  t h e  m e a n i n g  t h e o r i s t  
are ,  i n  a l l  r e l e v a n t  respects,  i d e n t i c a l .  I n  t h i s  case, t h e  mean ing  
t h e o r i s t  h a s  t o  r e j e c t  t h e  i n i t i a l  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  h e  knows what  i t  
i s  t o  c o u n t  a n d  wha t  it  i s  t o  c o u n t *  -he h a s  t o  " k i c k  away t h e  
l a d d e r "  ( C f .  K r i p k e  1982 ,  ~ - 2 1 ) ~ .  
T h i s  s e c o n d  p o i n t  a b o u t  a r g u m e n t  (1) i s  a l s o  t r ~ e  o f t h e  a r g u m e n t  
a s  it a p p e a r s  i n  K r i p k e f s  e x p o s i t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  i s  p e r h a p s  
o b s c u r e d  b y  c e r t a i n  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n s .  R a t h e r  t h a n  
i n q u i r i n g ,  c o n c e r n i n g  some a r b i t r a r y  p e r s o n  ( h e r e ,  J o n e s ) ,  w h e t h e r  
h e  h a s  b e e n  f o l l o w i n g  o n e  r u l e  as  o p p o s e d  t o  a n o t h e r ,  K r i p k e  
i n q u i r e s ,  c o n c e r n i n g  h i s  own p a s t  s e l f ,  w h e t h e r  h e  mean t  p l u s  o r  
q u u s  by  ' p l u s f  (Cf . f o o t n o t e  1) . It  may l o o k ,  t h e n ,  as t h o u g h  K r i p k e  
p o s e s  t h e  p r o b l e m  f r o m  a f i r s t - p e r s o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a t h i r d - p e r s o n  
p o i n t  o f  v i e w .  The  p o i n t  o f  h i s  a s k i n g  a b o u t  h i s  p a s t  s e l f  f r o m  t h e  
p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  h i s  p r e s e n t  s e l f ,  however ,  i s  p r e c i s e l y  t o  
d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  p e r s o n ,  t h e  m e a n i n g s  o f  whose u t t e r a n c e s  a r e  i n  
q u e s t i o n ,  f r o m  t h e  p e r s o n  i n q u i r i n g  a b o u t  t h e  u t t e r a n c e s .  A s  K r i p k e  
s a y s ,  
I p u t  t h e  p r o b l e m  i n  t h i s  way s o  a s  t o  a v o i d  c c n f u s i n g  
q u e s t i o n s  a b o u t  w h e t h e r  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  t a k i n g  p l a c e  ' b o t h  
i n s i d e  a n d  o u t s i d e  l a n g u a g e '  i n  some i l l e g i t i m a t e  s e n s e .  If w e  
6 ~ h i s  i s  t h e  p o s i t i o n  i n  wh ich  K r i p k e f s  s c e p t i c  f i n d s  h i m s e l f ,  
i n  t h e  e n d .  It s h o u l d  p e r h a p s  be n o t e d  t h a t  a  more a c c u r a t e  m e t a p h o r  
wou ld  be t h a t  t h e  s c e p t i c  h a s  t o  d e n y  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  ladder 
c l i m b e d  u p :  h e  h a s  t o  d e n y  t h a t ,  i n  mak ing  h i s  a r g u m e n t ,  h e  
e x p r e s s e d  a n y  p r o p o s i t i o n s .  
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a re  q u e r y i n g  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  t h e  word ' p l u s f ,  how c a n  w e  u s e  i t  
a t  t h e  same t i m e ?  ( K r i p k e  1982 ,  p . 1 2 )  
F o r  K r i p k e ,  t h e n ,  t h e  p r o b l e m s  'What makes it t h e  case t h a t  i n  t h e  
p z s t  I m e a n t  p l u s  b y  ' p l u s f  ? '  a n d  'What makes it t h e  c a s e  t h a t  J o n e s  
means  p l u s  b y  ' p l u s f  ? '  are n o t  r e l e v a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t .  And, a s  we h a v e  
s e e n ,  t h e  c o n s t r u a l  o f  t h e  a r g u m e n t  i n  terms o f  word-meaning i s  
p a r z l l e l  i n  a l l  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s  t o  t h e  a r g u m e n t  a b o u t  r u l e -  
f o l l o w i n g .  
I n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e s e  two  p o i n t s ,  s t e p  2 o f  a r g u m e n t  (I), i n  which  
a  s e a r c h  i s  u n d e r t a k e n  f o r  some f a c t  wh ich  d e t e r m i n e s  wh ich  r u l e  
J o n e s  h a s  b e e n  f o l l o w i n g ,  r e s e m b l e s  t h e  t y p e  o f  t h e o r i z i n g  a b o u t  
knowledge  a n d  b e l i e f  c a l l e d  ' n a t u r a l i z e d  e p i s t e m o l o g y f .  A c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h i s  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  e p i s t e m o l o g y ,  it i s  m e r e l y  a  b r a n c h  o f  
p s y c h o l o g y  w h i c h  h a s  as i t s  a i m  t o  d e t e r m i n e  what  r e l a t i o n  a  
c o g n i t i v e  a g e n t  m u s t  s t a n d  i n  t o  h i s  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  a n d  by  what  c a u s a l  
r o u t e  t h e  a g e n t  m u s t  h a v e  p a s s e d  t o  be i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n ,  i n  o r d e r  f o r  
t h e  a g e n t  t o  s t a n d  i n  some epistemic r e l a t i o n  t o  some f a c t 7 .  The 
p r o b l e m  p o s e d  t o  t h e  p r a c t i t i o n e r  o f  n a t u r a l i z e d  e p i s t e m o l o g y ,  l i k e  
t h e  p r o b l e m  p o s e d  i n  step 2 o f  a r g u m e n t  ( I ) ,  i s  t o  come u p  w i t h  some 
f a c t  o r  f a c t s  a b o u t  some p e r s o n  wh ich  make it t h e  c a s e  t h a t  h e  i s  
i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  s t a t e  - i n  t h e  case o f  n a t u r a l i z e d  e p i s t e m o l o g y ,  t h e  
s t a t e  o f  knowing  o r  b e i n g  j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  p; i n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  t h e  m e a n i n g  t h e o r i s t  i n  s tep 2 o f  a r g u m e n t  ( I ) ,  b e i n g  a f o l l o w e r  
o f  a g i v e n  r u l e .  And t h e  p r a c t i t i o n e r  o f  n a t u r a l i z e d  e p i s t e m o l o g y ,  
a g a i n  l i k e  t h e  m e a n i n g  t h e o r i s t  i n  s t e p  2 o f  a r g u m e n t  ( I ) ,  p o s e s  h e r  
q u e s t i o n  f r o m  a d e t a t c h e d ,  t h i r d  p e r s o n  p o i n t  o f  v i e w .  T h a t  i s ,  s h e  
'See ,  e g . ,  Q u i n e  1 9 6 9 ,  p p .  82-84, a n d  A l v i n  Goldman, 
Epistemology and Cognition (Cambr idge ,  Mass.: H a r v a r d ,  1 9 8 6 ) ,  e s p .  
c h a p t e r s  4 a n d  5 .  
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is assumed to know certain important facts which it i.s possible that 
her object of study does not. The naturalized epistemologist, after 
all, is assumed to know the state of Jonesf cognitive machinery, as 
well as whether the proposition p which Jones is supposed to believe 
(say), is true. Otherwise, she can hardly be expected to come up 
with a reliable assessment of Jonesr cognitive state. It is quite 
possible, however, that it should turn out that Jones himself has 
no knowledge of, nor justified beliefs about, the state of his 
cognitive machinery or the relevant state of the world. Thus, like 
the meaning theorist, who is assumed to know facts about what it is 
to follow certain rules which his object of study may not, the 
naturalized epistemologist is assumedto know facts about her object 
of study's cognitive states and about the state of the world which 
her object of study may not. 
Argument (I), then, represents the first reason for thinking that 
there is something problematic about following a rule. A second 
argument is strongly suggested by various passages in Wittgenstein' s 
writings, and is also suggested by certain comments of ~ripke's'~~. 
In his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Wittgenstein 
1 9 7 8 ) ,  Wittgenstein asks, 
 h he 
character 
McDowell 
following argument is in some respects similar to the 
ization of the rule-following problem as a dilemma, in 
1984. See section I11 below for more on this. 
' ~ n  what follows, I do not mean to be defending an 
interpretation of Wittgenstein. As it happens, I believe that the 
following argument reconstructs Wittgenstein's thinking better than 
the argument given above, but I will not argue for this claim. 
How c a n  t h e  word  "Slab"' '  i n d i c a t e  what  I h a v e  t o  do ,  when 
a f t e r  a l l  I c a n  b r i n g  a n y  a c t i o n  i n t o  a c c o r d  w i t h  a n y  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ?  
How c a n  I f o l l o w  a r u l e ,  when a f t e r  a l l  w h a t e v e r  I d o  c a n  be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  as f o l l o w i n g  i t ?  
What m u s t  I know, i n  o r d e r  t o  be able t o  obey  t h e  o r d e r ?  Is 
t h e r e  some knowledge ,  wh ich  makes  t h e  r u l e  f o l l o w a b l e  i n  o n l y  
t h i s  way? ( p . 3 4 1  - W i t t g e n s t e i n f s  i t a l i c s )  
The  p r o b l e m  i s  p u t  e v e n  more  d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p a s s a g e :  
How d o  I know t h a t  i n  w o r k i n g  o u t  t h e  series +2 I mus t  
w r i t e  
"20004,  20006" 
a n d  n o t  
"20004,  20008"? 
- (The  q u e s t i o n :  "How d o  I know t h a t  t h i s  c o l o u r  i s  ' r e d r ? ' I  i s  
s i m i l a r .  ) " . 
"But you  s u r e l y  know f o r  e x a m p l e  t h a t  you  mus t  a l w a y s  w r i t e  
t h e  same s e q u e n c e  o f  number s  i n  t h e  u n i t s :  2, 4 ,  6, 8 ,  0 ,  2 ,  
4 ,  e t c .  - Q u i t e  t r u e :  t h e  p r o b l e m  m u s t  a l r e a d y  a p p e a r  i n  t h i s  
s e q u e n c e ,  a n d  e v e n  i n  t h i s  o n e :  2 ,  2 ,  2 ,  2, e t c .  -For how d o  
I know t h a t  I am t o  w r i t e  "2" a f t e r  t h e  f i v e  h u n d r e d t h  "2"? 
i . e .  t h a t  ' t h e  same f i g u r e t  i n  t h a t  2lace i s  "2"? And i f  I 
know i t  i n  a d v a n c e ,  what  u s e  i s  t h i s  knowledge  t o  m e  l a te r  o n ?  
I mean: how d o  I know what  t o  d o  w i t h  t h i s  e a r l i e r  knowledge  
when t h e  s t e p  a c t u a l l y  h a s  t o  be t a k e n ?  ( p . 3 6  - W i t t g e n s t e i n f s  
i t a l i c s ) .  
T h e s e  p a s s a g e s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  I am n e v e r  j u s t i f i e d  when, i n  d o i n g  what  
I t a k e  t o  be f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e ,  I c o n t i n u e  i n  o n e  way r a t . h e r  t h a n  
a n o t h e r .  T o  spel l  t h i s  o u t ,  i m a g i n e  t h a t  I a m  seated a t  my d e s k ,  
e n g a g e d  i n  wha t  I wou ld  n o r m a l l y  t a k e  t o  be some r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  
a c t i v i t y  - c o u n t i n g  b y  t w o s ,  l e t  u s  suppose-  w r i t i n g  down s u c c e s s i v e  
v a l u e s  o f  t h e  series more  o r  less a u t o m a t i c a l l y .  I n  a moment o f  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  s e l f - e x a m i n a t i o n ,  however ,  I a s k  m y s e l f  "What 
j u s t i f i e s  me i n  w r i t i n g  down '20006' a n d  n o t  '20008'  a f t e r  '20004 '?  
-What i s  my g r o u n d  f o r  w r i t i n g  o n e  t h i n g  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n o t h e r ? " .  I n  
t h e  n o r m a l  c o u r s e  o f  e v e n t s ,  e v i d e n t l y ,  I s i m p l y  write down t h e  
s u c c e s s i v e  numbers  u n t h i n k i n g l y ,  b u t  I b e l i e v e  t h a t  I a m  d o i n g  more  
' O C ~ .  t h e  l a n g u a g e  game i n  wh ich  a b u i l d e r  s h o u t s  " S l a b ! "  t o  
h i s  h e l p e r  i n  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  I n v e s t i g a t i o n s  ( W i t t g e n s t e i n  1 9 5 8 )  , 52 .  
t h a n  m e r e l y  w r i t i n g  down w h a t e v e r  s t r i k e s  e y  f a n c y .  The  q u e s t i o n  
ra ised  i s  a n  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  o n e :  a l t h o u g h  I s u r e l y  seem t o  be 
j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  20006 f o l l o w s  20004 i n  t h e  g i v e n  series,  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  wha t  my j u s t i f i c a t i o n  is .  
One p o s s i b l e  a n s w e r  t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s  t h a t  I a m  j u s t i f i e d  i n  
f o l l o w i n g  20004 w i t h  20006 r a t h e r  t h a n  20008 ( o r  a n y t h i n g  e l s e ) ,  
b e c a u s e  when I c o u n t  b y  t w o s  I f o l l o w  t h e  more  b a s i c  r u l e  ' c o u n t  by  
o n e s  a n d  w r i t e  down e v e r y  o t h e r  n u m b e r f ,  a n d  t h i s  s p e c i f i e s  t h a t  
20006,  a n d  n o t  20008,  f o l l o w s  20004.  A s  W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s  f a m i l i a r  
comments o n  r u l e s  f o r  f o l l o w i n g  r u l e s  make p l a i n ,  however ,  t h i s  w i l l  
n o t  s u f f i c e i ' .  T h i s  a n s w e r  s i m p l y  raises t h e  q u e s t i o n s  'What 
j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  f o l l o w i n g  20004 by  20005 r a t h e r  t h a n  a n y t h i n g  e l se  
when c o u n t i n g  b y  ones?', a n d  'What j u s t i f i e s  me i n  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  
r u l e  "Write down e v e r y  o t h e r  number1' as I d o ? ' .  I n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  
a n s w e r s  t o  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s ,  I h a v e  n o  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  s u c c e e d i n g  
20004 w i t h  20006 i n  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  i n i t i a l  r u l e .  T h i s ,  m o r e o v e r ,  
i n d i c a t e s  t h e  p e r v a s i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m :  i f  t h e r e  i s  a p r o b l e m  
a b o u t  my f o l l o w i n g  s u c h  b a s i c  r u l e s  as  t h e  r u l e  f o r  c o u n t i n g  by 
o n e s ,  t h e n  t h e r e  i s  l i k e w i s e  a  p r o b l e m  a b o u t  t h e  who le  e d i f i c e  o f  
my r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  a c t i v i t i e s .  
R e l a t e d  o b j e c t i o n s  a t t e n d  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  I am j u s t i f i e d  i n  
w r i t i n g  or,e number r a t h e r  t h a n  a n o t h e r  b y  some s o r t  o f  i n t u i t i o n .  
A s  W i t t g e n s t e i n  n o t e s ,  
I f  i n t u i t i o n  i s  a n  i n n e r  v o i c e  -how d o  I know how I a m  t o  obey  
i t ?  And how d o  I know t h a t  it d o e s  n o t  m i s l e a d  me? F o r  i f  i t  
c a n  g u i d e  m e  r i g h t ,  i t  c a n  a l s o  g u i d e  m e  wrong.  
( ( I n t u i t i o n  a n  u n n e c e s s a r y  s h u f f l e ) ) .  ( W i t t g e n s t e i n  1 9 5 8 ,  
5 2 1 3 )  
l l c f .  W i t t g e n s t e i n  1 9 5 8 ,  5486,  152,  211 ,  2 3 9 .  
I t  i s  n o t  c lear  how a n  i n t u i t i o n  c o u l d  justify a n y  g i v e n  
c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e ,  u n l e s s  t h e r e  i s  r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  
i n t u i t i o n  i s  a r e l i a b l e  g u i d e .  How d o  I know t h a t  my i n t u i t i o n s  a r e  
n o t  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  wrong? 
The outcome o f  t h e s e  i n t i a l  r e f l e c t i o n s  i s  t h a t  I have  no 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  c o n t i n u i n g  a n y  g i v e n  r u l e ,  a t  a n y  j u n c t u r e ,  i n  any  
way. T h i s  i s  as much a s  t o  s a y  t h a t  i n  c o n t i n u i n g  any  g i v e n  r u l e ,  
I u l t i m a t e l y  mus t  a c t  w i t h o u t  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  r e a s o n s  -I must  make 
a ' l e a p  i n  t h e  d a r k f .  To bor row a comment o f  W i t t g e n s t e i n t s ,  "When 
I obey  a r u l e ,  I d o  n o t  c h o o s e .  I obey  t h e  r u l e  T h a t  
t h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e ,  i s  t h e  f i r s t  p r e m i s e  o f  t h i s  s e c o n d  a rgument :  
P r e m i s e  1: I n  d o i n g  what  I t a k e  t o  be f o l l o w i n g  a  r u l e ,  I h a v e  
no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  c o n t i n u i n g ,  a t  a n y  j u n c t u r e ,  i n  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  way. 
C o n s i d e r  n e x t ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p l a t i t u d e  a b o u t  r u l e - f o l l o w i n g :  
(P) I f  I a m  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e ,  t h e n ,  a s s u m i n g  I do n o t  want t o  
make a  m i s t a k e ,  I am c o n s t r a i n e d  a t  a n y  g i v e n  j u n c t u r e  t o  
c o n t i n u e  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  way -I am n o t  f r e e  t o  g o  on a s  I 
p l e a s e .  
I f  I a m  c o u n t i n g  by t w o s  a n d  I do n o t  want t o  make a  m i s t a k e ,  t h e n  
a f t e r  I ' v e  w r i t t e n ,  s a y ,  "546", I a m  c o n s t r a i n e d  t o  w r i t e  "548" .  
More g e n e r a l l y ,  i f ,  i n  w r i t i n g  down symbols  on a  page ,  I were f r e e  
a t  a n y  j u n c t u r e  t o  w r i t e  w h a t e v e r  I p l e a s e d ,  t h e n  I would n o t  b e  
f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e  -what I would b e  d o i n g  would b e s t  b e  d e s c r i b e d  a s  
d o o d l i n g .  T h i s  p l a t i t u d e ,  however ,  v e r y  p l a u s i b l y  e n t a i l s  
(P') I f  I am justified in believing t h a t  I am f o l l o w i n g  a  
r u l e ,  t h e n  I am justified in believing t h a t  I am c o n s t r a i n e d  
a t  any  g i v e n  j u n c t u r e  t o  c o n t i n u e  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  way. 
How, a f t e r  a l l ,  c o u l d  I be j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I a m  
f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e ,  w i t h o u t  my t h e r e b y  b e i n g  j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  
t h a t  I am c o n s t r a i n e d  i n  how I c a n  g o  o n ?  
O b s e r v e  n e x t ,  however ,  t h a t  i f ,  i n  d o i n g  what  I t a k e  t o  be 
f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e ,  I h a v e  no  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  c o n t i n u i n g ,  a t  a n y  
j u n c t u r e ,  i n  a n y  way - i f ,  t h a t  is ,  P r e m i s e  1 i s  t r u e -  t h e n  i t  
a p p e a r s  t o  be t h e  case t h a t  I am not j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I 
a m  c o n s t r a i n e d  as t o  how t o  c o n t i n u e .  F o r  it a p p e a r s  t h a t  n o t h i n g  
c o u l d  c o u n t  as j u s t i f y i n g  my b e l i e f  t h a t  I am c o n s t r a i n e d  t o  go  on 
i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  way i n  p u r s u i n g  some a c t i v i t y  o f  mine ,  o t h e r  t h a n  
my h a v i n g  t h e  s o r t  o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  c a r r y i n g  o n  i n  o n e  way a s  
o p p o s e d  t o  a n o t h e r  a t  a n y  g i v e n  j u n c t u r e ,  wh ich  P r e m i s e  1 d e n i e s  I 
h a v e .  To p u t  t h i s  a n o t h e r  way: p r i o r  t o  h a v i n g  r e f l e c t e d  o n  a n y  o f  
t h e  f o r e g o i n g ,  I w o u l d  p r e s u m a b l y  h a v e  s a id  t h a t  my j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I ' m  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e  o n  a g i v e n  o c c a s i o n  i s  t h a t  
I h a v e  some j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  g o i n g  o n  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  cases as  I d o .  
I n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  my h a v i n g  a n y  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s ,  
however ,  it a p p e a r s  t h a t  I c a n n o t  j u s t i f y  my b e l i e f  t h a t  I ' m  
c o n s t r a i n e d  t o  c a r r y  o n  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  way. F o r  f u t u r e  r e f e r e n c e ,  
c a l l  t h i s  c la in  ( C )  : 
( C )  I f ,  i n  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e ,  I h a v e  no  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
c o n t i n u i n g  a t  a n y  g i l l e n  j u n c t u r e  i n  a n y  way, t h e n  it i s  n o t  
t h e  case t h a t  I a m  j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I am 
c o n s t r a i n e d  a t  a n y  g i v e n  j u n c t u r e  t o  c o n t i n u e  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
way. 
Bu t  f r o m  P r e m i s e  1, ( C ) ,  a n d  P', it f o l l o w s  t h a t  I c a n n o t  j u s t i f y  
my bel ief  t h a t  I ' m  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e  r a t h e r  t h a n  m e r e l y  p r o d u c i n g  
a r b i t r a r y  n o i s e s  o r  s c r i b b l e s .  I f  t h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e ,  t h e n  my b e l i e f  
t h a t  I 'm  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e  on  a n y  g i v e n  o c c a s i o n  i s  r e a l l y  j u s t  a 
g r o u n d - l e v e l ,  u n j u s t i f i a b l e  c o n v i c t i o n .  
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The second Premise of this argument, then, is that if I have no 
justification for carrying on in one way rather than another ill 
doing what I take to be following a rule --that is, if I carry on 
'blindlyt- then I have no justification for my belief that I am 
following a rule and not just speaking or writing arbitrarily13. 
Again, if this is correct, and if the first premise is also correct, 
then I am never justified in believing that I'm following a rule. 
One might object to this that what justifies one's belief that 
one is following a rule is some sort of 'feelingf. This objection 
is inspired by the thought that, in following a rule, one has 
something like a feeling of concentration or of compulsion which is 
absent when one merely produces arbitrary noises or scribbles. This 
suggestion, however, misses the point. What I lack is a reason as 
to why those experiences which I take to be experiences of following 
a rule are evidence that I am following a rule. These experiences 
of concentration or compulsion give me no justification for 
believing that I am constrained in how to go on by anything other 
than my transient preferences. 
As it stands, this conclusion seems to threaten my apparently 
reasonable belief that I sometimes follow rules. Before proceeding 
to consider what the threat amounts to, it is worth considering one 
prima facie plausible response to it. This response is to accept the 
conclusion, but to deny that beliefs about rule-following, in order 
to be reasonable, must be justified. That is, the suggestion is that 
my belief that I am following a rule is reasonable despite my 
lacki~~g any justification for it. Now, insofar as the principle that 
I3~his premiss is just the conjunction of ( C )  and the 
contrapositive of (P') . 
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a belief can be reasonable although not justified, is appealed to 
in responding to scepticism about certain kinds of facts other than 
facts about rule-following, this possibility looks promising. For 
example, where my belief that there is an external world is 
concerned, plausibly, the answer to the sceptic who argues that it 
is unjustified, is to agree that I have no justification, but to 
maintain that the belief is reasonable nevertheless. If forms of 
scepticism such as scepticism concerning the existence of an 
external world can be met by appealing to this principle, then 
perhaps it applies where rule-following is concerned, as well. 
The claim in question, then, is that my belief that, in saying 
or writing what I have been, I have been following a rule, is 
reasonable although not justified. NOW, there are three conceptions 
of what the content of the belief might be, each of which entails 
one or another problem for this claim. First, it might be supposed 
that any arbitrary sequence of numbers (or letters or whatever), 
however erratic, is the extension of some rule, and that the content 
of my belief that I am following a rule is merely that I am 
following some one such rule. In this case, the difficulty is that 
it will be a matter of indifference whether my belief is true or 
not. Regardless of what I say Qr write, there will always be a rule 
to which I have conformed with complete accuracy -indeed, for any 
finite sequence, there will always be infinitely many rules to which 
it conforms (given that any finite sequence is a part of infinitely 
many infinite sequences). In such a case, then, the only difference 
between my acting randomly and my following a rule, would be the 
absense or presence of an epistemologically inaccessible relation 
between my actions and the rule. Since my belief that I'm following 
a r u l e  i s  p r e s u m a b l y  n o t  s u p p o s e d  t o  be i r r e l e v a n t  i n  t h i s  way, t h i s  
c a n n o t  be wha t  t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  my b e l i e f  i s  s u p p o s e d  t o  b e .  
A s e c o n d  s u g g e s t i o n  i s  t h a t  o n l y  c e r t a i n  s e q u e n c e s  - ' s i m p l e '  o r  
' n a t u r a l t  s e q u e n c e s -  are t h e  e x t e n s i o n s  o f  r u l e s ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  
c o n t e n t  o f  my b e l i e f  i s  t h a t  I am f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e  t h u s  c o n s t r u e d .  
The p r o b l e m  w i t h  t h i s  s u g g e s t i o n  c a n  be p u t  as a d i l emma.  I f ,  on  t h e  
o n e  h a n d ,  wha t  c o u n t s  a s  a s i m p l e  o r  n a t u r a l  r u l e  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  by 
m e ,  t h e n  my b e l i e f  t h a t  I ' m  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e  becomes  a t r i v i a l  
m a t t e r .  I f  i t  i s  u p  t o  m e  t o  d e c i d e  what  i s  a n d  what  i s  n o t  s i m p l e ,  
t h e n  w h e t h e r  I ' m  f o l l o w i n g  a  .ru:.e - i . e . ,  w h e t h e r  t h e  s e q u e n c e  I ' v e  
b e e n  p r o d u c i n g  c o n f o r m s  t o  a ' s i m p l e t  r u l e -  i s  u p  t o  m e .  The p r o b l e m  
w i t h  t h i s  s u g g e s t i o n  i s  t h a t ,  i f  it were c o r r e c t ,  the11 " t h i n k i n g  o n e  
was o b e y i n g  a r u l e  would  be t h e  same t h i n g  as  o b e y i n g  i t "  
( W i t t g e n s t e i n  1 9 5 8 ,  9 2 0 2 ) .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  i f  what  c o u n t s  as  a 
s i m p l e  r u l e  i s  f i x e d  by  s o m e t h i n g  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  m e ,  t h e n  my h a v i n g  
m e r e l y  a b r u t e  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  I ' m  f o l l o w i n g  a  r u l e  c a n n o t  b e  enough 
t o  make t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  I am, r e a s o n a b l e .  F o r ,  i f  t h e  r u l e  i s  t r u l y  
i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  me, t h e n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  I ' m  f o l l o w i n g  
i t  w i l l  n o t  be r e s o l v a b l e  b y  a p p e a l  s o l e l y  t o  how t h i n g s  s t a n d  w i t h  
m e .  The q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  my b r u t e  c o n v i c t i o n s  a re  r e l i a b l e  
i. i i c a t o r s  o f  w h e t h e r  I ' m  f o l l o w i n g  r u l e s ,  t h a t  i s ,  w i l l  n o t  b e  
r e s o l v a b l e  s o l e l y  b y  l o o k i n g  a t  my b r u t e  c o n v i c t i o n s .  
A t h i r d  a n d  f i n a l  s u g g e s t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  my b e l i e f  i s  
t h a t  I 'm f o l l o w i n g  a  p a r t i c u l a r  r u l e ,  wh ich  I h a v e  somehow 
i d e n t i f i e d .  The  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t h i s  s u g g e s t i o n  i s  t h a t  i t  r a i s e s  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  as  t o  how I c a n  i d e n t i f y  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  r u l e  i n  t h e  
r e q u i s i t e  way. F o r  how c a n  I s p e c i f y  - t o  m y s e l f  o r  anyone  else- 
wh ich  r u l e  I 'm f o l l o w i n g ,  o t h e r  t h a n  by  w r i t i n g  o u t  i t s  i n s t a ~ ~ c e s ?  
A s  W i t t g e n s t e i n  r e p e a t e d l y  e m p h a s i z e s ,  it i s  no h e l p  f o r  m e  t o  
a p p e a l  t o  a f o r m u l a  o r  p i c t u r e  h e r e ,  i n a s m u c h  as what  i s  a t  i s s u e  
i s  what  t h e  f o r m u l a  o r  p i c t u r e  p r e s c r i b e s 1 4 .  I t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  
d i f f i c u l t y  o f  g i v i n g  c o n t e n t  t o  t h e  i d e a  o f  h a v i n g  a  r u l e  ' i n  mind'  
i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  g i v i n g  i n s t a n c e s  o f  i t ,  which  g i v e s  r i se  t o  t h i s  
r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  p r o b l e m  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e .  
The  u p s h o t  o f  t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i s  t h a t  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  r e a c h e d  
a b o v e ,  t h a t  I ' m  n e v e r  j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I ' m  f o l l o w i n g  a 
r u l e ,  e n t a i l s  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  it i s  n e v e r  r e a s o n a b l e  f o r  m e  t o  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  I ' m  f o l l o w i n g  a  r u l e .  I f  t h e  b a s i c  a r g u m e n t  i s  c o r r e c t ,  
t h e n ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  e v e r y  b e l i e f  o f  m i n e  t h a t  I am f o l l o w i n g  a 
r u l e  i s  a n  u n r e a s o n a b l e  b e l i e f ,  wh ich ,  i f  I o u g h t  n o t  t o  b e l i e v e  
what  i s  u n r e a s o n a b l e ,  I o u g h t  t o  r e n o u n c e .  T h i s  i s  n o t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
t o  d e n y  t h a t  wha t  I call ' f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e '  ' f e e l s f  d i f f e r e n t  t h a n ,  
s a y ,  compos ing  f r i v o l o u s  f r e e - f o r m  n o n s e n s e  poems.  The p o i n t  i s ,  
r a t h e r ,  t h a t  my f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e  i s  s u p p o s e d  t o  b e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  b y  
i t s  b e i n g  s o m e t h i n g  wh ich  c o n s t r a i n s  m e  i n  how I c a n  g o  o n ,  a n d  i t  
a p p e a r s  t h a t  I c a n  h a v e  n o  r e a s o n  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h o s e  a c t i v i t i e s  
which  I h a v e  h i t h e r t o  c o u n t e d  a s  f o l l o w i n g  r u l e s  h a v e  t h i s  p r o p e r t y .  
I f  t h i s  i s  c o r r e c t ,  t h e n  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  a n d  
s p e a k i n g  o r  w r i t i n g  a r b i t r a r i l y ,  f o r  m e ,  i s  i d l e .  I f  b e i n g  c o r r e c t  
o r  i n c o r r e c t  i s  wha t  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  i n s t a n c e s  o f  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e  
f r o m  i n s t a n c e s  o f  f o l l o w i n g  a whim, t h e n  I h a v e  no  g r o u n d s  f o r  
d r a w i n g  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  -I h a v e  n o  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t a k i n g  t h e r e  
t o  b e  s u c h  a t h i n g  as  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e .  I f  I b e l i e v e  o n l y  what it 
i s  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  b e l i e v e ,  t h e n  I w i l l  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  t h e r e  j.s no s u c h  
t h i n g  a s  f o l l o w i n g  a  r u l e .  T h i s  a r g u m e n t ,  t h e n ,  s h a r e s  i n  common 
' 4See ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  W i t t g e n s t e i n  1958, 5586, 152 ,  198,  201. 
w i t h  t h e  f i r s t  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  it f i n d s  t h a t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  f o l l o w i n g  
a r u l e  i s  e m p t y .  
The  f o r e g o i n g  a r g u m e n t ,  t h e n ,  c a n  be b r i e f l y  e n c a p s u l a t e d  t h u s :  
( 2 )  When e n g a g e d  i n  a c t i v i t i e s  wh ich  I a m  i n c l i n e d  t o  c a l l  
' r u l e - f o l l o w i n g 1  a c t i v i t i e s ,  I h a v e  n o  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  a t  a n y  
g i v e n  j u n c t u r e  f o r  c o n t i n u i n g  i n  o n e  way as  o p p o s e d  t o  
a n o t h e r .  I f  t h i s  i s  t h e  case, however ,  t h e n  I c a n  p r o v i d e  no  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  my b e l i e f  t h a t  I am e v e r  f o l l o w i n g  a  r u l e  
a n d  n o t  j u s t  a c t i n g  o r  w r i t i n g  a r b i t r a r i l y .  S i n c e  my b e l i e f  
t h a t  I ' m  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e  i s  t h e  s o r t  o f  b e l i e f  which  i s  
r e a s o n a b l e  o n l y  i f  it c a n  be j u s t i f i e d ,  it i s  n o t  r e a s o n a b l e  
f o r  me t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  my 
f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e  a n d  s p e a k i n g  o r  w r i t i n g  a r b i t r a r i l y .  
A s  w i t h  a r g u m e n t  (I), t h i s  a r g u m e n t  a p p l i e s  a l s o  t o  mean ing  
s o m e t h i n g  b y  a word .  To see t h i s ,  i m a g i n e  t h a t ,  i n s t e a d  o f  s i t t i n g  
a t  my d e s k ,  I a m  s i t t i n g  a t  a window p i c k i n g  o u t  g r e e n  a u t o m o b i l e s  
a s  t h e y  p a s s  b y  o u t s i d e ,  a n d  I a s k  m y s e l f  'What j u s t i f i e s  me i n  
c a l l i n g  t h a t  l a s t  T o y o t a  ' g r e e n f  b u t  n o t  t h i s  ~ h r y s l e r ? ' "  The 
q u e s t i o n  t h i s  t i m e  c o n c e r n s  what  j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  u s i n g  a word as  I 
d o .  I h a v e  u s e d  t h e  word  ' g r e e n '  i n  t h e  p a s t  o n  c o u n t l e s s  o c c a s i o n s ,  
g r a n t e d ,  b u t  how comes it t o  be t h a t  I a m  now j u s t i f i e d  i n  a p p l y i n g  
it as  I d o ?  I t  c a n n o t  be s i m p l y  i n  v i r t u e  o f  my h a v i n g  i n  mind a 
m e n t a l  c o l o u r  s a m p l e ,  i n a s m u c h  as  t h e  q u e s t i o n  'What j u s t i f i e s  m e  
i n  c o u n t i n g  t h i s  c o l o u r  a n d  t h e  c o l o u r  o f  my m e n t a l  s a m p l e  a s  t h e  
same?'  wou ld  be no  l e ss  p r o b l e m a t i c  t h a n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  a t  h a n d L 6 .  
The q u e s t i o n ,  t h e n ,  i s ,  wha t  j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  c a l l i n g  t h i s  o b j e c t  
' g r e e n '  b u t  n o t  t h a t ,  a n d  i f  n o t h i n g  d o e s  - t h a t  i s ,  i f  my u s e s  o f  
' g r e e n '  a r e  b l i n d -  t h e n  what  i s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  my u s i n g  t h e  
p r e d i c a t e  ' g r e e n f  m e a n i n g f u l l y  a n d m y  m e r e l y  c h a t t e r i n g  a r b i t r a r i l y ?  
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*-Tha t  i s ,  I ' m  d o i n g  what  I would ,  p r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ,  t a k e  t o  
b e  p i c k i n g  o u t  g r e e n  a u t o m o b i l e s .  
: 6 C f .  W i t t g e n s t e i n  1 9 5 8 ,  5 7 3 .  
T h e r e  a re  t w o  a s p e c t s  of  t h i s  a r g u m e n t  w o r t h  t a k i n g  n o t e  o f ,  
p a r a l l e l  t o  t h e  two a s p e c t s  n o t e d  o f  a r g u m e n t  (1) .  The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  
it c o n c e r n s  my justification f o r  t a k i n g  m y s e l f  t o  be f o l l o w i n g  a 
r u l e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  what  f a c t  makes i t  t h e  case t h a t  I am a  f o l l o w e r  
o f  some r u l e .  N o t i c e ,  a g a i n ,  t h a t  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  would  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  y i e l d  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  f o r m e r  - t h e r e  m i g h t  be a f a c t  
a s  t o  w h e t h e r  I ' m  i n  some s t a t e  w i t h o u t  my b e i n g  j u s t i f i e d  i n  t a k i n g  
m y s e l f  t o  be i n  t h e  g i v e n  s t a t e .  The s e c o n d  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t h e  p e r s o n  
whose j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t a k i n g  h i m s e l f  t o  b e  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e  I am 
c a l l i n g  i n t o  q u e s t i o n ,  i s  myself. T h a t  i s ,  t h e  i n q u i r e r  a n d  t h e  
s u b j e c t  o f  i n q u i r y  a re  t h e  same pe r son1 ' .  T h i s  makes t h e  a rgumen t  
q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  t h a n ,  s a y ,  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t o  t h e  weake r  c o n c l u s i o n  
t h a t  I a m  n o t  j u s t i f i e d  i n  t a k i n g  my f r i e n d  J o n e s  t o  b e  f o l l o w i n g  
a  r u l e .  S u c h  a c o n c l u s i o n  m i g h t  b e  t r u e  e v e n  i f  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  
a r g u m e n t  ( 2 )  i s  f a l s e .  I f ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  I a m  n o t  j u s t i f i e d  i n  
t a k i n g  m y s e l f  t o  be f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e ,  t h e n  n o r  c a n  I be j u s t i f i e d  
i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  a n y o n e  e l se  i s  f o l l o w i n g  a  r u l e .  I f  I c a n n o t  
d i s t i n g u i s h  my f o l l o w i n g  a  r u l e  f r o m m y  c h a t t e r i n g  a r b i t r a r i l y ,  t h e n  
I h a v e  no r a t i o n a l  b a s i s  f o r  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h a t  I e v e r  f o l l o w  r u l e s ,  
a n d  i f  t h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e ,  t h e n  n o r  do  I h a v e  a r a t i o n a l  b a s i s  f o r  
f o r m i n g  j u d g e m e n t s  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  a n y o n e  e lse  e v e r  d o e s .  I n  t h e s e  two 
r e s p e c t s ,  a r g u m e n t  ( 2 )  d i f f e r s  f r o m  a r g u m e n t  (1) . Argument (I), i t  
w i l l  be r e c a l l e d ,  c o n c e r n e d  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  i s  a n y  f a c t  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  
some p e r s o n  d i s t i n c t  f r o m  my p r e s e n t  s e l f  i s  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e .  
" ~ n  terms o f  J o n e s ,  t h e n ,  t h e  p o i n t  would  b e  t h a t  it i s  Jones '  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t a k i n g  h i m s e l f  t o  be f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  
o u r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t a k i n g  J o n e s  t o  b e  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e .  
In the two respects just noted, argument (2) resembles 
traditional epistemological arguments such as Humef s argument that 
he has no justification for believing in bodies whose existence is 
continued and distinct from his own. His argument is that any belief 
in the existence of such a body would have to be justified either 
by sensory evidence or by reason, and neither suffices. The senses 
are insufficient, because they afford evidence for the existence of 
a body only as long as the body is being sensed, and because they 
deliver at best 'impressionsf from which the distinctness of bodies 
must be inferred, rather than direct evidence of this distinctness 
(Hume 1739, Bk I, Part IV, 511) . Supplementing Hume somewhat, we can 
say that reason is insufficient because it affords no principle 
which implies the existence of distinct, continuous bodies". Like 
argument ( 2 ) ,  then, Humef s argument (as supplemented) trades on what 
he, given his epistemically limited perspective, is justified in 
believing. Hume does not purport to show that there can be no bodies 
whose existence is continued and distinct from his own; rather, he 
argues that he cannot justify believing that there are any. And, 
again as with argument (2), Hume deduces this from what he himself 
is justified in believing -an inquiry into what his friend Jones is 
justified in believing, evidently, would presuppose the existence 
of Jones, which the initial conclusion precludes. 
On the model of this argument of Hume's, we might say that the 
conclusion of argument ( 2 )  is that my belief that 1' am following a 
''~urne in fact argues, not that reason cannot justify the 
belief in the existence of continued and distinct objects, but that 
reason is at least usually not the source of the belief. He 
concludes this on the grounds that "the greastest part of mankind" 
have no knowledge of any arguments that might be given for the 
existence of continued and distinct objects, but believe in them 
nevertheless. (Ibid.) 
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rule as I write "2, 4, 6, 8, . . ."  is neither the product of my 
senses gor of reason, but of my imagination (Cf. Hume 1739, p.244). 
Understood in this way, it is apparently quite different than the 
conclusion of argument (1). Indeed, arguments (1) and ( 2 )  are as 
different as are the arguments which arise in naturalized and Humean 
epistemology. 
Arguments (1) and ( 2 ) ,  then, appear to be different arguments. 
It may remain unclear, however, just what their differences come to. 
In order to illuminate this, it will be useful to compare what each 
of the arguments suggests is inadequate with some particular theory 
of rule-following or meaning. The obvious choice for such a theory 
is the dispositional theory, which Kripke criticizes in the course 
of setting out his sceptical argument. 
The basic dispositional theory of meaning is simply that to mean 
something by a word is to have a disposition to use it in a certain 
way. Paul Boghossian, in his discussion of rule-following, states 
the theory more precisely, thus: 
[Speaker] 0 means (property) P by predicate S iff (it is a 
counterfactual supporting generalization that) 0 is disposed 
to apply S to P. (Boghossian 1989, p.528. Boghossian goes on 
to reject this theory). 
This theory, then, suggests an answer to the question as to what 
fact about Jones makes it the case that he means something by his 
words. Jones means green by 'green', according to this theory, if 
and only if he is disposed to apply the word 'green' to green 
things. NOW, inasmuch as one is plainly not disposed to apply the 
word 'green' to every green thing that crosses one's path, and 
inasmuch as it is not clear just what counts as 'applying a word to 
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a propertyf, this theory evidently needs some elucidation and 
refinement. Let us consider how advocates of arguments (1) and (2) 
might respond to it, however, on the assumption that it can be 
refined to meet these preliminary objections. 
Argument (I), it will be recalled, is that there are no facts 
about any given speaker which choose between the different possible 
meaning-hypotheses which are consistent with her behaviour to date. 
The suggestion at hand is that facts about a speaker's linguistic 
dispositions do just this. Kripkef s familiar criticisms of this 
theory are that it fails to account for the finiteness of our 
dispositions, and that it fails to accomodate the possibility that 
one might be disposed systematically to misapply a given predicate 
(Kripke 1982, pp.22-32). Thus, considering just the second 
cri~ticism, according to this theory, if Jones is disposed to apply 
the predicate 'greenf to a certain blue thing, then what Jones means 
by 'greenf is ipso f a c t o  something which includes that blue thing 
in its extension. To rectify the theory, what is needed is something 
which determines which of Jonesf dispositions to call things 'green' 
are erroneous. For the purpose of defending argument (1) against 
this basic theory, then, it is sufficient to observe that 
dispositional facts, by themselves, fail to determine which uses of 
a predicate are true and which are false, and hence underdetermine 
what is meant by the predicate. 
There are various ways in which one might adapt the basic 
dispositional theory in order to try to meet this criticism. The 
point of rehearsing the dispositional theory and this criticism of 
it, however, is not to evaluate the theoryfs prospects as a 
refutation of argument (I), but to contrast this response with the 
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response appropriate to an exponent of argument (2). Recall that 
argument (2) as it applies to meaning, .is that inasmuch as in doing 
what I take to be using a word meaningfully, I have no justification 
for using it one way rather than another and therefore appear not 
to have any way of distinguishing speaking meaningfully from merely 
chattering arbitrarily, I have no justification for taking there to 
be such a thing as speaking meaningfully. Where this argument is 
concerned, it appears, the dispositional theory of meaning is simply 
beside the point. For what in the argument is it supposed to impugn? 
My dispositions do not, evidently, justify me in going on one way 
rather than another. More to the point, however, I beg the question 
if I assume that I can unproblematically predicate of rr,yself some 
dispositional property. Consider again the basic scenario: I imagine 
myself sitting at my window, calling certain passing objects 
'green', and I wonder what justifies me in doing this as I do, and 
hence what distinguishes this activity from chattering arbitrarily. 
Clearly, exactly the same problem can be raised about my calling any 
given set of tendencies of mine 'the disposition to such-and-sucht. 
Perhaps I have used the expression 'the disposition to such-and- 
sucht in the past on many occasions, but the question is, what 
justifies me in calling these present activities 'the disposition 
to such-and-such'? If the meaningfulness of my use of the word 
'green' is in question, the meaningfulness of my use of such 
abstruse expressions as 'the disposition to such-and-such' is 
unlikely to be any better off. 
The basic dispositional theory of meaning, then, fails to vitiate 
the conclusion either of arguments (1) or ( 2 ) ,  but it fails for very 
different reasons in the two cases. Where argument (1) is concerned, 
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facts about a speakerfs dispositions are admissable as a candidate 
for determining what the speaker means, and must be evaluated as 
such. Where argument (2) is concerned, by contrast, my very ability 
to formulate claims about my dispositions is what is in question, 
whence it won't do to try to appeal to dispositional facts. The 
comparison to epistemology is illuminating here. The status of 
dispositional facts here can be compared to the status of facts 
about the fcnctioning of cerebral mechanisms where epistemology is 
in question. Just as an exponent of argument (1) has to evaluate 
dispositional facts as possible meaning-constituting facts, so a 
naturalized epistemologist might well consider facts about the 
functioning of some cerebral mechanism or other to be relevant to 
whether X knows that p. On the other hand, in trying to solve the 
problem posed by argument ( Z ) ,  one can no more make use of 
dispositional facts than can the Humean appeai to facts about the 
functioning of cerebral mechanisms. Someone engaged in Humean 
epistemology would consider appealing to any fact about the 
functioningof cerebral mechanisms question-begging, since knowledge 
of it would presuppose what is in question, namely, knowledge of 
continued and distinct existences generally. 
The general difference between arguments (1) and (2) is 
illuminated by a comment of W.V. Quine's and a comparison of Colin 
McGinnts. In the course of discussing his rejection of the 
intentional and semantic idioms, Quine observes that his position 
is consistent with Brentanofs thesis that "there is no breaking out 
of the intentional vocabulary by explaining its members in other 
terms" (Quine, 1960 p.220), which is as much as to say that 
(putative) intentional and semantic facts are not reducible to non- 
intentional, non-semantic facts. Quine comments that where he 
differs from Brentano, is in his deriving from the apparent truth 
of this thesis the conclusion that there really are no semantic or 
intentional facts, where Brentano concludes that the truth of the 
thesis e~tails the need for an "autonomous science of intention" 
( p .  221) . Now, as McGinn points o1.t (McGinn 1984, p. 152) , argument 
(I), like the argument motivating Quine, can be construed as 
corroborating the truth of Brentano's thesis, and the exponent of 
argument (I), in adopting the Reductivist Thesis that facts about 
meaning, if such there be, must be reducible to some other, non- 
intentional, non-semantic facts, can be seen as siding with Quine 
rather than Brentano. Without the Reductivist Thesis, however, the 
conclusion of argument (1) leaves open the option, perhaps 
unpalatable but still viable, of following Brentano's suggestio~. 
Bracketting the Reductivist Thesis, then, what argument (1) shows 
is, at most, that semantic facts are not reducible to non-semantic, 
non-intentional facts. The conclusion of argument (2), by contrast, 
is that I never have any justification for taking there to be such 
a thing as mezning something by a word, under any circumstances. 
This conclusion is as much of a problem for the follower of Brentano 
as it is for anyone else. In short, whereas argument (1) purports 
to show that semantic facts are not reducible to non-semantic, non- 
intentional facts, argument (2) purports t-o show that one is never 
justified in taking there to be semantic facts. 
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Argument ( 2 ) ,  then, appears to show that I am not justified in 
taking there to be such a thing as following a rule cr meaning 
s o m e t h i n g  b y  a w o r d .  T h i s  r e s u l t  i s  a t  l eas t  h i g h l y  c o u n t e r -  
i n t u i t i v e ,  a n d  p e r h a p s  e v e n  i n c o h e r e n t .  I t  r e m a i n s ,  t h e n ,  t o  t r y  t o  
f i n d  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  p o s e d  b y  t h i s  a r g u m e n t .  
The  f i r s t  p r e m i s e  o f  a r g u m e n t  ( 2 ) ,  t h a t  i n  f o l l o w i n g  a  r u l e ,  I 
h a v e  no  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  a t  a n y  g i v e n  j u n c t u r e  f o r  c o n t i n u i n g  i n  o n e  
way as  o p p o s e d  t o  a n o t h e r ,  i s ,  i t  a p p e a r s ,  c o r r e c t .  I n  f o l l o w i n g  a  
r u l e ,  I mus t  a l w a y s  u l t i m a t e l y  p r o c e e d  f r o m  wha t  i s  g i v e n  - -pas t  
i n s t a n c e s  o f  t h e  r u l e ,  f o r m u l a e ,  i n t u i t i o n s ,  e tc . -  t o  some a c t i o n ,  
s u c h  as  w r i t i n g  dcwn a number .  S i n c e ,  a t  a n y  j u n c t u r e ,  t h e  c o u r s e  
o f  a c t i o n  d i c t a t e d  b y  a n y  o f  t h e  s o r t s  o f  t h i n g s  t h a t  c a n  b e  g i v e n  
i s  a l w a y s  o p e n  t o  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  t h e  c h o i c e  wh ich  I make u l t i m a t e l y  
m u s t  b e  made ' b l i n d l y r .  I f  a r g u m e n t  ( 2 )  i s  f l a w e d ,  t h e n ,  t h e  e r r o r  
m u s t  be i n  i t s  s e c o n d  premise. R e c a l l  t h a t  t h e  s e c o n d  premise was 
t h a :  i f  I h a v e  no  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  c a r r y i n g  o n  i n  o n e  way r a t h e r  
t h a n  a n o t h e r  i n  d o i n g  what  I t a k e  t o  b e  f o l l o w i n g  a  r u l e  - t h a t  i s ,  
i f  I c a r r y  o n  ' b l i n d l y r -  t h e n  I h a v e  n o  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  my b e l i e f  
t h a t  I am f o l l o w i n g  a  r u l e  a n d  n o t  j u s t  s p e a k i n g  o r  w r i t i n g  
a r b i t r a r i l y .  T h i s  premise was t h e  r e s u l t  o f  c o m b i n i n g  t h e  p l a t i t u d e  
( P ' )  I f  I a m  j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I am f o l l o w i n g  a  
r u l e ,  t h e n ,  a s s u m i n g  I d o  n o t  want  t o  make a  m i s t a k e ,  I am 
j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I am c o n s t r a i n e d  a t  a n y  g i v e n  
j u n c t u r e  t o  c o n t i n u e  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  way - t h a t  I am n o t  f r e e  
t o  g o  o n  as  I p l e a s e ,  
w i t h  t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  ( C )  
( C )  I f ,  i n  f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e ,  I h a v e  no  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
c o n t i n u i n g  i n  a n y  way, t h e n  it i s  n o t  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  I am 
j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I a m  c o n s t r a i n e d  a t  a n y  g i v e n  
j u n c t u r e  t o  c o n t i n u e  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  way. 
The  c o n d i t i o n a l  ( C )  was a c c e p t e d  on  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  it a p p e a r e d  
t h a t  n o t h i n g  o t h e r  t h a n  what  I m i g h t  a p p e a l  t o  i n  a d v a n c e  o f  
c o n t i n u i n g  a  g i v e n  r u l e  -a f o r m u l a  o r  a f e e l i n r ;  o r  a  s e n s e  o f  
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c o n v i c t i o n ,  say- t o  j u s t i f y  m e  i n  g o i n g  on  i n  o n e  way a s  o p p o s e d  t o  
a n o t h e r ,  c a n  g i v e  m e  a n y  r e a s o n  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  I ' m  c o n s t r a i n e d  i n  how 
I s h o u l d  c o n t i n u e  w i t h  t h e  r u l e .  Now, t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  
i s  t o  see t h a t  o n e  c a n  b e  j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  o n e  i s  
c o n s t r a i n e d  i n  how o n e  c a n  go  o n ,  a n d  y e t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  h a v e  no  p r i o r  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  c o n t i n u i n g  as  o n e  d o e s .  What makes t h i s  p o s s i b l e  
i s  b e i n g  a  member o f  a community o f  r u l e  f o l l o w e r s .  The community 
makes t h i s  p o s s i b l e  i n  a v e r y  mundane way: a l t h o u g h  i n  f o l l o w i n g  a  
r u l e ,  I p r o c e e d  ' b l i n d l y f ,  i f  I g o  wrong,  my community w i l l  l e t  me 
know t h a t  I h a v e  -I w i l l  p e r h a p s  be c r i t i c i z e d  a n d  t o l d  t o  p r o c e e d  
d i f f e r e n t l y .  The  p r e s e n c e  o f  my comnluni tyf  s c r i t i c i s m s  a n d  
c o r r e c t i o n s  j u s t i f y  m e  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I a m  c o n s t r a i n e d  i n  how I 
c a n  g o  o n .  
The community s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  p o s e d  d e p e n d s  on t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  a p u b l i c  p r a c t i c e  wh ich  c o u n t s  as  a d e f e a s i b l e  s t a n d a r d  
o f  c o r r e c t n e s s .  T h i s  a p p l i e s  b o t h  t o  t h e  r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  p r o b l e m  a n d  
t h e  p a r a l l e l  p r o b l e m  a b o u t  m e a n i n g .  P l a u s i b l y ,  I c o u n t  t h o s e  o f  my 
( a d m i t t e d l y  b l i n d )  u s e s  o f  words  as  m e a ~ i n g f u l  wh ich  I c a n  see 
c o n f o r m  t o  a pract ice  o f  s p e a k i n g  w i t h  them - i . e . ,  which  ma tch  
r e a s o n a b l y  c l o s e l y  t o  my communi ty ' s  u s e s  o f  t h e  same words ,  a n d  f o r  
wh ich  I am h e l d  a c c o u n t a b l e  by my communi ty .  When I c h a t t e r  
a r b i t r a r i l y ,  on  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e r e  i s  no  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  p u b l i c  
p r a c t i c e  -no-one w i l l  t e l l  m e  t h a t  I f  v e  c h a t t e r e d  i n c o r r e c t l y .  Thus ,  
what  j u s t i f i e s  me i n  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  my u s e s  o f  t h e  word ' g r e e n f  a s  
m e a n i n g f u l  i s  t h a t  t h e y  a re  l a r g e l y  t h e  same as  t h e  u s e s  made o f  i t  
b y  o t h e r  members o f  my community,  a n d  t h a t  where  o u r  u s e s  d i v e r g e ,  
e i t h e r  I ( m o s t  o f t e n )  o r  t h e  o t h e r  members o f  my community ( v e r y  
r a r e l y )  m u s t  r e v i s e  my o r  t h e i r  u s e l g .  S i m i l a r l y ,  I am j u s t i f i e d  i n  
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  a s  i n s t a n c e s  o f ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  m a t h e m a t i c h l  r u l e -  
f o l l o w i n g ,  t h o s e  o f  my d e p l o y m e n t s  o f  m a t h e m a t i c a l  s y m b o l s  which  
m a t c h  r e a s o n a b l y  w e l l  t o  t h e  u s e s  made o f  t h e  s y m b o l s  by  p e o p l e  
p r a c t i c e d  i n  m a t h e m a t i c s ,  a n d  wh ich  a re  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  c o r r e c t i o n  
o f  s u c h  p e o p l e .  
The u p s h o t  o f  t h i s  i s  t h a t  a r g u m e n t  ( 2 )  i s  unsound  b e c a u s e  i t s  
s e c o n d  premise i s  f a l s e .  I t  d o e s  n o t  f o l l o w ,  as  t h e  s e c o n d  p r e m i s e  
e n t a i l s  it does, t h a t  b e c a u s e  my u s e s  o f  w o r d s  a r e  b l i n d ,  I am n o t  
j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  my u s e s  are  m e a n i n g f u l .  I u s e  words  i n  
p u b l i c ,  l i n g u i s t i c  c o n t e x t s  ( i n  " l a n g u a g e  g a m e s " ) ,  i n  wh ich  o t h e r  
p e o p l e  u s e  t h e  same words  a?  I d o ,  a n d  i n  wh ich  d i v e r g e n c e s  i n  o u r  
u s e s  r e q u i r e  c o r r e c t i o n .  I t  i s  t h e s e  f a c t s  wh ich  j u s t i f y  my b e l i e f  
t h a t  I 'm  s p e a k i n g  m e a n i n g f u l l y  r a t h e r  t h a n  c h a t t e r i n g  a r b i t r a r i l y ,  
i n  u s i n g  a g i v e n  w o r d .  
Now, i n  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a r g u m e n t  ( 2 ) ,  o n e  m i g h t  
p r e s s  t h e  q u e s t i o n s ,  wha t  j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  my u s e s  o f  
' g r e e n 1 ,  s a y ,  a r e  the same as  t h o s e  o f  my community,  a n d  what  
j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  i n t e r p r e t i n g  v a r i o u s  o f  t h e i r  u t t e r a n c e s  a n d  
g e s t u r e s  as  e x h o r t a t i o n s  t o  correct my u s e ?  The a n s w e r  t o  t h e s e  
q u e s t i o n s  i s  t h a t  I j u s t  see t h a t  o u r  u s e s  a re  t h e  same,  a n d  I j u s t  
see t h a t  c e r t a i n  u t t e r a n c e s  a n d  g e s t u r e s  a r e  e x h o r t a t i o n s  t o  m e  t o  
c o r r e c t  my u s e ,  much i n  t h e  way t h a t  I see t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a cup on 
my d e s k .  T h u s ,  when I s a y  ' T h a t  a u t o m o b i l e  i s  g r e e n '  a n d  a p e e r  o f  
m i n e  r e s p o n d s  'No i t ' s  n o t ,  t h a t r s  n o t  g r e e n  a t  a l l ' ,  I d o  n o t  
interpret him a s  m e a n i n g  t h e  same a s  what  I mean b y  ' g r e e n '  ( i . e . ,  
"1n p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  i t  i s  much more  r a r e  f o r  my community t o  
h a v e  t o  r e v i s e  i t s  u s e  t h a n  m e ,  I mean no  more  t h a n  t h a t  t h e  
s u b s t a n t i a l  m a j o r i t y  i s  m o s t  o f t e n  r i g h t .  
I do not go through some ratiocinative (rule-follouing) process, 
constructing his meanings out of his non-intentionally characterized 
behaviour) nor do I interpret him to be correcting (or at least 
contradicting) me. That he means green and not grue or any other 
property by 'green' is, under the circumstances, just given. In 
order for me to be able to distinguish my speaking meaningfully or 
my following a rule from my merely chattering arbitrarily, it must 
be the case that I immediately . e l  without interpreting, -to 
interpret is to follow a rule) perceive that certain individuals 
(those who share my 'form of lifef) sometimes have the authority to 
correct my use of a given word, and I theirs. The norm-governed 
practice of speaking a language is, so to speak, epistemically 
'given' . 
This characterization of the implications of argument (2) echoes 
John McDowellr s construal of Wittgenstein' s account of rule- 
following as a public practice, as a solution to a dilemma (McDowell 
1984, esp. ~ p . 3 4 1 ~ 2 ) .  According to McDowell, the first half of the 
dilemma posed by the rule-following problem is that if we construe 
being able to follow a rule as having an interpretation, then we are 
saddled with an infinite regress of interpretations ("Scylla") . The 
obvious solution to this, that rule-following and meaning are merely 
blind or unreflective, threatens to steer us to the other half of 
the dilemma, that rule-following and meaning are illusory insofar 
as they are not governed by any norms -there is nothing to talk but 
arbitrary, blind utterings of sounds ("Charybdis"). McDowell 
comment sf 
The point of PI 5198, and part of the point of 54201-202, is 
that the key to finding the indispensible middle course is the 
idea of a custom or practice. How can a performance both be 
nothing but a 'blind' reaction to a situation, not an attempt 
t o  ac t  o n  a n  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( a v o i d i n g  S c y l l a ) ;  a n d  be a  case 
o f  g o i n g  b y  a r u l e  ( a v o i d i n g  C h a r y b d i s ) ?  The a n s w e r  i s :  b y  
b e l o n g i n g  t o  a c u s t o m  ( P I  5 1 9 8 ) ,  p r a c t i c e  ( P I  5 2 0 2 )  o r  
i n s t i t u t i o n  (RFM V I - 3 1 )  . ( I b i d .  ) 
A s  M c D o w e l l r s  c o n s t r u a l  o f  t h e  r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  p r o b l e m  makes  c lear ,  
t h e  p u b l i c  pract ice,  i f  it i s  t o  p l a y  a r o l e  i n  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  
p r o b l e m ,  m u s t  be n o r m a t i v e .  The  prac t ice ,  t h a t  i s ,  mus t  be more  t h a n  
m e r e l y  a n  a r b i t r a r y ,  u n i f o r m  p a t t e r n  o f  b e h a v i o u r  e x h i b i t e d  b y  some 
set o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  -a m e r e  s t a t i s t i c a l .  phenomenon,  as it  were. I f  
it were j u s t  t h i s ,  w e  wou ld  succumb t o  C h a r i b d i s .  A p r a c t i c e  i s ,  
r a t h e r ,  a p a t t e r n  o f  u s e  w h i c h  c o u n t s  a s  a ( d e f e a s i b l e )  s t a n d a r d  o f  
c o r r e c t n e s s .  When I s a y  o f  some o b j e c t  t h a t  it i s  g r e e n ,  I am 
s p e a k i n g  m e a n i n g f u l l y  n o t  m e r e l y  i n s o f a r  as  t h e r e  e x i s t  o t h e r  
i n d i v i d u a l s  who p r o d u c e  t h e  s o u n d  ' g r e e n f  i n  s im i l a r  s u r r o u n d i n g s ,  
b u t  b e c a u s e  a d i v e r g e n c e  b e t w e e n  my u s a g e  a n d  t h e  c o m u n i t y f s  would 
r e q u i r e  a r e v i s i o n  e i t h e r  o f  my u s e  (mos t  l i k e l y )  o r  e l se  a  r e v i s i o n  
o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y ' s  ( v e r y  u n l i k e l y )  . 
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CHAPTER 3:  A DEFENCE OF THE COMMUNITARIAN CONCEPTION OF LANGUAGE 
S ince  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  I n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  s i n c e  Kripke' s 
commentary on it1, t h e  i d e a  i s  f a m i l i a r  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  s c e p t i c a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  about ru le- fo l lowing o r  meaning which l e a d  t o  t h e  
conclus ion  t h a t  speaking  a language i n  some sense  knowable only  by 
onese l f  -a ' s o l i t a r y  l a n g u a g e f ,  a s  I w i l l  c a l l  it- i s  somehow 
prob lemat i c2 .  Arguments which proceed i n  t h i s  way t y p i c a l l y  assume 
two burdens .  F i r s t ,  t hey  have t o  show t h a t  t h e  s c e p t i c a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  do e n t a i l  t h a t  a  s o l i t a r y  speaker  f a c e s  t h e  problems 
claimed.  Second, t h e y  have t o  show t h a i  t h e  s c e p t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
do not  s i m i l a r l y  undermine communal language.  Now, t h i s  double 
burden n a t u r a l l y  i n v i t e s  two r e l a t e d  o b j e c t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  one might 
a rgue  t h a t  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  r e l e v a n t  s c e p t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
weigh a g a i n s t  s o l i t a r y  language, they  a l s o  undermine communal 
language.  That i s ,  one might argue t h a t  i f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  do make a s c e p t i c a l  case ,  i t  i s  a genera l  case ,  and 
not one which s e l e c t i v e l y  t a r g e t s  s o l i t a r y  language.  Second, one 
might a rgue  t h a t  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  r e sources  of a  community of 
speaker s  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  i n  agreement a f f o r d  a  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  
s c e p t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  s o  a l s o  do analogous r e sources  t h a t  a r e  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  a  speaker  i n  i s o l a t i o n .  The aim of t h i s  chap te r  i s  t o  
defend a  v e r s i o n  of t h e  s c e p t i c a l  argument a g a i n s t  t h e s e  twc l i n e s  
of o b j e c t i o n .  
'Saul Kripke, Wit tgens te in  on Rules  and P r i v a t e  Language 
(Kripke 1 9 8 2 )  . 
2 ~ o r e  w i l l  be s a i d  below about what i s  meant by ' s o l i t a r y  
l a n g u a g e f .  Note a l s o  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of t h e  arguments I r e f e r  t o  
i s  supposed t o  be t h a t  they  undermine only s o l i t a r y  language, and 
not  t h a t  they  e s t a b l i s h  a  genera l  meaning s c e p t i c i s m .  
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I w i l l  begin by a r t i c u l a t i n g  a version of t h e  argument i n  
quest  ion .  The conclusion of t h i s  argument, s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  w i l l  be 
t h a t  one cannot be j u s t i f i e d  i n  be l iev ing  t h a t ,  i n  u t t e r i n g  given 
words o r  i n  doing anything e l s e ,  one i s  speaking a  s o l i t a r y  
language. In Sect ion 11, I w i l l  respond t o  ob jec t ions  of t he  f i r s t  
kind j u s t  mentioned, and i n  Section 111, t o  ob jec t ions  of t h e  second 
kind.  
As jus t  ind ica ted ,  t h e  s c e p t i c a l  argument i s  d i r ec t ed  aga ins t  
what I w i l l  c a l l  ' s o l i t a r y  l anguagef .  More prec i se ly ,  i t  i s  d i r ec t ed  
aga ins t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of one's being j u s t i f i e d  i n  bel ieving t h a t  
one i s  speaking a  s o l i t a r y  language. By ' s o l i t a r y  languagef ,  I mean 
any supposed language of e i t h e r  of t he  following two types .  F i r s t ,  
any supposed language whose terms r e f e r  t o  th ings  knowable only by 
oneself  - th ings  such a s  one's  p r i v a t e  sensa t ions .  Such languages, 
I t ake  i t ,  a r e  what Wittgenstein r e f e r s  t o  a s  ' p r iva te  languagesf3 .  
And second, any supposed language contr ived by a  person e n t i r e l y  
i s o l a t e d  from human con tac t .  What i s  common t o  these  two types of 
language i s  t h a t ,  a s  w i l l  be seen, would-be speakers of them cannot 
be j u s t i f i e d  i n  be l iev ing  t h a t  they know t h e  meanings of t h e i r  
terms.  In what fol lows,  I w i l l  speak of would-be speakers of such 
supposed languages a s  ' s o l i t a r y  speakersf  
To s e t  t h e  s c e p t i c a l  problem, suppose f i r s t  t h a t  I have been 
i s o l a t e d  s ince  my b i r t h  --that I have never had any in t e r ac t i on ,  
3Cf. Wit tgenste in:  "The ind iv idua l  words of t h i s  language a r e  
t o  r e f e r  t o  what can only be known t o  t he  person speaking; t o  h i s  
immediate p r i v a t e  sensa t ions .  So another person cannot understand 
the  language." (Wittgenstein 1958, 5 2 4 3 )  
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l i n g u i s t i c  o r  o the rwise ,  with any o t h e r  pe r son .  I am, so  t o  speak, 
a  Robinson Crusoe s i n c e  b i r t h .  Next, suppose t h a t  I have con t r ived  
what I t a k e  t o  be a  language, and t h a t  I u t t e r  sentences  of t h i s  
supposed language i n  v a r i o u s  s i t u a t i o n s .  Consider,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
my uses  of a  given p r e d i c a t e  of t h i s  supposed language - ' g r e e n f ,  
s a y .  For t h e  sake  of concre teness ,  we can suppose t h a t  'green'  i n  
my language means, i f  anyth ing ,  what t h e  English p r e d i c a t e  'greenf  
means. Now, suppose I say ,  concerning some o b j e c t  x, 'x  i s  g r e e n ' .  
N a t u r a l l y ,  I am conf iden t  of j u s t  what it i s  t h a t  I am p r e d i c a t i n g  
of x  -I know, s o  I t h i n k ,  what 'green1 means. Upon r e f l e c t i o n ,  
however, it occurs  t o  m e  t o  ques t ion  t h i s .  I ask ,  f i r s t ,  'What i s  
i t  t o  know t h e  meaning of a  p r e d i c a t e  such a s  'g reenf  ?I, and second, 
'Given t h e  answer t o  t h e  f i r s t  q u e s t i o n ,  what j u s t i f i e s  me i n  
b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I do know t h e  p r e d i c a t e ' s  meaning?' .  These ques t ions  
appear  t o  be coherent  and, prima f a c i e ,  ought t o  be answerable.  The 
s c e p t i c a l  problem a r i s e s  because,  a s  i t  t u r n s  o u t ,  t h e  answer t o  t h e  
f i r s t  q u e s t i o n  e n t a i l s  t h a t  t h e  answer t o  t h e  second i s  'Nothing. '  
Before proceeding t o  show why t h i s  should be so ,  some comments 
on t h e  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  i n  o r d e r .  The f i r s t  ques t ion ,  'What i s  i t  f o r  
me t o  know t h e  meaning of a  p r e d i c a t e ? ' ,  i s  of obvious i n t e r e s t .  
I n s o f a r  a s  knowing t h e  meanings of ( a t  l e a s t  many o f )  t h e  p r e d i c a t e s  
and o t h e r  e x p r e s s i o n s  of language i s  a  p recond i t ion  f o r  
unders tanding t h e  language,  and i n s o f a r  a s  g iv ing  an account of what 
i t  i s  t o  understand a  language i s  one of t h e  c e n t r a l  t a s k s  of the 
philosophy of language, t h e  t a s k  of g iv ing  an account of what i t  i s  
t o  know t h e  meaning of a  p r e d i c a t e  i s  of c e n t r a l  importance. 
Moreover, i t  i s  p l a u s i b l e  t h a t ,  i n  many c a s e s  a t  l e a s t ,  i n  order  t o  
mean something by an express ion  - tha t  i s ,  i n  o rde r  t o  be a b l e  t o  
s p e a k  m e a n i n g f u l l y  i n  u s i n g  a n  e x p r e s s i o n -  o n e  m u s t  know t h e  m e a n i n g  
o f  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n 4 .  C e r t a i n l y ,  f o r  a s o l i t a r y  s p e a k e r ,  t h e r e  
w o u l d n ' t  be much p o i n t  i n  u s i n g  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  i f  s h e  d i d n f t  know i t s  
m e a n i n g .  I n  g i v i n g  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  w h a t  it i s  t o  know t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  
a  p red ica te ,  t h e n ,  w e  w o u l d  be g i v i n g  a l a r g e  pa r t  o f  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  
w h a t  it i s  t o  mean  s o m e t h i n g  b y  a p red ica te .  
T h e  s e c o n d  q u e s t i o n ,  'What j u s t i f i e s  me i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I d o  
know t h e  m e a n i n g s  o f  t h e  predicates  o f  my l a n g u a g e ? '  i s  a l s o  o f  
i n t e r e s t .  What c o n c e r n s  me, a f t e r  a l l ,  i s  n o t  m e r e l y  t h e  a b s t r a c t  
q u e s t i o n  o f  w h a t  it i s  t o  know t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  a p red ica te ,  b u t  t h e  
d i r e c t l y  r e l e v a n t  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r  I am r i g h t  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  I d o  
know t h e  m e a n i n g s  o f  t h e  p r e d i c a t e s  o f  my s o l i t a r y  l a n g u a g e .  I f  I 
h a v e  d i s c o v e r e d  t h a t  t o  know t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  a p r e d i c a t e  i s  t o  be i n  
s t a t e  X,  t h e n  f o r  me t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  I know t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  a 
p r e d i c a t e  i s  f o r  me t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  I am i n  s t a t e  X. And i f ,  f o r  
e a c h  o f  t h e  p r e d i c a t e s  o f  my l a n g u a g e ,  I h a v e  n o  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I am i n  s t a t e  X ,  t h e n  n o r  w i l l  I h a v e  a n y  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  2 know t h e  m e a n i n g s  o f  t h e  
p r e d i c a t e s .  Of c o u r s e ,  t h i s  w o u l d  n o t  be a c a u s e  f o r  c o n c e r n ,  i f  I 
c o u l d  show t h a t  t h e  b e l i e f  was r a t i o n a l  i n  t h e  a b s e n s e  o f  my h a v i n g  
a n y  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  T h a t  I know t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  a word ,  t h o u g h ,  i s  a  
s u b s t a n t i v e  c l a i m  -I c a n n o t  s i m p l y  t a k e  f o r  g r a n t e d  t h a t  I d o .  T h e r e  
a r e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  many w o r d s  w h o s e  m e a n i n g s  I d o  n o t  know, a n d  i t  i s  
 his c l a i m  i s  h e d g e d  ( ' i n  many cases a t  l e a s t f )  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  
p l a u s i b l e  t h a t  o n e  c a n ,  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  a l i n g u i s t i c  c o m m u n i t y ,  
s o m e t i m e s  u s e  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  m e a n i n g f u l l y  w i t h o u t  k n o w i n g  i t s  
m e a n i n g .  T y l e r  B u r g e r s  e x a m p l e  o f  a s p e a k e r  who m i s t a k e n l y  b e l i e v e s  
t h a t  h e  c a n  h a v e  a r t h r i t i s  i n  h i s  t h i g h  ( B u r g e ,  ' I n d i v i d u a l i s m  a n d  
t h e  M e n t a l ' ,  i n  P .  F r e n c h ,  T .  U e h l i n g ,  a n d  H .  W e t t s t e i n ,  ed s . ,  
M i d w e s t  S t u d i e s  i n  Philosophy 4 .  M i n n e a p o l i s :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
M i n n e s o t a  P r e s s ,  1 9 7 9 ) ,  p l a u s i b l y  s h o w s  t h i s .  
p o s s i b l e  f o r  me t o  t h i n k  t h a t  I know t h e  meaning of a  word when I  
do n o t .  And i n s o f a r  a s  t h i s  i s  t h e  case ,  I could  not  r e s t  content  
t h a t  I am i n  s t a t e  X i f  I had no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  my b e l i e f  t h a t  
I am5,6 . To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o i n t ,  cons ide r  t h e  theory  which holds 
t h a t  t o  know t h e  meaning of a  p r e d i c a t e  i s  f o r  t h e  p r e d i c a t e  t o  
s t a n d  i n  a  s u i  g e n e r i s  means t ha t  r e l a t i o n  t o  a  P l a t o n i c  e n t i t y  of 
a  c e r t a i n  s o r t .  And suppose t h a t  t h e  theory  does not provide  t h a t  
t h e  ho ld ing  of t h i s  means t h a t  r e l a t i o n  can be r e l i a b l y  i n f e r r e d  
from f a c t s  about  usage o r  o t h e r  e p i s t e ~ ~ l c a l l y  a c c e s s i b l e  f a c t s .  
Then, on t h i s  t h e o r y ,  I would have no reason whatsoever t o  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  my p r e d i c a t e s  s t a n d  i n  t h e  means t h a t  r e l a t i o n  t o  s u i t a b l e  
P l a t o n i c  e n t i t i e s ,  even i f  t hey  d i d .  I t  would not ,  t h a t  i s ,  be 
r easonab le  f o r  me t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  I know t h e  meanings of my 
p r e d i c a t e s  (even though I would know what i t  i s  t o  kn3w t h e  meaning 
of a  p r e d i c a t e ) .  
The l a s t  comment concerns t h e  fo rmula t ions  of t h e  q u e s t i o n s .  So 
f a r ,  what has  been d i s c u s s e d  a r e  q u e s t i o n s  a s  t o  my knowing t h e  
meaning of ' g reen ' .  Now, one might wonder what t h e  r e l a t i o n  i s  
' ~ o t e  t h a t  I am not  presupposing he re  t h a t ,  g e n e r a l l y  speaking,  
f o r  one ' s  b e l i e f  t h a t  P t o  be r a t i o n a l ,  one m u s t  have a  j u s t i f i e d  
b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  s p e c i f i c  c o n d i t i o n s  which have t o  hold f o r  P t o  be 
t h e  case ,  ho ld .  Thus i t  may be t h a t  a l though,  f o r  example, I  do not 
know what c o n d i t i o r ~ s  have t o  hold f o r  i t  t o  be t h e  case  t h a t  my 
stomach w i l l  d i g e s t  t h e  sandwich I j u s t  a t e ,  my b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  w i l l  
i s  r a t i o n a l  a l l  t h e  same. Once one knows what cond i t ions  have t o  
hold f o r  P t o  be t h e  case ,  however, m a t t e r s  change. A 
g a s t r o e n t e r o l o g i s t ,  f o r  example, being appr i sed  of t h e  cond i t ions  
necessary  f o r  d i g e s t i o n  t o  t a k e  p lace ,  and enqu i r ing  s e r i o u s l y  i n t o  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  a s  t o  whether it w i l l ,  would not be r a t i o n a l  i n  
b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  it w i l l  i f ,  a f t e r  having i n v e s t i g a t e d ,  she had no 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  t h e  necessary c o n d i t i o n s  do hold 
( t h a t  t h e  necessary  stomach a c i d s  a r e  p r e s e n t ,  e t c . ) .  I am 
m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t  t h e  phi losopher  enqu i r ing  i n t o  whether he knows t h e  
meaning of a  p r e d i c a t e ,  i s  l i k e  t h e  g a s t r o e n t e r o l o g i s t  h e r e .  
"his p o i n t  w j . 1 1  be taken up i n  more d e t a i l ,  i n  s e c t i o n  111. 
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b e t w e e n  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s ,  a n d  t h e  p a r a l l e l  q u e s t i o n s  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  
w h e t h e r  I know t h a t  ' g r e e n '  means  g r e e n 7 .  To b e g i n  w i t h ,  i t  s h o u l d  
be n o t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a n  a m b i g u i t y  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  q u e s t i o n s .  I n  
s a y i n g  t h a t  S knows t h a t  t h e  E n g l i s h  p r e d i c a t e  ' g r e e n '  means g r e e n ,  
o n e  m i g h t ,  on  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  mean m e r e l y  t h a t  S knows a c e r t a i n  
m e t a l i n g u i s t i c  p r o p o s i t i o n  t o  be t r u e ,  v i z . ,  t h a t  t h e  E n g l i s h  
p r e d i c a t e  ' g r e e n f  means  g r e e n .  S f s  knowing t h i s  m e t a l i n g u i s t i c  
p r o p o s i t i o n  t o  be t r u e  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  S r s  n o t  knowing t h e  
m e a n i n g  o f  ' g r e e n f  -S may know t h i s  s i m p l y  i n  v i r t u e  o f  knowing t h a t  
a l l  s e n t e n c e s  o f  t h e  f o r m  'The E n g l i s h  p r e d i c a t e  'XI means XI, a r e  
t r u e .  I n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  I s h a l l  n o t  be c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  
t h u s  c o n s t r u e d .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i n  s a y i n g  t h a t  S  knows t h a t  t h e  
E n g l i s h  p r e d i c a t e  ' g r e e n '  means g r e e n ,  o n e  may s i m p l y  mean t h a t  S  
knows t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  p r e d i c a t e  ' g r e e n ' .  On t h i s  
c o n s t r u a l ,  t h e n ,  t h e  p a r a l l e l  q u e s t i o n s  are  e q u i v a l e n t .  I n s o f a r  a s  
t h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e ,  e i t h e r  f o r m u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  would  b e  
s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h i s  c h a p t e r .  D e s p i t e  t h i s  e q u i v a l e n c e ,  t h o u g h ,  I 
w i l l  f o r m u l a t e  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o n l y  i n  terms o f  knowing  t h e  m e a n i n g  
o f  ' g r e e n ' ,  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  knowing  t h a t  ' g r e e n '  means  g r e e n .  T h i s  i s  
b e c a u s e  t h e  f o r m e r  f o r m u l a t i o n ,  u n l i k e  t h e  l a t t e r ,  i s  unambiguous ,  
a n d  b e c a u s e  t h e  f o r m e r  d o e s  n o t  p r e s u p p o s e ,  a s  t h e  l a t t e r  d o e s ,  t h a t  
i n  e n q u i r i n g  as t o  w h e t h e r  I am j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I know 
t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  ' g r e e n ' ,  I c a n  u s e  as  w e l l  a s  m e n t i o n  t h e  p r e d i c a t e .  
T h i s  h a v i n g  b e e n  s a i d ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  as  t o  what  i t  i s  t o  know t h e  
m e a n i n g  o f  a p r e d i c a t e  s u c h  as ' g r e e n ' ,  as  w e l l  as t h e  q u e s t i o n  a s  
' S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  p a r a l l e l  q u e s t i o n s  a re ,  'What i s  i t  t o  know 
t h a t  ' g r e e n '  means g r e e n ? ' ,  a n d  'What j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  
I know t h a t  ' g r e e n '  means g r e e n ? '  
t o  w h e t h e r  I am j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I d o  know i t s  m e a n i n g ,  
c a n  be t a k e n  u p .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  b e g i n  t o  f o r m u l a t e  a n  a n s w e r  t o  t h e  f i r s t  q u e s t i o n ,  
c o n s i d e r  how w e  o r d i n a r i l y  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  s o m e o n e  knows t h e  
m e a n i n g  o f  a p r ed i ca t e .  N o r m a l l y ,  i f  s o m e o n e  c o n s i s t e n t l y  t e r m s  
t h i n g s  ' g r e e n f  w h i c h  w e  - t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  m a j o r i t y  o f  s p e a k e r s  o f  
E n g l i s h ,  t h a t  is- sccept t o  be g r e e n ,  a n d  m a k e s  m o s t l y  t h e  same 
i n f e r e n c e s  as w e  w o u l d  w i t h  t h e  s e n t e n c e  'x i s  g r e e n " ,  t h e n  w e  
w i l l  u n r e f l e c t i v e l y  a c c e p t  t h a t  s h e  knows t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  ' g r e e n ' .  
C o n v e r s e l y ,  o t h e r  t h i n g s  b e i n g  e q u a l ,  i f  s o m e o n e  c o n s i s t e n t l y  terms 
t h i n g s  ' g r e e n '  w h i c h  w e  w o u l d  n o t  t a k e  t o  be g r e e n ,  o r  m a k e s  many 
i n f e r e n c e s  w h i c h  w e  w o u l d  n o t  make  w i t h  t h e  s e n t e n c e  'x i s  g r e e n ' ,  
t h e n  w e  w i l l  s a y  t h a t  s h e  d o e s  n o t  know t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  ' g r e e n ' .  A 
f i r s t  s u g g e s t i o n ,  t h e n ,  i s  t h i s :  
S u g g e s t i o n  1) O t h e r  t h i n g s  b e i n g  e q u a l ,  t o  know t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  
a p r e d i c a t e  i s  t o  be able t o  u s e  it m o s t l y  a s  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  
s p e a k e r s  o f  t h e  l a n g u a g e  w o u l d .  
T h e r e  i s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  p r o b l e m  w i t h  t h i s  s u g g e s t i o n ,  h o w e v e r .  To 
see t h i s ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  case o f  a s p e a k e r  who a g r e e s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
w i t h  u s  i n  w h a t  s h e  terms ' g r e e n f  a n d  i n  t h e  i n f e r e n c e s  s h e  m a k e s  
w i t h  s e n t e n c e s  c o n t a i n i n g  i t ,  b u t ,  i n  t h o s e  cases i n  w h i c h  h e r  u s e s  
d i v e r g e  f r o m  o u r s ,  s h e  p e r s i s t s  i n  h e r  d i v e r g e n t  u s e s  a n d  r e m a i n s  
i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  o u r  a t t e m p t s  t o  c o r r e c t  h e r .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  s h e  m i g h t  
t e r m  t h i n g s  w h i c h  a re  a d e e p  n a v y  b l u e ,  ' g r e e n ' ,  a n d  r e m a i n  
o b l i v i o u s  t o  o u r  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  h e r  u s e .  I f  t h i s  p e r s o n ' s  b e h a v i o u r  
was c o n s i s t e n t  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  w e  w o u l d  n o t  n o r m a l l y  s a y  t h a t  s h e  
knows t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  p r e d i c a t e  ' g r e e n ' .  P a r t  o f  k n o w i n g  
w h a t  ' g r e e n r  m e a n s  i s  k n o w i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a correct  u s e  t o  w h i c h  
 or e x a m p l e ,  s h e  i n f e r s  f r o m  'x i s  g r e e n '  t o  'x i s  c o l o u r e d ' .  
o n e  m u s t ,  l i k e  a l l  E n g l i s h  s p e a k e r s ,  a i m  t o  c o n f o r m .  I n s o f a r  as  t h e  
s i m i l a r i t y  o f  t h i s  p e r s o n ' s  u s e s  o f  ' g r e e n f  a n d  E n g l i s h  s p e a k e r s t  
u s e s  i s  a mere c o i n c i d e n c e  a n d  n o t  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a common a i m ,  s h e  
d o e s  n o t  know wha t  t h e  E n g l i s h  p r e d i c a t e  ' g r e e n '  means .  I n  a s i m i l a r  
v e i n ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  case o f  a m a c h i n e ,  o u t f i t t e d  a n d  programmed t o  
term t h i n g s  w e  a c c e p t  t o  be g r e e n ,  ' g r e e n r ,  a n d  t o  make s u i t a b l e  
i n f e r e n c e s  w i t h  'x i s  g r e e n '  ( a n d  s i m i l a r l y  programmed f o r  o t h e r  
E n g l i s h  e x p r e s s i o n s ) ,  b u t  e n t i r e l y  u n a b l e  t o  a l t e r  i t s  p a t t e r n  o f  
j u d g e m e n t s  i n  l i g h t  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  - u n a b l e ,  t h a t  i s ,  t o  c o r r e c t  
i t s e l f .  S u c h  a m a c h i n e  wou ld  n o t ,  I s u b m i t ,  know t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  
' g r e e n f ,  n o r  o f  a n y  o t h e r  e x p r e s s i o n .  I n s o f a r  as i t s  u s e s  o f  t h e  
p r e d i c a t e  wou ld  be s i m p l y  programmed r e a c t i o n s ,  a n d  n o t  t h e  r e s u l t  
o f  i t s  h a v i n g  a i m e d  t o  s p e a k  c o r r e c t l y ,  it would  n o t  mean a n y t h i n g  
b y  t h e  w o r d s  i t  p r o n o u n c e s ,  n o r  wou ld  it know t h e i r  m e a n i n g s .  What 
t h e s e  c a s e s  show, i s  t h a t  t o  know t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  a  p r e d i c a t e  o f  a  
g i v e n  l a n g u a g e ,  o n e  m u s t  n o t  o n l y  u s e  i t  m o s t l y  as s p e a k e r s  o f  t h e  
l a n g u a g e  wou ld ,  b u t  o n e  m u s t  h a v e  i t  as  o n e ' s  a i m  t o  u s e  i t  
c o r r e c t l y .  S u g g e s t i o n  (1) s h o u l d  b e  r e v i s e d ,  t h e n ,  as f o l l o w s :  
S u g g e s t i o n  2 )  O t h e r  t h i n g s  b e i n g  e q u a l ,  t o  know t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  
a p r e d i c a t e  i s  t o  b e  able t o  u s e  it m o s t l y  as t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  
s p e a k e r s  o f  t h e  l a n g u a g e  wou ld ,  a n d  t o  h a v e  it a s  o n e ' s  a i m  t o  
u s e  it c o r r e c t l y .  
What s u g g e s t i o n  ( 2 )  claims, it s h o u l d  b e  e m p h a s i z e d ,  i s  t h a t  i n  
o r d e r  t o  know t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  a n  e x p r e s s i o n ,  o n e  h a s  ( i n  p a r t )  t o  a i m  
t o  u s e  it correctly. Now, o n e  m i g h t  s u p p o s e  t h a t  t o  a i m  t o  u s e  a n  
e x p r e s s i o n  c o r r e c t l y  i s  j u s t  t o  aim t o  u s e  it as  mos t  s p e a k e r s  o f  
t h e  l a n g u a g e  w o u l d .  I t  s h o u l d  b e  c l e a r  on  r e f l e c t i o n ,  howeve r ,  t h a t  
i n  n o r m a l  s p e e c h  - t h a t  i s ,  where  no  p r o p i t i a t o r y ,  d e c e i t f u l ,  o r  
o :her  s p e c i a l  e n d s  are  b e i n g  p u r s u e d -  o u r  a i m  i s  n o t  m e r e l y  t o  s a y  
what  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  s p e a k e r s  wou ld  s a y ,  b u t  t o  s p e a k  t h e  t r u t h .  
Thus ,  a p e r s o n  who asserts 'x i s  P 1  a g a i n s t  d o u b t e r s  who a s s e r t  ' x  
i s  n o t  P f ,  i s  n o t  making a c l a i m  a b o u t  what  most  p e o p l e  would s a y ;  
s h e  i s  making a  claim a b o u t  what x i s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  w e  a im t o  make 
i n f e r e n c e s  w i t h  \x i s  P f  t h a t  a r e  c o r r e c t ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  m e r e l y  t h e  
i n f e r e n c e s  which most  p e o p l e  would make. The d e f a u l t  s u p p o s i t i o n ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  a  p r e d i c a t e  c u r r e n t  among t h e  
s u b s t a n t i a l  m a j o r i t y  o f  s p e a k e r s  i s  t h e  c o r r e c t  u s e ,  a n d  h e n c e  t h a t  
i f  w e  are i n  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e s e  s p e a k e r s  w e  are l i k e l y  t o  be 
c o r r e c t ,  b u t  t h i s  n e e d  n o t  a l w a y s  be t h e  case. 
S u g g e s t i o n  (2), t h e n ,  l o o k s  l i k e  a  p r o m i s i n g  answer  t o  t h e  f i r s t  
q u e s t i o n .  The p r o b l e m  which it p o s e s  f o r  t h e  s o l i t a r y  s p e a k e r ,  
t h o u g h ,  i s  t h a t  h e  w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  be i n  ag reement  w i t h  t h e  
m a j o r i t y  o f  s p e a k e r s  o f  h i s  s o l i t a r y  l a n g u a g e  ( s i n c e  h e  c o n s t i t u t e s  
t h e  whole  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  s p e a k e r s ) .  T h i s  makes i t  
i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y  t r i v i a l  t h a t  h e  knows t h e  meaning o f  t h e  p r e d i c a t e .  
I n  l i g h t  o f  t h i s ,  a  n a t u r a l  t h i r d  s u g g e s t i o n  i s  s i m p l y  
S u g g e s t i o n  3 )  O t h e r  t h i n g s  b e i n g  e q u a l ,  t o  know t h e  meaning o f  
a p r e d i c a t e  i s  t o  be a b l e  t o  u s e  it m o s t l y  c o r r e c t l y ,  a n d  t o  
h a v e  it a s  o n e f  s aim t o  u s e  it c o r r e c t l y g .  
F o r  s o l i t a r y  l a n g u a g e s  a t  leas t ,  t h i s  s u r e l y  c a n n o t  be 
o b j e c t i o n a b l e .  I n d e e d ,  i n s o f a r  as t h e  d e f a u l t  a s s u m p t i o n ,  j u s t  
m e n t i o n e d ,  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  a p r e d i c a t e  c u r r e n t  among t h e  m a j o r i t y  
'Here a n d  t h r o u q h o u t ,  I assume t h a t  it i s  c o r r e c t  t o  term x 
' P f ,  i f  a n d  o n l y  i f  x i s  P. I f o r m u l a t e  my d i s c u s s i o n  i n  terms of  
what  it i s  c o r r e c t  t o  s a y ,  b e c a u s e  I t a k e  t h i s  t o  b e  i d i o m a t i c a l l y  
c o r r e c t .  N o t h i n g  would b e  l o s t ,  however,  i f  f o r m u l a t i o n s  i n  terms 
o f  s p e a k i n g  t r u t h f u l l y  were s u b s t i t u t e d  t h r o u g h o u t  f o r  my 
f o r m u l a t i o n s  i n  terms o f  c o r r e c t  u s e .  Then s u g g e s t i o n  ( 3 ) ,  f o r  
example ,  would r e a d ,  
O t h e r  t h i n g s  b e i n g  e q u a l ,  t o  know t h e  meaning o f  a  p r e d i c a t e  
i s  t o  be able t o  use it  t o  speak m o s t l y  t r u t h f u l l y ,  and t o  
h a v e  it a s  o n e ' s  a i m  t o  s p e a k  m o s t l y  t r u t h f u l l y  i n  u s i n g  i t .  
of  s p e a k e r s  i s  t h e  c o r r e c t  u s e ,  i s  r i g h t ,  s u g g e s t i o n  ( 3 )  f o l l o w s  
d i r e c t l y  f rom s u g g e s t i o n  ( 2 )  lo. 
T h e r e  a r e  two q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  t o  make t o  s u g g e s t i o n  ( 3 ) .  The f i r s t  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  i s  o c c a s i o n e d  by t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  p r e d i c a t e s  w i t h  
n u l l  e x t e n s i o n s ,  s u c h  as  ' u n i c o r n t ,  ' p h l o g i s t o n f  o r  ' l u r n i n i f e r o u s  
e t h e r t .  Where s u c h  terms are c o n c e r n e d ,  knowing t h e  termst meanings  
c a n n o t  c o n s i s t  i n  b e i n g  able ( i n  p a r t )  t o  p r e d i c a t e  them of t h i n g s  
which are i n  t h e i r  e x t e n s i o n s ,  s i n c e  t h e r e  are no s u c h  t h i n g s .  
P l a u s i b l y ,  i n  s u c h  cases, knowing t h e  meaning o f  t h e  p r e d i c a t e  must 
c o n s i s t  e n t i r e l y  i n  a i m i n g  t o  make, a n d  b e i n g  a b l e  t o  make, c o r r e c t  
i n f e r e n c e s  w i t h  s e n t e n c e s  c o n t a i n i n g  i t .  Secondly ,  o n e  migh t  o b j e c t  
t h a t  t h e r e  c a n  b e  cases i n  which a  p e r s o n  g e n e r a l l y  f a i l s  t o  u s e  a 
p r e d i c a t e  m o s t l y  c o r r e c t l y ,  a n d  y e t  s t i l l  knows i t s  meaning,  
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  f a i l u r e s  are d u e  t o  m e n t a l  o r  p e r c e p t u a l  l a p s e s  
o f  some k i n d .  I f  it i s  i n d e e d  p l a u s i b l e  t h a t  t h e r e  are c a s e s  o f  t h i s  
k i n d ,  t h e  a c c o u n t  o f  what it i s  t o  know t h e  meaning of  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  
would h a v e  t o  be m o d i f i e d  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t o  know t h e  meaning o f  
a n  e x p r e s s i o n  i s  t o  a i m  t o  u s e  it, a n d  t o  be a b l e  t o  u s e  it, m o s t l y  
c o r r e c t l y  when o n e ' s  m e n t a l  a n d  p e r c e p t u a l  f a c u l t i e s  a r e  o p e r a t i n g  
m i n i m a l l y  r e l i a b l y .  
The a i m  o f  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  d i s c u s s i o n ,  it s h o u l d  be emphasized,  i s  
t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  min imal  r e q u i r e m e n t s  which one  must  meet i n  o r d e r  
t o  know t h e  meaning o f  a n  e x p r e s s i o n ,  w i t h  a view t o  s e e i n g  whe ther  
I c a n  b e  j u s t i f i e d ,  i n  t h e  s c e n a r i o  d e s c r i b e d  a t  t h e  o u t s e t ,  i n  
b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I m e e t  them. F o r  p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e s ,  what i s  
i n t e r e s t i n g  a b o u t  s u g g e s t i o n  ( 3 )  i s  t h a t ,  c e n t r a l  t o  what knowing 
'1 w i l l  a r g u e ,  i n  S e c t i o n  I1 t h a t  t h i s  d e f a u l t  a s sumpt ion  
- t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  s p e a k e r s  must  b e  c o r r e c t ,  most  o f  t h e  time- 
must  be c o r r e c t .  
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t h e  mean ing  o f  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  i s ,  i s  t h e  matter o f  w h e t h e r  one  i s  
u s i n g  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  correctly. T h a t  i s ,  knowing t h e  meaning o f  a n  
e x p r e s s i o n  i s  a matter o f  a i m i n g  a n d  b e i n g  a b l e  t o  u s e  it i n  a c c o r d  
w i t h  a s t a n d a r d  of  u s e .  Given t h i s ,  t h e  s e c o n d  part  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
-'What j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  b e l i e - ~ i n g  t h a t  I know t h e  meaning o f  a  g i v e n  
e x p r e s s i o n ? ' -  becomes, 'What j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I am 
a i m i n g ,  a n d  a m  a b l e ,  t o  u s e  a g i v e n  e x p r e s s i o n  c o r r e c t l y ,  i . e . ,  i n  
a c c o r d  w i t h  t h e  r u l e  f o r  i t s  u s e ? '  I n  t h e  s c e n a r i o  d e s c r i b e d  above ,  
i n  which I am s o l i t a r y  a n d  I t e r m  x  ' g r e e n f ,  t h e  answer  i s  n o t  
o b v i o u s .  C e r t a i n l y ,  I h a v e  a  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  x i s  c o r r e c t l y  t e r m e d  
' g r e e n '  - a f t e r  all, my u n r e f l e c t i v e  d i s p o s i t i o n  i s  t o  s a y  ' x  i s  
g r e e n . '  T h i s  i s  j u s t  t o  s a y ,  however,  t h a t  it seems r i g h t  t o  m e  t o  
t e r m  x ' g r e e n . '  I n  o r d e r  f o r  m e  t o  j u s t i f y  my c o n v i c t i o n ,  what I 
n e e d  i s  some r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  what seems r i g h t  t o  m e  i s  a  
r e l i ab le  i n d i c a t o r  o f  what  is r i g h t .  Wi thou t  s u c h  a r e a s o n ,  my 
b e l i e f  t h a t  I am a b l e  t o  u s e  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  c o r r e c t l y  w i l l  be mere 
o p t i m i s m .  And i n  o r d e r  f o r  m e  t o  be able t o  h a v e  s u c h  a r e a s o n ,  what 
I need ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  my d i r e c t  epistemic a c c e s s  t o  what  seems t o  
m e  t o  b e  r i g h t ,  i s  some k i n d  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  e p i s t e m i c  a c c e s s  t o  what 
i s  r i g h t .  T h a t  i s ,  I n e e d  some way o f  j u d g i n g ,  a t  l e a s t  some of t h e  
t i m e ,  w h e t h e r  a judgement o f  mine  i s  r i g h t ,  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  whe the r  
it seems t o  m e  t o  b e  r i g h t .  S i n c e  t h i s  seems n o t  t o  b e  someth ing  
which I am a b l e  t o  d o  i n  t h e  s c e n a r i o  d e s c r i b e d  a t  t h e  o u t s e t ,  it 
a p p e a r s ,  on  r e f l e c t i o n ,  t h a t  I r e a l l y  d o  n o t  know what ' g r e e n f  
means .  
It w i l l  b e  recalled t h a t  ' s o l i t d r y  l a n g u a g e ' ,  a s  I have  d e f i n e d  
i t ,  rtdfer: n o t  c n l y  o  l a n g u a g e s  c o n t r i v e d  by i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  I i m a g i n e  n ,yse l f  t o  be i n  a t  t h e  o u t s e t  - t h a t  i s ,  i s o l a t e d  
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from all human contact- but also to languages whose terms refer to 
objects knowable only to one person, sometimes called 'private 
languages'. NOW, insofar as members of a person's community could 
not, by hypothesis, know the supposed meanings of the expressions 
of the given personfs supposed private language, they would be of 
no help to this person in determining whether he was able to use its 
expressions in accord with a standard of correct use. Thus, whatever 
conclusions apply to the isolated speaker will apply equally to any 
would-be private-language speaker, regardless of the presence or 
absence of other people in his environs. 
The problem, then, is that the answer to the first question 
appears to entail that the answer to the second question -'What 
justifies me in believing that I do know the predicatef s meaning?', 
is 'Nothing.' Before considering how a person who was not solitary 
can escape this problem, there are three prima facie plausible 
responses to consider. 
A first response to the problem is to reject the claim that being 
correct is a matter of being in accord with an independent standard, 
and hence to reject that there is a problem about my being justified 
in believing that I am using my predicates mostly correctly. That 
is, one might maintain that Wittgenstein's slogan, " [flor a large 
class of cases . . . the meaning of a word is its use in the language" 
(Wittgenstein 1958, § 4 3 ) ,  is correct, on the interpretation that 
\usef means actual use. In the case of my solitary language, then, 
there would be no problem about my being justified in believing that 
I am aiming to use, and succeeding in using, my predicates mostly 
correctly, since my actual uses would ips0 facto be correct uses. 
This suggestion is motivated by the thought that, insofar as it is 
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I who a s s i g n  t h e  p r e d i c a t e s  o f  my s o l i t a r y  l a n g u a g e  t h e i r  meanings ,  
t h e  c o r r e c t  u s e s  c a n n o t  be i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  m e .  The f a m i l i a r  p rob lem 
w i t h  t h i s  s u g g e s t i o n ,  t h o u g h ,  i s  t h a t  it makes it i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  m e  
n o t  t o  b e  j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I know t h e  meaning of a  
p r e d i c a t e .  The v e r y  f a c t  o f  my u s i n g  a p r e d i c a t e  e n t a i l s  t h a t  I know 
i t s  meaning,  a n d  t h a t  I a m  j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I know i t s  
meaning.  S i n c e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  my n o t  knowing t h e  meaning,  a n d  
o f  my n o t  b e i n g  j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I know t h e  meaning,  are 
real  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  which must  be a c c o i w d a t e d ,  t h i s  r e s p o n s e ,  as it 
s t a n d s ,  c a n n o t  b e  r i g h t .  Now, a  more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  v a r i a n t  o f  t h i s  
p o s i t i o n  -one which a v o i d s  t h i s  p r o b l e m -  i s  t o  c o n s t r u e  'meaning i s  
u s e '  t o  mean no  more t h a n  t h a t  two s p e a k e r s f  e x p r e s s i o n s  have  t h e  
same meaning i f  a n d  o n l y  i f  t h e y  h a v e  t h e  same u s e .  On t h i s  
c o n s t r u a l ,  t o  s a y  t h a t  o n e  i s  c o n f o r m i n g  t o  a s t a n d a r d  o f  u s e  i s  
j u s t  t o  s a y  t h a t  o n e  i s  u s i n g ,  a n d  a i m i n g  t o  u s e ,  a p r e d i c a t e  as 
a n o t h e r  s p e a k e r  o r  s p e a k e r s  would.  A s  h a s  b e e n  s e e n ,  though ,  t h i s  
c o n s t r u a l  c f  t h e  'meaning i s  u s e f  s l o ~ a n  i s  o f  no u s e  t o  t h e  
i s o l a t e d  s p e a k e r ,  s i n c e  it p r e s u p p o s e s  t h a t  t h e r e  are more t h a n  one  
s p e a k e r  o f  t h e  l a n g u a g e .  
T h i n k i n g  a l o n g  s imilar  l i n e s ,  I m i g h t  s u p p o s e ,  s e c o n d l y ,  t h a t  t h e  
mere f a c t  t h a t  I a m  c o n f i d e n t  a b o u t  t e r m i n g  some t h i n g s  ' g r e e n f  a n d  
a b o u t  n o t  s o  t e r m i n g  o t h e r s ,  i s  enough t o  j u s t i f y  my c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  
I know what ' g r e e n f  means.  A f t e r  a l l ,  it i s  g e n e r a l l y  t h e  c a s e  w i t h  
what I t a k e  t o  be p r e d i c a t e s  whose meanings  I know, t h a t  I am 
i n c l i n e d  t o  p r e d i c a t e  them o f  some o b j e c t s  a n d  n o t  o t h e r s ,  whereas  
t h i s  i s  n o t  g e n e r a l l y  t h e  case w i t h  what I t a k e  t o  b e  nonsense  words 
a n d  p r e d i c a t e s  whose mean ings  I do  n o t  know ( I  d o n ' t  go  a r o u n d  
terming some things but not others 'glumphf , say) l ' .  This, in one 
form or another, is the basic reply of the defender of solitary 
language, and will be discussed in more detail in section 111. The 
basic problem with this suggestion, though, is that my having a 
feeling of confidence or conviction or naturalness as I term a thing 
'greent is not, by itself, evidence that it is correct to term the 
thing 'greenr. What I need, but am not afforded by such feelings 
alone, is a reason to believe that the presence of the feelings as 
I use the term is a reliable indication that the use is correct. 
When I meaningfully predicate 'green' of some object, I say that the 
object is a member of a certain set -namely, the extension of 
'greent- the constitution of which is independent of my 
inclinations. That my word 'greenf manages appropriately to latch 
onto this set, or any set at all, it seems, cannot be determined by 
examining solely my inclinations to use the word, since my 
inclinations need not reflect anything more than my transient 
preferences. 
A third response to the question is to suggest that I can be 
justified in believing that my uses are meaningful insofar as I can 
make a detached, empirical study of them and determine them to have 
the meanings they do. In determining that my uses conform to certain 
rules of use, established by an empirical science of semantics, I 
ll~his view, it should be noted, is an epistemological 
counterpart to the so-called 'dispositionalf account of meaning, 
according to which meaning something by an expression consists in 
being disposed to use the expression in a certain way. Since the aim 
here is not to solve any sceptical problems about what constitutes 
meaning something by an expression, the attempt will not be made 
here to evaluate the dispositional account. For a comparison of the 
epistemological and constitutive accounts, see Section I1 of Chapter 
2. 
would  j u s t i f y  my b e l i e f  t h a t  my u s e s  a re  m o s t l y  c o r r e c t 1 2 .  To see 
t h e  r e j o i n d e r  t o  t h i s  r e s p o n s e ,  n o t i c e  f i r s t  t h a t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
ra ised  a b o u t  m e a n i n g  c a n  e q u a l l y  be p o s e d  a b o u t  r u l e - f o l l o w i n g .  
Thus ,  i n s t e a d  o f  a s k i n g  wha t  i t  i s  f o r  m e  t o  know t h e  mean ing  o f  a n  
e x p r e s s i o n ,  I c a n  a s k  wha t  it i s  f o r  me t o  f o l l o w  a r u l e ,  s u c h  as 
a r u l e  o f  l o g i c  o r  a r i t h m e t i c ,  o r ,  more  p e r t i n e n t l y ,  a r u l e  o f  
s c i e n t i f i c  p r o c e d u r e .  And, i n s o f a r  as t h e  a n s w e r  i s  t h a t  it i s  t o  
be i n  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  a s t a n d a r d  o f  a c e r t a i n  s o r t ,  t h e  same 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  q u e s t i o n  arises: wha t  j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  b e l i e v i n g t h a t  
I a m  i n  c o n f o r m i t y ?  Thus ,  t o  a n s w e r  t h e  q u e s t i o n  \What j u s t i f i e s  m e  
i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  my u s e s  o f  ' g r e e n t  are m o s t l y  c o r r e c t ? '  w i t h  t h e  
r e p l y ,  ' T h e y ' r e  i n  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  a r u l e  of u s e  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  
e m p i r i c a l  s e m a n t i c s f ,  i s  m e r e l y  t o  raise t h e  f u r t h e r  q u e s t i o n  'What 
j u s t i f i e s  me i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  my t a k i n g  t h e m  t o  be i n  c o n f o r m i t y  
i s  a r e l i ab l e  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e y  a re  i n  ~ o n f o r r n i t y ? " ~  I n  s h o r t ,  
t h e  o b j e c t i o n  comes down t o  t h i s :  i f  t h e r e  i s  a p r o b l e m  a b o u t  my 
b e i n g  j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I am u s i n g  a word a s  b a s i c  a s  
' g r e e n '  i n  a c c o r d  w i t h  a s t a n d a r d  o f  u s e ,  t h e n  it i s  h a r d  t o  see how 
I c o u l d  b e g i n  t o  be j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I am f o l l o w  a n y t h i n g  
as  a b s t r u s e  as  a r u l e  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  p r o c e d u r e ,  l e t  a l o n e  how I c o u l d  
a p p e a l  t o  t h e  o u t c o m e s  o f  s u c h  a b s t r u s e  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  t o  j u s t i f y  my 
i n i t i a l  b e l i e f .  
I f  my b e i n g  a member o f  a l i n g u i s t i c  community i s  t o  a l l o w  m e  t o  
escape t h i s  p r o b l e m ,  t h e n  i t  mus t  somehow a f f o r d  m e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
120ne l i n e  o f  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h i s  r e s p o n s e  wh ich  w i l l  n o t  be 
p u r s u e d  h e r e ,  i s  Q u i n e r s  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a s c i e n c e  
o f  s e m a n t i c s  ( Q u i n e  1 9 6 0 ,  c h .  2 ) .  
1 3 ~ h e s e  r e m a r k s ,  e v i d e n t l y ,  r e c a p i t u l a t e  W i t t g e n s t e i n f s  
comments  o n  ' r u l e s  f o r  f o l l o w i n g  r u l e s f .  S e e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
W i t t g e n s t e i n  1950 ,  5506,  139-141. 
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j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I a m  u s i n g  t h e  term 'g reen '  m o s t l y  
c o r r e c t l y .  I n  a b a n a l  way, t h o u g h ,  t h i s  i s  j u s t  what rr.y community 
d o e s .  I f  I am a s p e a k e r  o f  E n g l i s h  a n d  I t e r m  s o m e t h i n g  t h a t  is ,  
s a y ,  brown, ' g r e e n ' ,  t h e n  I w i l l  b e  t o l d  t h a t  what I h a v s  s a i d  i s  
wrong - t h a t  it i s  i n c o r r e c t  t o  t e r m  t h i s  t h i n g  ' g r e e n ' .  On t h e  o t h e r  
hand,  i f  I t e r m  s o m e t h i n g  which i s  g r e e n ,  ' g r e e n ' ,  my community 
( i . e . ,  members o f  my community) w i l l  e i t h e r  u n r e f l e c t i v e l y  a c c e p t  
my u s e ,  o r ,  i f  it h a p p e n s  t h a t  I am i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  l e a r n i n g  t h e  
mean ing  o f  t h e  t e r m ,  my community m i g h t  r e a s s u r e  m e  t h a t  I have  g o t  
t h i n g s  r i g h t .  I n d e e d ,  o n e ' s  a c c e p t i n g  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  one '  s 
t e a c h e r s  as  t o  what i s  a n d  i.s n o t  c o r r e c t l y  termed 'g reen '  i s  a 
p r e c o n d i t i o n  f o r  l e a r n i n g  t h e  meaning o f  t h e  t e r m .  G e n e r a l l y ,  my 
community a d h e r e s  t o  a  p r a c t i c e  o f  t e r m i n g  c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  ' g reen '  
b u t  n o t  o t h e r s .  I n s o f a r  as it u n r e f l e c t i v e l y  a c c e p t s  c o n f o r m i t y  t o  
t h i s  p r a c t i c e ,  b u t  c h a l l e n g e s  d e v i a t i o n s  f r o m i t ,  my community g i v e s  
m e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I am c o r r e c t  i n  t e r m i n g  t h o s e  
t h i n g s  ' g r e e n '  which  I d o  a n d  i n  n o t  s o - t e r m i n g  t h o s e  which I d o  
n o t .  
The f o r e g o i n g  may g i v e  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t ,  i n  o r d e r  f o r  m e  t o  
see t h a t  I am b e i n g  c o r r e c t e d ,  a n d  h e n c e  t h a t  my words are a t  l e a s t  
c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  b e i n g  m e a n i n g f u l ,  I h a v e  f i r s t  t o  u n d e r s t a n d ,  a n d  b e  
j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I u n d e r s t a n d ,  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  t h e  
community members c o r r e c t i n g  m e .  T h i s  would e n g e n d e r  t h e  p rob lem 
t h a t ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  come t o  b e  j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  one  
u n d e r s t a n d s  a l a n g u a g e ,  o n e  would h a v e  a l r e a d y  t o  be j u s t i f i e d  i n  
b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  o n e  u n d e r s t a n d s  t h e  l a n g u a g e .  My community 's  
d i s a g r e e m e n t  w i t h ,  o r  a c c e p t a n c e  o f ,  my u s e  o f  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  need  
n o t ,  however,  be c o m u n i c a t e d  l i n g u i s t i c a l l y .  A l l  t h a t  I need  b e  
able t o  r e c o g n i z e ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  see t h a t  my u s e s  are r i g h t  o r  wrong,  
are t h e  u s u a l  s l g n s  b y  wh ich  p e o p l e  e x p r e s s  a p p r o v a l  o r  d i s a p r o v a l .  
W i t t g e n s t e i n  describes t e a c h i n g  a s t u d e n t  b y  means o f  s u c h  s i g n s ,  
i n  c o n s i d e r i n g  how t h e  words  ' o r d e r f  a n d  ' r u l e r  are t a u g h t :  
I n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t e a c h i n g  I s h a l l  shew him t h e  same 
c o l o u r s ,  t h e  same l e n g t h s ,  t h e  same s h a p e s ,  I s h a l l  make h im 
f i n d  them a n d  p r o d u c e  them,  a n d  s o  o n .  . . .  
I d o  it, h e  d o e s  i t  a f t e r  me; a n d  I i n f l u e n c e  h im by  
e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  a g r e e m e n t ,  r e j e c t i o n ,  e x p e c t a t i o n ,  
e n c o u r a g e m e n t .  I l e t  h im g o  t h i s  way, o r  h o l d  h im b a c k ;  a n d  s o  
o n .  ( W i t t g e n s t e i n  1958,  S 2 0 8 ) .  
T h i s ,  p l a u s i b l y ,  i s  how i n f a n t s  a n d  p e o p l e  coming t o  new a n d  a l i e n  
c u l t u r e s  are t a u g h t  t h e  p r e v a l e n t  l a n g u a g e .  
I t  s h o u l d  a l s o  be n o t e d  t h a t ,  i f  I am t o  a v o i d  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  
' r u l e s  f o r  f o l l o w i n g  r u l e s f  o r  ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 1  , 
my s e e i n g  t h a t  someone  i s  i n  a g r e e m e n t  o r  d i s a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  m e  
c a n n o t  be a m a t t e r  o f  my i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h a t  p e r s o n ,  where  by  
' i n t e r p r e t i n g '  I mean c o n s u l t i n g  a t r a n s l a t i o n  m a n u a l  o f  some s o r t .  
I f  it were, t h e n  t h e  p r o b l e m  which  my b e i n g  a member o f  a community 
was s u p p o s e d  t o  s o l v e ,  wou ld  s i m p l y  r e -emerge  c o n c e r n i n g  my 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t a k i n g  m y s e l f  t o  be f o l l o w i n g  a r u l e  i n  mak ing  t h e  
j . n t e r p r e t a t i o n 1 4 .  I t  mus t  be t h e  case, t h e n ,  t h a t  n o r m a l l y  I s i m p l y  
- i . e . ,  w i t h o u t  c o n s u l t i n g t r a n s l a t i o n  m a n u a l s  o r  d r a w i n g  i n f e r e n c e s -  
see t h a t  my p e e r s  a g r e e  o r  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  m e .  
A s  m e n t i o n e d  a t  t h e  o u t s e t ,  t h e  s c e p t i c a l  c o n c l u s i o n  n a t u r a l l y  
i n v i t e s  t w o  q u e s t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  it i s  n a t u r a l  t o  a s k  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  
a r e n ' t  d o u b t s ,  p a r a l l e l  t o  t h e  d o u b t s  r a i s e d  i n  t h e  case i n  which  
I am s o l i t a r y ,  f o r  t h e  c a s e  i n  wh ich  I am a member o f  a community.  
And s e c o n d ,  i f  t h e  c o m r n u n i t a r i a n  a n s w e r  t o  t h e  i n i t i a l  q u e s t i o n  i s  
a n  a d e q u a t e  a n s w e r ,  it i s  n a t u r a l  t o  a s k  w h e t h e r  a s i m i l a r l y  ' b a n a l t  
140n t h i s  p o i n t ,  see W i t t g e n s t e i n  1958 ,  SS198, 201 .  
answer can't be formulated which does not advert to a community of 
speakers -perhaps one which appeals to a 'community of time-slices' 
of myself. These two questions reflect a general qualm about the 
given solution to the problem, namely, that the point at which the 
sceptic's doubts are rejected seems arbitrary. After all, what 
justifies me in not rejecting the doubts earlier, and hence 
resisting the need to appeal to a communityr or later, which would 
lead me to doubt that my community affords what's needed for me to 
be justified in believing that I know what I mean? Robert Fogelin 
txpresses this qualm succinctly in his discussion of Wittgenstein 
on private language, as follows: 
... the public-check argument15 relies on what I have called 
a general sceptical argument16. If this general sceptical 
argument shows the impossibility of all language, then its 
specific application to a private language is arbitrary. It is 
essential, therefore, to find a defense against this sceptical 
argument that p~otects a public language without at the same 
time being serviceable for the protection of a private 
language. It does not seem that this demand has been met, for 
when we construct what seems to be Wittgensteinrs defense 
against a sceptical attack upon a public language, it y.'.elds 
a defense of a private language as a special case. (Fogelin 
1987, p.183)'' 
In what follows, the attempt will be made to show that this line of 
objection, although appealingly even-handed, does not apply to the 
argument given above. In contrast to what Fogelin charges is the 
case for Wittgensteinfs argument, the argument given above against 
the possibility of a solitary person's being able to justify that 
she is speaking a language is not what Fogelin calls a 'general' 
15~hat is, the argument against private language which Fogelin 
finds in Wittgenstein. 
161.e., an argument "that is independent of any particular 
subject matter" (p. 179) . 
 or remarks in much the same spirit, see Blackburn 1984, 
p.295. 
sceptical argument. The aim below will be to show that the 
recommended 'communitarian solutionf does indeed represent a stable 
position, and that it represents the only stable position. 
The form of the objection to be addressed in this section is 
this: if I cannot be justified in believing that I know the meanings 
of the predicates of my language in the solitary case, then nor can 
I be justified in believing that I know the meanings of the 
predicates of my language in the public case. That is, insofar as 
there is a sceptical argument to be made, it is an argument which 
undermines the public case to the same extent as the solitary. I 
will consider two instances of the objection. 
To see the first instance of this objection, consider the 
following comments on 'communitarianism', due to Paul Boghossian: 
Communitarianism is a response to the perceived inability to 
define a distinction, at the level of the individual, between 
correct and incorrect dispositions [say, to use a predicate]. 
The suggestion that correctness consists in agreement with the 
dispositions of onet s community is designed to meet this need. 
(Boghossian 1989, p. 534) 
As Boghossian indicates, there is a problem in specifying what the 
distinction between being correct and being incorrect in one's use 
of a word (or having a disposition to use a word correctly or 
incorrectly) consists in, "at the level of the individualv -a 
problem which arises when one is a solitary speaker as in the 
problem above. Very briefly, the communitarian solution to this 
problem is to identify being correct with being in accord with (the 
majority of) one's linguistic community, and being incorrect with 
being in disaccord. On this view, then, the totality of one's 
linguistic community's dispositions to use a given predicate 
determine the predicate's extension. If the community as a whole is 
disposed to term x 'Pt, then x is P. 
The objection to this communitarian account of language is that 
it fails to take account of the possibility of one's whole 
linguistic community's being mistaken. It should be clear on 
reflection that one's community as a whole's terming something 'PI  
does not ipso facto make it P, as this account entails it does. For 
example, the mere fact that the substantial majority of one's 
community is inclined to term a certain celestial body 'a start is 
not sufficient to make it a star -it may turn out on closer 
inspection to be, say, a planet or moon of a planet. In this 
respect, the community account of laqguage seems to be no better off 
than the straight-forward dispositional account which equates the 
extension of a person's predicate 'PI with what she is disposed to 
term 'PI. This latter account fails, like the community account, 
because it leaves no room for error where evidently there must be 
room for error. So, if there is a problem in defining a distinction 
between correct and incorrect dispositions at the level of the 
individual, there is likewise a problem at the level of a 
cornmunit yls . 
As an objection to the communitarian account of language given, 
this is an effective criticism. The objection, however, is 
misdirected, insofar as the communitarian account objected to is not 
what is being proposed in this chapter. The problem for which the 
account just outlined is offered as a solution, again, is to "define 
a distinction" between correct and incorrect uses of a word. It is, 
 or a more complete and subtle discussion and criticism of 
this account, see Boghossian 1989, pp.534-536. 
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in other words, to fill in, in non-trivial terms, the right hand 
side of the biconditional, 
S ' s  use of word W is correct <-> . . . 
This amounts to giving a non-trivial specification of the extension 
of any predicate of S's language, since it is correct to term a 
given thing ' P f  if and only if the thing is in the extension of 'P' . 
The role of the community in solving the problem posed in section 
I above, on the other hand, is not to determine the extensions of 
the predicates of the language. To see this, recall that the problem 
there was to determine what it is for me to know what a word of mine 
means, such that I'm justified in believing that I know what it 
means. The proposal was that to know what a word means is just to 
be able to use it mostly correctly. It is sufficient, then, in order 
for my community to furnish me with a justification for believing 
that I know what my ~ords mean, that it justify me in believing that 
most of my uses of my words are correct. And for my community to do 
this, it is sufficient that I be justified in believing that its 
uses be merely mostly correct. My believing that my community is 
mistaken from time to time -and thus that its uses are unable to fix 
the predicatesf extensions- is consistent with my being justified 
in believing that its tacit approval or open disapproval of my uses 
provide me with (defeasible) grounds for taking my uses to be 
correct or incorrect. Even community-wide uses of a predicate which 
are possibly erroneous can serve as a prima facie standard of 
correctness, provided that it is very probable that they are 
correct. 
The response to the first objection, then, is that my linguistic 
communityfs uses of a given predicate need not be assumed to be 
e x t e n s i o n - d e t e r m i n i n g .  My community a s  a who le  c a n  go  wrong, 
p r o v i d e d  o n l y  t h a t  i t s  u s e s  are  c o r r e c t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  o f t e n  t h a t  t h e y  
c a n  s e r v e  as a d e f e a s i b l e  s t a n d a r d  o f  c o r r e c t n e s s .  The  s e c o n d  
o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  I am immune t o  t h e  s c e p t i c a l  c o n c l u s i o n  
when i n  a community o f  s p e a k e r s  b u t  n o t  when s o l i t a r y ,  c o n c e r n s  my 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  my communi ty ' s  u s e s  o f  i t s  
predicates  a re  m o s t  o f  t h e  t i m e  c o r r e c t .  I f  I do  n o t  h a v e  a n y  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h i s ,  t h e n ,  e v i d e n t l y ,  I w i l l  n o t  h a v e  
a n y  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  m y  u s e s  are m o s t l y  c o r r e c t ,  a n d  
h e n c e  t h a t  I know wha t  t h e  p r e d i c a t e s  mean. P r i m a  f a c i e ,  t h i s  
p r o b l e m  a p p e a r s  t o  be p r e c i s e l y  p a r a l l e l  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  f a c i n g  m e  
i n  t h e  s c e n a r i o  a b o v e ,  i n  wh ich  I am a s o l i t a r y  s p e a k e r .  T h e r e  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  q u e s t i o n  w a s ,  e f f e c t i v e l y ,  what  j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  b e l i e v i n g  
t h a t  what  seems r i g h t  t o  me i s  a re l i ab le  i n d i c a t o r  o f  what  i s  
r i g h t ?  Here t h e  q u e s t i o n  is ,  what  j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  
what  my community t a k e s  t o  b e  r i g h t ,  i s  a r e l i ab l e  i n d i c a t o r  o f  what  
i s  r i g h t ?  
T h i s  q u e s t i o n  c a n  be t a k e n  i n  t w o  ways19. On t h e  f i r s t  way o f  
t a k i n g  it, it i s  as sumed  t h a t  my l i n g u i s t i c  community,  whom, we're 
s u p p o s i n g ,  a g r e e  i n  t h e i r  u s e s  o f  t h e i r  words ,  d o  mean s o m e t h i n g  by  
t h e i r  w o r d s  ( a n d  a l l  mean t h e  same t h i n g ) .  Then t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s ,  
wha t  j u s t i f i e s  me - r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  g i v e n  a s s u m p t i o n -  i n  b e l i e v i n g  
t h a t  wha t  my community as a who le  t a k e  t o  b e  t h e  c o r r e c t  u s e s  o f  
t h e i r  p r e d i c a t e s ,  d o  n o t  d i v e r g e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  f r o m  what  i n  f a c t  a r e  
191n C h r i s t o p h e r  P e a c o c k e f s  t e r m s ,  t h e s e  a re  t h e  i s s u e  o f  
w h e t h e r  w e  a re  mak ing  m i s t a k e s  i n  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  r u l e s ,  a n d  t h e  
i s s u e  o f  w h e t h e r  w e  are  mak ing  m i s t a k e s  a b o u t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  r u l e s  
( P e a c o c k e  1981 ,  p .  76,7) . T h e s e  two  ways o f  t a k i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n  a l s o  
p a r a l l e l  F o g e l i n '  s s c e p t i c ' s  r e s p o n s e  t o  W i t t g e n s . t e i n  ( F o g e l i n  1987 ,  
p . 1 8 1 , 2 ) .  
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t h e  c o r r e c t  u s e s ?  T h a t  i s ,  what j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  t h e i r  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  of  t h e i r  p r e d i c a t e s  are n o t  m o s t l y  m i s t a k e n ?  For  
example ,  why n o t  s u p p o s e  t h a t ,  t h o u g h  t h e r e  i s  v e r y  l a r g e  a g r e e r e n t  
i n  t h e  community as t o  what t h e  c o r r e c t  u s e s  o f  ' c u b i c '  o r  ' m a r r i e d r  
o r  'sweet' are, n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  w e  are a l l  more o f t e n  t h a n  n o t ,  
i n c o r r e c t  - e .g . ,  most  t h i n g s  w e  t e r m  'sweet', i n  f a c t  a r e  n o t  
c o r r e c t l y  s o  t e r m e d ,  a n d  many t h i n g s  w e  would n o t  term 'sweett i n  
f a c t  are c o r r e c t l y  s o  t e r m e d .  The s e c o n d  way o f  t a k i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
p o s e d  above  i s  w i t h  t h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  - t h a t  my l i n g u i s t i c  community 
d o  mean s o m e t h i n g  b y  t h e i r  words- d ropped .  Then t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s ,  
what j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  what my community t a k e  t o  b e  t h e  
c o r r e c t  u s e s  o f  a p r e d i c a t e  are a  r e l i a b l e  i n d i c a t o r  o f  what i n  f a c t  
a r e  t h e  c o r r e c t  u s e s ,  as opposed  t o  n o t h i n g  a t  a l l ?  Why s u p p o s e  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  s u c h  a t h i n g  as a c o r r e c t  u s e  - i .e . ,  a  meaning- a s  opposed 
t o  m e r e l y  a c o n f o r m i t y  i n  d i s p o s i t i o n s  t o  u s e  t h e  p r e d i c a t e ?  
The b a l a n c e  of  t h e  r e m a i n d e r  of t h i s  s e c t i o n  w i l l  b e  d e v o t e d  t o  
a n s w e r i n g  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  a s  u n d e r s t o o d  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  way. A s  w i l l  b e  
s e e n ,  t h e  a n s w e r  t o  t h i s  c o n s t u a l  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n  e n t a i l s  a n  answer  
t o  t h e  f i r s t  way o f  t a k i n g  it, as w e l l .  I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h e t  t h i s  
s e c o n d  way o f  t a k i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  t h e  r e l e v a n t  p a r a l l e l  t o  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  f o r  t h e  s o l i t a r y  c a s e .  T h e r e  t h e  i s s u e  was, what j u s t i f i e s  
m e  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  what  seems r i g h t  t o  m e  i s  a r e l i ab le  i n d i c a t o r  
o f  what i s  r i g h t ,  as  opposed  t o  b e i n g  n e i t h e r  r i g h t  n o r  wrong a t  
a l l ?  My c o n c e r n  was n o t  t h a t  I migh t  mean s o m e t h i n g  d i f f e r e n t  t h a n  
what I a p p e a r  t o  mean by  my words,  b u t  r a t h e r  t h a t  I c a n ' t  j u s t i f y  
t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  I mean a n y t h i n g  a t  a l l .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  c o n c e r n  h e r e  
i s  t o  show, n o t  t h a t  what my community t a k e  t o  be r i g h t  d o e s n ' t  
d i v e r g e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  f rom what i n  f a c t  i s  r i g h t ,  b u t  r a t h e r  t h a t  
what my community take t o  be r igh t  i s  i n  f a c t  evaluable a s  r ight  or 
wrong. 
What i s  being proposed i s  a scepticism concerning the 
meaningfulness of public speech, p a r a l l e l  t o  the  scepticism i n  the  
s o l i t a r y  case. The correct  response t o  t h i s  scepticism, I maintain, 
i s  t o  r e j e c t  the  aberrant uses of our ordinary concepts which the  
scept ic  exp lo i t s  t o  get h i s  r e s u l t .  I n  t h i s  respect,  the  response 
i s  analogous t o  a fami l ia r  l i n e  of response t o  scepticism concerning 
the  exis tence of an 'external worldr. W i t t ~ e n s t e i n  summarizes t h i s  
l i n e  of response i n  the  course of discussing the  concept of 
I t  [character izing the  concept of 'seeing'] i s  the  same as  
when one t r i e s  t o  def ine the  concept of a material  object i n  
terms of 'what i s  r e a l l y  s e e n f .  --What we have t o  do i s  t o  
accept t h e  everyday language-game, and t o  note f a l s e  accounts 
of the  matter a s  f a l s e .  The primitive language-game which 
children a re  taught needs no j z s t i f i ca t ion ;  attempts a t  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  need t o  be re jec ted .  (Wittgenstein 1958,  p.200) 
Now, I c i t e  t h i s  comment of Wittgenteinrs because it connects the 
response t o  t h i s  scepticism -r ight ly,  I maintain- d i rec t ly  t o  the 
i ssue  of whether our normal 'language-gamef requires  jus t i f i ca t ion .  
Since the  scep t i ca l  argument against  s o l i t a r y  language given i n  
sect ion I t r ades  on a r e l a t ed  question of jus t i f i ca t ion ,  it may seem 
t h a t  t h i s  l i n e  of response w i l l  show the  argument against  s o l i t a r y  
language t o  be inval id ,  a s  well.  Indeed, Robert Fogelin argues just 
t h i s .  I w i l l  respond t o  t h i s  i n  two s tages.  F i r s t ,  I w i l l  s e t  out 
the  response t o  the  scep t i ca l  argument against  public language, 
together w i t h  Fogelin's, and indicate  what I take t o  be a flaw i n  
''TO be c lear ,  Wittgenstein i s  objecting, not t o  'external 
worldf scepticism, but ra ther  t o  a view of perception which the 
scept ic  explo i t s ,  according t o  which Itwhat i s  rea l ly  seen" i s  not 
physical  objects  but sense-data. 
F o g e l i n ' s  a r g u m e n t .  T h i s  w i l l  r e q u i r e  d e v e l o p i n g t h e  a n a l o g y  b e t w e e n  
' e x t e r n a l  w o r l d r  s c e p t i c i s m  a n d  p u b l i c  l a n g u a g e  s c e p t i c i s m ,  a n d  t h e  
r e s p o n s e  t= then!, i n  some d e t a i l .  Then ,  i n  s e c t i o n  111, I w i l l  a r g u e  
t h a t  t h e  r e s p o n s e ,  p r o p e r l y  f o r m u l a t e d ,  i s  o f  no  u s e  t o  t h e  s o l i t a r y  
s p e a k e r .  
C o n s i d e r ,  t o  b e g i n  w i t h ,  some r e m a r k s  o f  F o g e l i n ' s .  A s  was n o t e d  
a t  t h e  e n d  o f  s e c t i o n  I ,  F o g e l i n  c h a r g e s  W i t t g e n s t e i n  w i t h  u s i n g  a 
" g e n e r a l  s c e p t i c a l  a r g u m e n t "  -i .e . ,  o n e  wh ich  is " i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  a n y  
p a r t i c u l a r  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r n  ( F o g e l i n  1987 ,  p . 1 7 9 ) -  t o  make h i s  case 
a g a i n s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a p r i v a t e  l a n g u a g e 2 ' .  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
h e  s a y s :  
I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  s c e p t i c  e x p l o i t s  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  
s e e m i n g  a n d  b e i n g  a n d  a r g u e s  t h a t  w e  are  n o t  i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  
d e c i d e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s  w h e t h e r  s o m e t h i n g  h a s  a 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o r  o n l y  seems t o .  ( T h i s  i s  j u s t  how 
W i t t g e n s t e i n  a r g u e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a p r i v a t e  
l a n g u a g e . )  I n  e v e r y d a y  l i f e  t h i s  c h a l l e n g e  d o e s  n o t  b o t h e r  u s  
b e c a u s e  w e  a c c e p t  a p r i n c i p l e  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  k i n d :  
If s o m e t h i n g  seems  t o  be p, t h e n  ( d e f e a s i b l y )  i t  i s  p .  
. . . I f  t h e r e  s eems  t o  be a tree i n  f r o n t  o f  me, I s t r a i g h t a w a y  
t h i n k  t h e r e  i s  a tree i n  f r o n t  o f  m e ,  a n d  r e t r e a t  f r o m  t h i s  
b e l i e f  o n l y  f o r  g o o d  r e a s o n s .  The  w i l e  o f  t h e  s c e p t i c  i s  t o  
r e v e r s e  t h i s  p r e s u m p t i o n  a n d  demand t h a t  w e  a n t i c i p a t e  a n d  
e l i m i n a t e  e v e r y  p o s s i b l e  c i r c u m s t a n c e  t h a t  m i g h t  a r i s e  a n d  
t h e r e b y  d e f e a t  my p r e s u m p t i o n .  (p.  1 8 0 )  . 
F o g e l i n ' s  c r i t i c i s m  o f  W i t t g e n s t e i n  i s ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  t h a t  a l t k ' c ~ ~ g h  i n  
t h e  p r i v a t e  l a n g u a g e  c a s e ,  h e  t a k e s  t h i s  s c e p t i c a l  s t r a ' e g y  t o  be 
effectjvs, i n  t h e  p u b l i c  case h e  d o e s  n o t ,  a n d  t h e r e  i s  no  g r o u n d  
f o r  t h e  UBL;~.,: e s t a n d a r d z 2 .  F o g e l i n  m a i n t a i r : ~  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  
f o o t n o t e  
2 2 ~  d o  n g t  mean t o  be d e f e n d i n g  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  a r g u m e n t  
p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  i s  W i t t g e n s t e i n '  s ( t h i s  would  be a  t a s k  f o r  
a s e p a r a t e  paper) .  My p o i n t  i s  r a t h e r  m e r e l y  t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  
a r g u m e n t  i s  n o t  s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  t h e  c r i t i c i sm which  F o g e l i n  l e v e l s  
a g a i n s t  W i t t g e n s t e i n .  
Wittgenste in  i s  r i g h t  t o  t ake  our 'everydayt epistemological  
p r i n c i p l e s  t o  provide an adequate answer t o  t h e  s cep t i c ,  he i s  wrong 
t o  suppose t h a t  they cannot be app l ied  t o  defend t h e  s o l i t a r y  
speaker.  
A s t ra ight- forward example of t h e  s c e p t i c a l  s t r a t egy  which 
Fogelin ( r i g h t l y ,  I mainta in)  r e j e c t s ,  i s  provided by Bertrand 
Russel l  i n  t h e  opening pages of h i s  The Problems of  Philosophy 
(Russe l l  1 9 1 2 ) .  Russe l l ' s  concern is ,  i n  p a r t ,  t h e  problem of t he  
ex i s t ence  of an ex t e rna l  world, which w i l l  serve  a s  a p a r a l l e l  t o  
t h e  problem of t h e  ex i s tence  of f a c t s  about t h e  cor rec tness  of uses 
of express ions  of a  publ ic  language. Russel l  begins by observing 
t h a t  " [ i l t  seems t o  me t h a t  I am now s i t t i n g  i n  a  cha i r ,  a t  a t a b l e  
of a  c e r t a i n  shape, on which I see  shee t s  of paper with wr i t ing  or  
p r i n t "  p . .  He goes on t o  say, however, t h a t  " a l l  t h i s  may be 
reasonably doubted" p .  1 . H i s  argument f o r  doubting t h i s  begins 
with t h e  claim t h a t  i f ,  f o r  example, he moves about t h e  t a b l e  he i s  
s i t t i n g  a t ,  t h e  p a t t e r n s  of l i g h t  r e f l e c t e d  off  t h e  t a b l e ,  and hence 
t h e  t a b l e t s  apparent  colour ,  w i l l  change. Likewise, he notes,  t h e  
aspect  which t h e  t a h l e  p resen ts  w i l l  change from being t rapezo ida l  
t o  rhombic and back again ,  a s  he v a r i e s  t h e  angle from which he 
looks a t  i t .  General izing t h i s  l i n e  of thought t o  t h e  other  senses,  
Russel l  concludes t h a t  
. . . i t  becomes evident  t h a t  t h e  r e a l  t a b l e ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  one, i s  
not t h e  same a s  what we immediately experience by s igh t  or  
touch o r  hear ing.  The r e a l  t a b l e ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  one, i s  not 
immediately known t o  u s  a t  a l l ,  but  m u s t  be an inference from 
what i s  immediately known. Hence, two very d i f f i c u l t  quest ions 
a t  once a r i s e ;  namely, (1) Is t h e r e  a r e a l  t a b l e  a t  a l l ?  ( 2 )  
I f  so, what s o r t  of a b j e c t  can it  be? (p.3-4) . 
The f i r s t  s t e p  i n  t h e  s c e p t i c a l  argument, then,  i s  t o  make the  case 
t h a t  what we see  i s  not what we normally t ake  ourselves  t o  see ,  but 
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r a t h e r  some k i n d  o f  p e r c e p t u a l  i n t e r m e d i a r y  - s e n s e  d a t a ,  i n  t h i s  
case- f r o m  w h i c h  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  o b j e c t  n o r m a l l y  t a k e n  t o  b e  
s e e n ,  mus t  be i n f e r r e d .  The  n e x t  s t e p  i s  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  n e i t h e r  t h e  
d e l i v e r a n c e s  o f  t h e  s e n s e s  n o r  a n y  p r i n c i p l e  o f  r e a s o n  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  
t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  r e q u i r e d  i n f e r e n c e 2 3 .  The  c o n c l u s i o n  i s  t h a t  it i s  
n o t  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  b e l i e v e  i n  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  t h i n g s  i n  
q u e s t i o n .  I n  s h o r t ,  o n e  r e jec t s  t h a t  it c a n  s i m p l y  be t a k e n  f o r  
g r a n t e d  t h a t  o n e  c a n  i n f e r  f r o m  s o m e t h i n g ' s  s e e m i n g  t o  be p t o  
( d e f e a s i b l y )  i t s  b e i n g  p. S i n c e  what  i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  s e n s e s  
f a l l s  s h o r t  o f  p i t s e l f ,  a space f o r  d o u b t  i s  o p e n e d ,  a n d  it becomes 
r e a s o n a b l e  t o  d o u b t  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  are r ea l  tab les  a n d  c h a i r s  -an 
' e x t e r n a l  w o r l d 1 -  a t  a l l ,  as o p p o s e d  t o  m e r e  s e n s e - d a t a .  
The  a n a l o g y  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  my j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  i n  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  f a c t s  a b o u t  t h e  c o r r e c t n e s s  o f  my communi ty ' s  u s e s  
o f  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  o u r  l a n g u a g e ,  i s  d i r ec t .  I n  t h e  n o r m a l  c o u r s e  
o f  e v e n t s ,  I u n r e f l s c t i v e l y  t a k e  t h e r e  t o  be f a c t s  a b o u t  what  t h e  
c o r r e c t  u s e s  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  are.  I n  n o r m a l  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h a t  i s ,  when 
members o f  my l i n g u i s t i c  community t e r m  a t h i n g  ' z i n c '  o r  'a r a b b i t f  
o r  'a baseball  game1 o r  w h a t e v e r ,  wha t  ( I  b e l i e v e )  I p e r c e i v e  i s  n o t  
j u s t  p e o p l e  e x h i b i t i n g  v o c a l  b e h a v i o u r ,  b u t  r a t h e r ,  p e o p l e  mak ing  
s t a t e m e n t s  w h i c h  are e i t h e r  c o r r e c t  o r  i n c o r r e c t .  T h a t  I p e r c e i v e  
t h e  u t t e r a n c e s  o f  my peers i n  t h i s  way, it s h o u l d  be n o t e d ,  i s  no  
more  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  t h a n  t h a t  I see a d e s k  i n  f r o n t  o f  me when I 
e n t e r  my o f f i c e .  Here a g a i n ,  however ,  o n e  m i g h t  m a i n t a i n  t h a t ,  
d e s p i t e  t h e  n a t u r a l n e s s  o f  s u c h  c o n v i c t i o n s ,  t h e y  c a n  r e a s o n a b l y  be 
231n h i s  t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m ,  R u s s e l l  res is ts  t h i s  s t e p .  
F o r  a c r i t i c i s m  o f  R u s s e l l ' s  s t r a t e g y  f o r  e v a d i n g  t h e  s c e p t i c i s m  
w h i c h  h i s  d o u b t s  l e a d  t o w a r d ,  see C r i s p i n  W r i g h t ' s  ' F a c t s  a n d  
C e r t a i n t y t ,  i n  Proceedings o f  the British Academy, 1986. p p .  429-472 .  
d o u b t e d .  Cne m i g h t  a r g u e ,  f o r  example ,  as f o l l o w s .  F i r s t ,  it i s  
e v i d e n t  t h a t  my s e n s e  o r g a n s  are e a c h  s e n s i t i v e  o n l y  t o  p h y s i c a l  
s t i m u l i  i n  my e n v i r o n m e n t .  Second,  s i n c e  it i s  o n l y  t h r o u g h  my 
s e n s e s  t h a t  I come t o  l e a r n  o f  my e n v i r o n m e n t ,  it f o l l o w s  t h a t  
( p a r a p h r a s i n g  W.V. Q u i n e )  t h e  o n l y  f a c t s  I h a v e  t o  go  on i n  
i n t e r p r e t i n g  my peers are f a c t s  a b o u t  t h e  f o r c e s  t h a t  1 see 
i m p i n g i n g  on t h e i r  s e n s o r y  s u r f a c e s  a n d  t h e i r  o b s e r v a b l e  b e h a v i o u r ,  
v o c a l  a n d  o t h e r w i s e 2 4 .  T h i r d ,  s i n c e  ( p u t a t i v e )  f a c t s  a b o u t  t h e  
c o r r e c t n e s s  o f  t h e i r  u s e s  o f  words  are n o t  o f  t h e  g i v e n  k i n d s ,  i t  
f o l l o w s  t h a t  I do n o t  l e a r n  s u c h  f a c t s  d i r e c t l y  a t  a l l .  A s  R u s s e l l  
m i g h t  h a v e  p u t  i t ,  
. . .it becomes e v i d e n t  t h a t  f a c t s  s u c h  a s  w h e t h e r  a g i v e n  t h i n g  
i s  c o r r e c t l y  t e r m e d  'a r a b b i t ' ,  i f  t h e y  e x i s t ,  are  n o t  t h e  
same as what  w e  i m e d i a t e l y  t a k e  i n  b y  s i g h t  o r  t o u c h  o r  
h e a r i n g .  Such f a c t s ,  i f  t h e y  e x i s t ,  a r e  n o t  immediately known 
t o  u s  a t  a l l ,  b u t  must  b e  a n  i n f e r e n c e  f rom what i s  
i m m e d i a t e l y  known. Hence, two v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  q u e s t i o n s  a t  o n c e  
a r i s e ;  namely,  (1) A r e  t h e r e  s u c h  f a c t s  a t  a l l ?  ( 2 )  I f  s o ,  
what  s o r t  o f  f a c t s  c a n  t h e y  b e ?  
To c o m p l e t e  t h e  case, it i s  a r g u e d  t h a t  n o t h i n g  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  
s e n s e s  o r  r e a s o n  j u s t i f i e s  t h e  i n f e r e n c e  f rom what  i s  ' i m m e d i a t e l y  
knownr t o  c o n c l u s i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  o b t a i n i n g  o f  t h e  f a c t s  i n  
q u e s t i o n 2 5 .  Once a g a i n ,  t h e n ,  t h e r e  i s  a b a r  t o  i n f e r r i n g  f rom what 
'seems' t o  be t h e  case t o  wha.2 ( d e f e a s i b l y )  i s  t h e  c a s e ,  and  a  
c o n s e q u e n t  d o u b t  as t o  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  are f a c t s  o f  t h e  g i v e n  k i n d  a t  
a l l .  
24Cf .  Q u i n e  1 9 6 0 ,  p . 2 8 :  " A l l  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  d a t a  [ t h e  f i e l d  
l i n g u i s t ]  h a s  t o  g o  on are t h e  f o r c e s  t h a t  h e  sees i m p i n g i n g  on t h e  
n a t i v e t  s s u r f a c e s  a n d  t h e  o b s e r v a b l e  b e h a v i o u r ,  v o c a l  a n d  o t h e r w i s e ,  
o f  t h e  n a t i v e o ' .  
2 5 ~ u i n e  i s  a n  example  o f  a  p h i l o s o p h e r  who a r g u e s  i n  t h i s  way. 
Note  t h o u g h ,  t h a t  h i s  well-known argument  i n  C h a p t e r  2 o f  Word and 
Object (Quine  1 9 6 2 )  c o n c e r n s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n £  e r r i n g  f  ronl what 
i s  g i v e n  t o  c o n c l u s i o n s  a b o u t  mean ing .  What I a m  t a k i n g  i s s u e  w i t h  
h e r e  are t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  what i s  g i v e n .  
A t  least  where t h e  k i n d  o f  s c e p t i c i s m  set o u t  above c o n c e r n i n g  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a n  e x t e r n a l  w o r l d  i s  a t  i s s u e ,  I t a k e  t h e  g e n e r a l  
'common s e n s e '  r e s p o n s e  t o  b e  f a m i l i a r .  F i r s t ,  w e  o b s e r v e  t h a t  
t h o u g h  it i s  i n  some s e n s e  p o s s i b l e  f o r  m e  t o  d o u b t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
a t  p r e s e n t  a d e s k  i n  f r o n t  o f  m e ,  t h i s  i s  n o t  s o m e t h i n g  which it i s  
r e a s o n a b l e  t o  d o u b t .  I t  i s  n o t  clear j u s t  how a p e r s o n  would have  
t o  behave  t o  e v i n c e  s i n c e r e ,  n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l  d o u b t  as t o  whe ther  
t h e r e  i s  a d e s k  i n  f r o n t  of him ( i n  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which w e  would 
a l l  p r e - p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y  t a k e  t h e r e  t o  b e  o n e ) ,  b u t ,  s u p p o s i n g  it t o  
be p o s s i b l e ,  w e  would n o t  h o l d  s u c h  a p e r s o n ' s  d o u b t  t o  be 
r e a s o n a b l e .  A s  J .  L .  A u s t i n  o b s e r v e s  ( r e f e r r i n g  t o  a  p a s s a g @  i n  
I t  [ t h e  p a s s a g e  i n  Locke] s u g g e s t s  t h a t  when, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  I 
l o o k  a t  a c h a i r  a few y a r d s  i n  f r o n t  o f  m e  i n  b r o a d  d a y l i g h t ,  
my v iew i s  t h a t  I have  ( o n l y )  as much c e r t a i n t y  as I need  a n d  
c a n  g e t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a c h a i r  a n d  t h a t  I see i t .  But i n  f a c t  
t h e  p l a i n  man would r e g a r d  d o u b t  i n  s u c h  a  case, n o t  as f a r -  
f e t c h e d  o r  o v e r - r e f i n e d  o r  somehow u n p r a c t i c a l ,  b u t  as p l a i n  
n o n s e n s e ;  h e  would s a y ,  q u i t e  c o r r e c t l y ,  'Well, i f  t h a t ' s  n o t  
s e e i n g  a c h a i r ,  t h e n  I d o n ' t  know what is . '  ( A u s t i n  1962,  
p . 1 0 )  
I t a k e  t h i s  p o i n t  a b o u t  t h e  o r d i n a r y  n o t i o n  o f  d o u b t  t o  b e  v a l i d .  
I n  o r d i n a r y  s i t u a t i o n s ,  one  s i m p l y  c a n n o t  r a t i o n a l l y  d o u b t  t h a t  what 
normal  p e o p l e  would u n r e f l e c t i v e l y  t a k e  t o  b e  a d e s k ,  i s  a d e s k .  I f  
t h e r e  were known t o  be a n  e x t r e m e l y  a c c o m p l i s h e d  i l l u s i o n i s t  o r  
p r a n k s t e r  o r  d e s i g n e r  o f  s t a g e - p r o p s  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y ,  s u c h  a doub t  
m i g h t  be r e a s o n a b l e ,  b u t  s u c h  are p r e c i s e l y  n o t  o r d i n a r y  s i t u a t i o n s .  
2 6 " t h e  c e r t a i n t y  o f  t h i n g s  e x i s t i n g  r e r u m  n a t u r a ,  when w e  have 
t h e  t e s t i m o n y  o f  o u r  s e n s e s  f o r  i t ,  i s  n o t  o n l y  as g r e a t  a s  0u.r 
f r a m e  c a n  a t t a i n  t o ,  b u t  as o u r  c o n d i t i o n  needs tu  An E s s a y  C o n c e r n i n g  
Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g .  Bk  I V ,  c h .  X I ,  s e c t i o n  8 .  A u s t i n  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  
c i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p a s s a g e  i n  A . J .  Ayer,  The F o u n d a t i o n s  o f  E m p i r i c a l  
Knowledge .  Macmil lan ,  1 9 4 0 .  p . 1 .  
120 
These considerations speak against Fogelin's suggestion that the 
relevant epistemological principle adhered to in everyday life is 
'If something seems to be p, then (defeasibly) it is p ' .  This 
principle suggests, what Locke and Russell would presumably accept, 
that what we see, in ordinary situations, is not simply what is the 
case, but rather what seems to be the case. Once this is conceded, 
a good part of the sceptic's case is already made. For me to allow 
that there merely seems to be a desk in front of me now, but to 
insist that I'm nevertheless entitled to infer to its actually being 
there, is for me to admit the correctness of the basis of the 
sceptic's epistemological picture. Once I have done this, resisting 
the sceptic's argument is more difficult than Fogelin suggests. 
Suppose, for example that I say, standing in my office, 'There's a 
desk heref. If, in reponse to the sceptic's familiar doubts, I say 
that my claim is based on what seems to be the case, together with 
my right to infer using the stated principle, then the sceptic will 
likely ask what justifes my use of the principle. The alternative, 
which Austin recommends, to having to respond or justify not 
responding to this last question of the scepticls, is to reject the 
reasoning which leads to the supposition that the desk is not simply 
-that is, not mediately- seen. 
Supposing Austin, rather than Fogelin, to be right here, the 
problem with the sceptical argument. lies, not in what can or cannot 
be inferred from what we are taken to 'immediately experience', but 
rather in what the argument claims we immediately experience. In the 
case of Russellls argument, the step to be rejected is the 
transition from the claim that, seen from different perspectives, 
the desk will look different, to the conclusion that all that we 
i m m e d i a t e l y  e x p e r i e n c e  i s  p a t c h w o r k s  of c o l o u r ,  s e n s a t i o n s  o f  
p r e s s u r e  a p p a r e n t l y  a t  o u r  f i n g e r t i p s ,  a n d  s o  f o r t h 2 ' .  The 
d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t h i s  s tep i s  t h a t  it i s  s i m p l y  f a l s e  t h a t  t h e  d e s k  
l o o k s  d i f f e r e n t ,  i n  t h e  way R u s s e l l  s u g g e s t s ,  f rom d i f f e r e n t  a n g l e s .  
The c o r n e r s  o f  my d e s k  l o o k  r i g h t - a n g l e d ,  n o t  o b t u s e  o r  a c u t e ,  f rom 
a n y  a n g l e  t h a t  I hook a t  it, i n  normal  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  I f  a s k e d  t o  
c h o o s e  which,  among a c a r p e n t e r ' s  s q u a r e ,  a similar ,  o b t u s e  a n g l e d  
o b j e c t  a n d  a s imilar ,  a c u t e  a n g l e d  o b j e c t ,  would f i t  t h e  c o r n e r s  o f  
my d e s k  ( o r  e v e n  a n o r m a l - l o o k i n g  r e c t a n g u l a r  d e s k  n e v e r  b e f o r e  
e x a m i n e d ) ,  I would  c h o o s e  t h e  c a r p e n t e r r s  s q u a r e .  S i m i l a r  o b j e c t i o n s  
a p p l y  t o  R u s s e l l f  s claims a b o u t  t h e  d e s k ' s  c o l o u r s .  Now, t o  be s u r e ,  
i f  I c o n c e n t r a t e ,  I c a n  f o c u s  my a t t e n t i o n  on t h e  pa tchwork  o f  
c o l o u r s  which t h e  t a b l e ,  s e e n  f r o m  a  c e r t a i n  a n g l e ,  p r e s e n t s ,  a n d  
see t h e  v a r i o u s  q u a d r i l a t e r a l  p a t c h e s  a s  h a v i n g  a c u t e  a n d  o b t u s e ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  s q u a r e ,  a n g l e s .  To g e t  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  my s e e i n g  a  
t a b l e  i s  a  matter o f  my i n  sbme s e n s e  e x p e r i e n c i n g  s u c h  p a t c h e s  a n d  
t h e n  i n f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  t a b l e t s  p r e s e n c e ,  t h o u g h ,  much n e e d s  t o  b e  
s a i d  a b o u t  t h e  s e n s e s  i n  which ' e x p e r i e n c e '  a n d  ' i n f e r '  a r e  b e i n g  
u s e d .  F o r  t h e y  are c e r t a i n l y  n o t  t h e  s e n s e s  o r d i n a r i l y  u s e d :  i n  
o r d i n a r y  t a l k ,  I d o  n o t  s a y  t h a t  I i n f e r  t o  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  t a b l e  
s t a n d i n g  d i r e c t l y  i n  f r o n t  o f  m e ,  n o r  t h a t  I e x p e r i e n c e  p a t c h e s  o f  
c o l o ~ r ~ ~ .  
2 7 ~ u s t i n f  s t a r g e t  i n  S e n s e  a n d  Sensibilia i s  A .  J .  Ayer,  who 
t a l k s  a b o u t  " d i r e c t l y  p e r c e i v i n g w  r a t h e r  t h a n  " i m m e d i a t e l y  
e x p e r i e n c i n g " ,  b u t  t h e  p o i n t  i s  t h e  same. 
280f c o u r s e ,  o n e  p o s s i b l e  p a t h  t o  R u s s e l l ' s  c o n c l u s i o n  i s  f rom 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  it i s  o n l y  s o m e t h i n g  l i k e  t h i s  pa tchwork  o f  c o l o u r s  
which i m p i n g e s  on  o n e ' s  r e t i n a l  s u r f a c e s .  A s  W .  V .  Q u i n e  p o i n t s  o u t  
( Q u i n e  1 9 6 0 ,  p . 2 ) ,  however,  t h i s  a t t e m p t  t o  d e f e n d  t h e  
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  p r i o r i t y  o f  ' s e n s e  d a t a f  i t s e l f  d e p e n d s  on knowledge 
o f  f a c t s  a b o u t  t h e  e x t e r n a l  w o r l d  - s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  f a c t s  a b o u t  t h e  
s e n s e  o r g a n s .  A s  Q u i n e  s a y s ,  " [el n t i f  i c a t i o n  b e g i n s  a t  arm's l e n g t h ;  
The foregoing is plainly not, and is not meant to be, a thorough 
refutation of the argument briefly summarized above. For example, 
I have not discussed the possible rejoinder from the sceptic that 
his is a different, 'philosophicalf type of doubt or 'seemingf, than 
the common sense doubts and seemings adverted to by Austin. I take 
Austin's strategy to be to show that there is no coherent such 
notion of doubt or seeming, by showing that all attempts of the 
sceptic's to explicate it invoke expressions used in similarly 
abnormal ways2'. As in the passage from Wittgenstein cited above, 
this line of argument implicitly takes our normal way of talking not 
to be in need of justification, in the sense of being demonstrably 
reducible to some priviledged vocabulary, such as the vocabulary of 
sense-data. Although I take the strategy to be effective, I do not 
claim to have shown here more than that it is plausible that it is. 
The response to scepticism about the existence of facts as to the 
correctness of my community's uses of expressions is directly 
analogous to the response to scepticism about the existence of an 
external world. To begin with, we should note that the former 
scepticism, like the latter, contradicts what appear to be some 
quite basic facts of experience. For example, in the normal course 
of events, when someone says to me, 'Your rabbit has escaped its 
hutch', I unreflectively take that person to mean by her expression 
'your rabbitt, a certain rabbit. In the normal course of events, to 
the points of condensation in the primordial conceptual scheme are 
things glimpsed, not glimpses." 
2 9 ~ h ~ s ,  for example, see Austin's discussions (in Austin 1962) 
of 'directly perceivedf (pp.14-19 -c.f. our 'immediately 
experienced' ) , 'lookst, 'appearsf and 'seemsf (pp.33-43), and 'realt 
(pp.62-77). 
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d o u b t  t h i s ,  o r  t o  v e n t u r e  m e r e l y  t h a t  i t  seems t h a t  by 'your  r a b b i t  
s h e  meant t h e  c e r t a i n  r a b b i t ,  would be a l m o s t  as p e r v e r s e  a s  t o  
d o u b t  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  i s  a d e s k  i n  f r o n t  o f  me ,  o r  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e r e  
m e r e l y  seems t o  be a d e s k .  S i m i l a r l y ,  it seems clear t h a t  what I am 
shown when I am t a u g h t  t h e  meaning o f  a new l i n g u i s t i c  e x p r e s s i o n  
i s  n o t  m e r e l y  i n  what  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  p e o p l e  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  u t t e r  t h e  
e x p r e s s i o n ,  as  t h e  s c e p t i c  s u g g e s t s .  R a t h e r ,  what I a m  t a u g h t  i s  i n  
what c i r c u m s t a n c e s  it i s  c o r r e c t  t o  u s e  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n .  T h i s  i s  
clear f rom t h e  f ac t  t h a t ,  o n c e  I ' v e  g r a s p e d  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n ' s  
meaning,  community members a n d  I w i l l  argue w i t h  o n e  a n o t h e r  i f  o u r  
d i s p o s i t i o n s  t o  u s e  it d i f f e r ,  a n d  n o t  m e r e l y  r e g i s t e r  t h e  d e v i a t i o n  
f rom w h a t ' s  e x p e c t e d .  G r a n t e d ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  my 
community 's  l a n g u a g e  h a v e  c o r r e c t  u s e s  d o e s  n o t  t y p i c a l l y  c r o s s  my 
mind when I make, o r  when I am p r e s e n t e d  w i t h ,  u n p r o b l e m a t i c  mundane 
judgements  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  l a n g u a g e .  Nor, however, d o e s  it 
t y p i c a l l y  c r o s s  my mind when I e n t e r  my o f f i c e  s p a c e  t h a t  t h e r e ' s  
a  d e s k  i n  f r o n t  o f  m e .  
Once a g a i n ,  t h e n ,  t h e r e  i s  good r e a s o n  t o  i n q u i r e  i n t o  t h e  
s c e p t i c ' s  g r o u n d s  f o r  d o u b t .  As i n  t h e  c a s e  of  e x t e r n a l - w o r l d  
s c e p t i c i s m ,  t h e  sceptic 's  argument  i s  s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d .  H i s  
s t r a t e g y ,  a g a i n ,  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  what w e  p e r c e i v e  w i t h  someth ing  
o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  f a c t s  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  a n d  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  f a c t s  i n  
q u e s t i o n  c a n n o t  b e  i n f e r r e d  f rom what i s  p e r c e i v e d .  And, as i n  t h e  
c a s e  of  ' e x t e r n a l  w o r l d r  s c e p t i c i s m ,  t h i s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  a  non- 
t r i v i a l  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t h e s i s  which i s  a t  odds  w i t h  common s e n s e .  The 
s c e p t i c ' s  f i r s t  p r e m i s e ,  t h a t  o u r  s e n s e  o r g a n s  a r e  e a c h  s e n s i t i v e  
o n l y  t o  p h y s i c a l  s t i m u l i ,  i s  s u r e l y  u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e .  What i s  
q u e s t i o n a b l e  i s  t h e  s t e p  f rom t h i s  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  a l l  t h e  
objective data we have to go on in interpreting another person are 
the forces that we see impinging on the personf s bodily surfaces and 
her or his observable behaviour, vocal and otherwise. Since bits of 
data are facts of a certain sort, such as that a neter shows a 
certain reading or that a person uttered certain sounds upon being 
aurally impacted in a certain way, this conclusion says, in effect, 
that the only facts we non-inferentially perceive to obtain are 
'physical factsf -facts about the presence, movements, and 
configurations of physical objects. And this neither obviously 
follows from the first premise, nor is it obviously true. Concerning 
whether it follows, note that we have already given up, in 
responding to the external-world scepticism considered above, the 
idea that our sensory apparatus deliver to us some special class of 
'immediately given' sense data from which all judgements about 
physical objects must ultimately be derivable. Given this, it is not 
clear how the limitations of our sensory apparatus can be invoked 
to show that we do not simply (non-inferentially) perceive such 
things as that someone means a certain rabbit by 'your rabbitf, or 
that she disagrees that a certain object is correctly termed ' p f 3 O .  
Just as the problem of the underdetermination of facts about the 
external world by sense-data was solved by rejecting the picture of 
perception which gives rise to it, then, so the problem of the 
underdetermination of semantic facts by physcial facts is solved by 
rejecting the account of perception which gives rise to it. And as 
 he view being defended here, that we perceive non- 
inferentially the contents of othersf utterances is defended by John 
McDowell, especially in his 'Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of 
Understandingf, in Herman Parrett and Jacques Bouveresse (eds.) 
Meaning and Understanding. New York: De Gruyter, 1981, pp. 225-248. 
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to the prima facie plausibility of the conclusion, as has already 
been emphasized, when I make such judgements it is normally not as 
the result of my drawing any explicit inference -in normal cases I 
just see that, by 'your rabbit', my peers mean a certain rabbit. 
The answer to the present question, then, as to what justifies 
my belief that my community's uses of the expressions of its 
language are evaluable as correct or not, is that I just see that 
they are -I neither have nor need a more explicit justification than 
this. The entirety of our social practice is based on our taking one 
another to be speaking meaningfully, and insofar as the sceptic's 
doubts as to the soundness of this practice are based on a dubious 
account of the kinds of states of affairs we can perceive to obtain, 
we are justified in upholding the practice. Now this view, that we 
normally simply see, without making any inferences, that another 
person is in agreement or disagreement, or that a fellow speaker 
means such-and-such by her words, of course is not meant to entail 
that we cannot be wrong. In cases in which we are wrong, though, it 
is no mystery how we discover that we are. Just as we find that 
something which we took to be a desk is not a desk, by, say, tapping 
it and discovering it to be made of convincingly finished cardboard, 
so we discover that someone whom we took to be in disagreement was 
in fact in agreement, by what that person says and does in later 
situations, and in response to further questioning. Our knowledge 
of whether our peers are in agreement or disagreement with us, then, 
is defeasible, but there is nothing mysterious in this. 
It will be clear from this, what the response to the first 
construal of the question raised above -namely, 'What justifies me 
i11 believing that what my community as a whole take to be the 
1 2 6  
correct  uses of t h e i r  predicates ,  do not diverge subs tant ia l ly  from 
what i n  f a c t  a re  the  correct  uses?'- w i l l  be. Just  a s  our having a  
useful p rac t i ce  of taking one another t o  be speaking meaningfully 
i n  u t t e r ing  words i s  a l l  t he  jus t i f i ca t ion  I need for  believing t h a t  
we are ,  our having a  prac t ice  of assuming, where there  i s  widespread 
agreement among speakers of the  language, t h a t  a  given usage i s  
cor rec t ,  i s  a l s o  a l l  t he  jus t i f i ca t ion  I need fo r  believing t h a t  the 
usage i s  cor rec t .  I t  can hardly be maintained t h a t  whereas we simply 
perceive one another's ut terances t o  be evaluable a s  correct  or 
incorrect ,  we may be d r a s t i c a l l y  wrong about when they a re  correct  
andwhen incorrec t .  This would be analogous t o  maintaining t h a t ,  
whereas it i s  absurd fo r  me t o  doubt t h a t  there  i s  a  material  object 
i n  f ront  of me, I cannot s imi lar ly  dismiss the  p o s s i b i l i t y  tha t  it 
may be a  chair  or a  sheep, ra ther  than the  desk which it 'appears' 
t o  be. 
The general response here, then, l i k e  the  response t o  external  
world scepticism, i s  based on a  re jec t ion  of the  scept ic ' s  zrgument 
t h a t  the  relevant pa r t  of our normal prac t ice  or 'language gamet 
-our t a l k  of mater ial  objects ,  on the  one hand, and our t a l k  of 
statements being correct  or t rue ,  on the  other hand- nust be 
reducible t o  some other ,  pr ivi leged vocabulary. I n  re jec t ing  the 
scept ic ' s  argument fo r  the  p r i o r i t y  of the  priviledged vocabulary, 
h i s  argument fo r  the  need f o r  a  jus t i f i ca t ion  of our ordinary t , i l k  
i n  terms of it, i s  undercut. 
I11 
I n  sect ion I, it was maintained t h a t  t o  know the  meaning of a  
predicate  i s  t o  aim, and t o  be able,  t o  use it mostly correct ly ,  and 
t h a t  a s o l i t a r y  s p e a k e r  c a n n o t  be j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  h e r  
o r  h i s  u s e s  are c o r r e c t .  I t  was a l s o  h e l d  t h a t  a s p e a k e r  i n  a 
l i n g u i s t i c  community s t a i g h t - f o r w a r d l y  c a n  b e  j u s t i f i e d i n  b e l i e v i n g  
t h a t  h e r  o r  h i s  u s e s  are m o s t l y  c o r r e c t .  The p o i n t  o f  s e c t i o n  I1 was 
t o  r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  i f  t h e  r e a s o n s  are sound  f o r  
t h i n k i n g  t h a t  t h e  s o l i t a r y  s p e a k e r  c a n n o t  be j u s t i f i e d ,  t h e n  t h e  
same r e a s o n s  w i l l  show t h a t  t h e  s p e a k e r  i n  a community c a n n o t  b e  
j u s t i f i e d ,  e i t h e r .  A s  w a s  n o t e d  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  s e c t i o n  I, t h o u g h ,  o n e  
m i g h t  j u s t  as w e l l  object t h a t  i f  t h e r e  i s  a  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  
s c e p t i c a l  a r g u m e n t  f o r  t h e  s p e a k e r  i n  a l i n g u i s t i c  community, t h e n  
t h e r e  i s  a n  a n a l o g o u s  s o l u t i o n  f o r  t h e  s o l i t a r y  s p e a k e r .  T h i s  
s e c t i o n  i s  d e v o t e d  t o  showing  t h a t  it d o e s  n o t .  
Simon B l a c k b u r n  makes a n  o b j e c t i o n  c l o s e  i n  s p i r i t  t o  t h e  
o b j e c t i o n  t o  be c r i t i c i s e d  h e r e ,  i n  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  K r i p k e ' s  
v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  p r o b l e m .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  p r o b l e m  a n d  
c o m m u n i t a r i a n  s o l u t i o n  d e v e l o p e d  i n  s e c t i o n  I are n o t  K r i p k e ' s ,  
B l a c k b u r n ' s  o b j e c t i o n  t o  K r i p k e  c a n  be r e f o r m u l a t e d  t o  a p p l y  t o  
them.  P a r a p h r a s i n g  B l a c k b u r n ,  t h e n ,  t h e  o b j e c t i o r l  c a n  be p u t  a s  
3 1 ~ l a c k b u r n r s  o r i g i n a l  o b j e c t i o n  r e a d s  a s  f o l l o w s :  
"It may b e  h e l p f u l  t o  t h i n k  o f  it l i k e  t h i s .  The members o f  a 
community s t a n d  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  as t h e  momentary t i m e - s l i c e s  o f  a n  
i n d i v i d u a l  d o .  So  j u s t  a s  t h e  o r i g i n a l  scept ic  q u e r i e s  what  i t  i s  
f o r  o n e  p e r s o n - t i m e  t o  b e  f a i t h f u l  t o  a  r u l e  a d o p t e d  by  a p r e v i o u s  
p e r s o n - t i m e ,  s o  t h e  p u b l i c  s c e p t i c  q u e r i e s  what  it i s  f o r  o n e  p e r s o n  
t o  be f a i t h f u l  t o  t h e  same r u l e  as  t h a t  a d o p t e d  b y  a n o t h e r .  Now, i f  
t h e  p u b l i c  s c e p t i c  c a n  be b y - p a s s e d  by ,  i n  e f f e c t  s a y i n g  t h a t  t h i s  
i s  what  w e  d o  -we see e a c h  o t h e r  as m u t ~ a l l y  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  same 
r u l e ,  o r  d i g n i f y  o r  compl imen t  e a c h  o t h e r  as s o  d o i n g ,  p r o v i d e d  t h e  
e x p o s e d  prac t ice  a g r e e s  w e l l  enough,  t h e n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s c e p t i c  c a n  
b e  b y - p a s s e d  i n  t h e  same way. H i s  d o u b t s  a d m i t  of t h e  same 
p r o j e c t i v e  s o l u t i o n . "  ( B l a c k b u r n  1984 ,  p . 2 9 4 ) .  I d o  n o t  mean t o  
i m p u t e  my v a r i a n t  o f  B l a c k b u r n ' s  o b j e c t i o n  t o  B l a c k b u r n  h i m s e l f .  
It may be h e l p f u l  t o  t h i n k  o f  i t  l i k e  t h i s .  The members o f  
a communi ty  s t a n d  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  as t h e  momentary t i m e - s l i c e s  
o f  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  d o .  S o  j u s t  as  t h e  o r i g i n a l  s c e p t i c  
c h a l l e n g e s  my j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  my v a r i o u s  
time-slices are u s i n g  t h e i r  words  m o s t l y  c o r r e c t l y ,  s o  t h e  
p u b l i c  sceptic  c h a l l e n g e s  my j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  
t h e  members  o f  my community as  a w h o l e  are u s i n g  t h e i r  words  
m o s t l y  c o r r e c t l y .  Now, i f  t h e  p u b l i c  s c e p t i c  c a n  be by-passed  
by ,  i n  e f fect  s a y i n g  t h a t  t h i s  i s  wha t  it i s  f o r  t h e  community 
as  a w h o l e  t o  be correct - t h a t  I j u s t  see t h a t  such-and-such  
i s  a c o r r e c t  u s e ,  i n  cases i n  w h i c h  i t  is- t h e n  t h e  s o l i t a r y  
scept ic  c a n  be b y - p a s s e d  i n  t h e  same way. H i s  d o u b t s  a d m i t  o f  
t h e  same 'common s e n s e f  s o l u t i o n  -I j u s t  see t h a t  s u c h  a n d  
s u c h  u s e s  o f  my p r e v i o u s  time-slices are c o r r e c t .  
T h i s  c r i t i c i s m ,  t h e n ,  t a k e s  t h e r e  t o  be a d i r e c t  a n a l o g y  b e t w e e n  t h e  
s o l i t a r y  s p e a k e r  a n d  t h e  s p e a k e r  s u r r o u n d e d  b y  a l i n g u i s t i c  
community,  w h i c h  u n d e r m i n e s  t h e  a r g u m e n t  a g a i n s t  t h e  s c e p t i c i s m  i n  
t h e  s o l i t a r y  case ( o r ,  a t  l e a s t ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  
t w o  cases) 32. 
The  o b j e c t i o n  c a n  be p u t  more  p r e c i s e l y  as f o l l o w s .  I n  t h e  
s c e n a r i o  described i n  s e c t i o n  I, I h a v e  b e f o r e  m e  a number o f  
o b j e c t s  w h i c h  I am t e r m i n g  e i t h e r  ' g r e e n f  o r  ' n o t  g r e e n ' .  The 
q u e s t i o n  p o s e d  was, i n  e f f e c t ,  what  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  c a n  I ,  as  a 
s o l i t a r y  s p e a k e r  o f  my l a n g u a g e ,  h a v e  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  i t  i s  
c o r r e c t  f o r  me t o  t e r m  t h e s e  t h i n g s  ' g r e e n '  b u t  n o t  t h o s e ?  The 
a n s w e r  was t h a t  s i n c e  n o t h i n g  I c a n  a p p e a l  t o  a f f o r d s  t h e  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  I s h o u l d  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  it i s  c o r r e c t  o r  i n c o r r e c t ,  
as t h e  c a s e  may be. I n  s h o r t ,  I h a v e  n o  g r o u n d  f o r  d r a w i n g  a 
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  what  seems r i g h t  a n d  wha t  i s  r i g h t .  The p r e s e n t  
o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h i s  i s  t h a t  s u r e l y  I do h a v e  a bas is  f o r  d r a w i n g  t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n ,  name ly ,  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o r  a b s e n c e  i n  my ' p r e s e n t  t i m e -  
s l i c e f  o f  a n  i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  h e e d  what  p a s t  time-slices h a v e  s a i d .  
T h u s  s u r e l y  I c a n ,  as a s o l i t a r y  s p c a k e r ,  t e r m  a g i v e n  t h i n g  'PI, 
3 2 ~ e e  a l s o  F o g e l i n  1 9 8 7 ,  p . 1 8 3 ,  f o r  a n  o b j e c t i o n  i n  much t h e  
same s p i r i t .  
129 
take a closer look at it, then on second thought term it 'not-PI. 
In such circumstances, surely, it would be appropriate to say that 
the claim 'This is P' initially seemed r i g h t  t~ me, but turned out 
not to be. Naturally, my latter judgement is defeasible -a yet 
further future time-slice of myself may, on even closer inspection, 
reverse my judgement yet again- but part of the point of the common 
sense epistemology belaboured in section 11 was just that such 
claims are always defeasible anyway. It was not because claims as 
to what is correctly termed 'PI are indefeasible in the public case, 
that the scepticism was defeated there -it was conceded that theyf re 
not indefeasible. 
One might claim, in support of this objection, that the analogy 
here, between the individual considered as a set of momentary 'time- 
slicesf and the community of speakers, is in all relevant respects, 
exact. Thus, just as a judgement of mine can disagree or accord with 
the judgement of another community member, so a present judgement 
of mine can disagree or accord with past and future judgements. And, 
inasmuch as the possibility of agreement and disagreement is the 
same in the two cases, so also is the possibility of distinguishing 
what is correct from what is incorrect. 
The first criticism of this objection concerns the exactness of 
this putative analogy between a community of speakers and an 
individual considered as a set of time-slices. The key fact about 
the members of my linguistic community, it will be recalled, is that 
they can, by their words or gestures, simply tell me or show me that 
what I have said is wrong. Normally, when, as a whole, they do this, 
I have grounds for believing that I've made a mistake. Thus, suppose 
that I'm inclined, on the basis of information available to me at 
a given time, to term x 'PI. If I were in a community of linguistic 
peers, all of whom objected to my so terming x, I would have grounds 
to believe that what I had said is incorrect; if they did not 
object, I would have grounds for believing that it is correctg3. 
Consider, however, the parallel for the solitary case. In this case, 
the analogy to my communityf s objecting to what I had said would be 
for my memories from earlier times m y  past time-slices- to cause 
me to reverse my inclination. The first point of disanalogy to note 
is that whereas I do sometimes term thirigs 'PI when the considerable 
majority of my linguistic community wouldn't (again, this is 
typically what is the case when I make a mistake), I would not term 
x 'PI if my past time-slices were in near unanimity that x is not 
correctly termed 'PI. After all, what I say on a given occasion is 
not completely unconditioned by what I have szid in the past -if I 
am inclined to term x 'PI now, it is because of something in my past 
experience of x and of other things I've termed 'P"'. Assuming I 
am not speaking merely out of whimsey, I will not term something, 
say, 'green', unless it strikes me as similar to things I've termed 
'greenf in the past -i.e., which past time slices have termed 
'greenf. 
The second point of disanalogy to note concerns the nature of the 
disagreement between, on the one hand, me and my linguistic peers, 
I should be emphasized, again, that cases in which one 
individual (perhaps a scientist or philosopher) opposes the majority 
and proves right, are relatively uncommon and can be accomodated as 
exceptions. The majority of cases, I submit, are like the case in 
which I term a certain glass of liquid 'a good stoutf, whereupon all 
those around me object that it is correctly termed 'a bitter', and 
not 'a stout'. In such cases, I should infer that it is incorrect 
to term the liquid 'a stoutf. 
3 4 I am assuming that I am speaking reasonably carefully, and 
that any 'mistakest I may make are not due simply to haste. 
and on the other hand, me and my past time-slices. In the first 
case, we m e  and my peers- all have direct access to x as it is at 
present. We all come to our views on the basis of the same 
information. In the second case, by contrast, it is only my present 
time-slice which has access to x as it is at present. The things 
termed 'Pf or 'not-P' by my past time-slices were either not x, or 
were x as it was at previous times (were different 'time-slices' of 
X )  . Thus, in the second case, it is up to me alone -my present time- 
slice- to determine whether x as it is at present is similar in 
relevant respects to what my past time-slices termed 'P' or 'not-Pf . 
If one were to make an accurate analogy in community terms for this 
consultation of my past time-slices, then, it would not be simply 
the model of ordinary correction by linguistic peers. Rather, the 
model would be this: when making a judgement, I listen to what each 
(or as many as I like) of my community members has said about things 
which I alone can judge to be similar or not to the thing now in 
front of me, and then I alone make my judgement as to whether it is 
correctly termed 'P'~~. 
The issue, then, is whether these differences between onef s being 
solitary and one's being in a community of linguistic peers, make 
35~here are other points of disanalogy besides these two. One 
worth mentioning concerns the fact that learning a language requires 
accepting the authority of certain speakers -for a child, the 
authority of her parents, for a non-native, that of competent 
speakers (and it is a familiar point that there is 'division of 
linguistic labourt, whereby native speakers defer to the authority 
of 'expertst in particular fields). In the solitary case, the 
individual whose usage is being corrected m y  present time-slice- 
is always the most experienced, and hence plausibly the most expert, 
among the individuals judging, since past time-slices necessarily 
have less experience. In the community, by contrast, the individual 
being corrected is characteristically not the most experienced, and 
defers to greater experience. 
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the difference between onef s being able to justify onef s belief that 
one is speaking meaningfully or not. The present suggestion, again, 
is that my basis for drawing the distinction in the solitary case 
between what seems right and what is right, is the presence or 
absence in my present time-slice of an inclination to heed what past 
time-slices have said. Formulated as an answer to the question posed 
in section I, then, the suggestion is that what justifies me, when 
solitary, in believing that I am aiming to use a given predicate ' P f  
correctly and am able to use it mostly correctly, is that in 
deciding whether to term a given thing 'Pf, I in some sense take 
note of, or heed, past occasions on which I termed things 'PI or 
'not-Pf (I consult past time-slices of myself) . And my claim amounts 
to this: whereas the tacit acceptance or open disapproval of my 
peers with the judgements I make gives me reason to think that I'm 
conforming to an independent standard of correct use in terming 
things 'P', my being inclined to heed past occasions on which I used 
P , does not. Consider the relevance of the first point of 
disanalogy just discussed, that my past time-slices cannot, whereas 
my peers can, almost all be in disagreement with my present 
judgement. When in a linguistic community, it is always possible for 
. me to learn, even when I have weighed as carefully as I am able to 
whether to term x 'PI, that I have likely made a mistake in terming 
x P .  This is because, despite my careful deliberation, the 
substantial majority of my peers may disagree with me, and this will 
usually be good grounds for me to infer that I am mistaken. This, 
in turn, is sufficient reason to believe that my wordsf uses are 
subject to a standard of correctness independent of my dispositions. 
When I am solitary, however, this indication of the independence of 
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the correctness of what I say f r o m  what I am disposed to say -of 
what is right from what seems right- is not available to me. For me 
to weigh as carefully as I can whether to term x 'P', when solitary, 
is just for me to consult all of my past time-slices, and hence to 
preclude the possibility of there being a substantial disagreement 
between what they indicate and what I have said. 
The second point of disanalogy reinforces the general point. 
Suppose, for the moment, that there is agreement, either among my 
peers or my time-slices, as the case may be, that I was correct to 
say ' x  is PI. Given that in the public case, all who agree with my 
saying this have access to x, it is clear that what is agreed to is 
that x is in the extension of ' P f  (we suppose, of course, that in 
each case we all mean the same thing by 'PI). In the solitary case, 
however, since my past time-slices did not have access to x as it 
is at present, the possibility arises that I (my present time-slice) 
am mistaken in taking the things termed 'P' by my past time-slices 
to be relevantly similar to x as it is at present. The possibility 
arises, then, t h ~ t  the agreement between myself and my past time- 
slices is attributable, not to a sameness in the object examined and 
an agreement as to whether it is in the extension of \Pf, but to a 
difference in the object together with a compensating change in what 
the extension of 'P' is taken to be. And this point applies 
similarly to the case where there is disagreement as to whether to 
term x 'PI. That is, the possibility arises that the disagreement 
is due to a difference in the object being examined, and not to a 
difference as to what the extension of 'P' is taken to be. Insofar 
as this is the case, my being in agreement with my past time-slices 
as to what to term ' P f  is not an indication that I am using it in 
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a c c o r d  w i t h  a s t a n d a r d  of  c o r r e c t n e s s .  The a g r e e m e n t  c a n  j u s t  a s  
e a s i l y  be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  my w a v e r i n g  a r b i t r a r i l y  i n  what I c o u n t  as 
b e i n g  i n  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  ' P f ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  compensa to ry  w a v e r i n g  
as t o  w h e t h e r  t o  c o u n t  t h e  o b j e c t s  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  as  ' t h e  samet 
as o b j e c t s  t e r m e d  'PI b y  past time-slices. 
The r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  o b j e c t i o n  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  t h e n ,  comes 
t o  t h i s .  The a n s w e r  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  'What j u s t i f i e s  m e  i n  b e l i e v i n g  
t h a t  my u s e s  of 'PI are m o s t l y  c o r r e c t ? '  a f f o r d e d  by my l i n g u i s t i c  
p e e r s ,  i s  clear:  t h e y  t e l l  m e  t h e y ' r e  c o r r e c t .  The p a r a l l e l  answer  
i n  t h e  s o l i t a r y  case, t h o u g h ,  i s  i n a d e q u a t e .  A s  we a l r e a d y  know, 
' I t ' s  what  I ' m  i n c l i n e d  t o  s a y ' ,  w i l l  n o t  do  -as was a r g u e d  i n  
s e c t i o n  I, t h i s  d o e s  n o t  d i s t i n g u i s h  be tween  my m e r e l y  h a v i n g  a  
d i s p o s i t i o n  t o  u t t e r  t h e  p r e d i c a t e ,  a n d  my b e i n g  able t o  u s e  it i n  
a c c o r d  w i t h  a s t a n d a r d  o f  c o r r e c t n e s s .  And it s i m p l y  d o e s  n o t  make 
a n y  r e l e v a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  t o  a d d  ' I t ' s  what  I ' m  i n c l i n e d  t o  s a y  h a v i n g  
heeded  m y  p a s t  u t t e r a n c e s  o f  'P". T h a t  I am i n c l i n e d  t o  r e f l e c t  
b a c k  t o  past o c c a s i o n s  o f  u t t e r a n c e  i n  some c a s e s  b u t  n o t  o t h e r s  i n  
making a c u r r e n t  u t t e r a n c e ,  d o e s  n o t  show, i n  t h e  way t h a t  my p e e r s  
t a k i n g  i s s u e  w i t h  my c u r r e n t  u t t e r a n c e  d o e s ,  t h a t  my u t t e r a n c e  i s  
e v a l u a b l e  as  c o r r e c t  o r  n o t .  
Now, i t  may s t i l l  seem t h a t  a d o u b l e  s t a n d a r d  i s  b e i n g  a p p l i e d  
h e r e .  The answer  t o  t h e  scept ic  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  c a s e ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  was 
a n  a p p e a l  t o  common s e n s e :  i n  t h e  normal  c o u r s e  o f  e v e n t s ,  I s i m p l y  
p e r c e i v e  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  u s e d  b y  my l i n g u i s t i c  p e e r s  t o  b e  
m e a n i n g f u l ,  when t h e y  a r e .  S u r e l y ,  o n e  m i g h t  s a y ,  t h e r e  c a n  b e  no 
o b j e c t i o n  t o  a p p e a l i n g  t o  common s e n s e  i n  t h e  s o l i t a r y  case as w e l l :  
I s i m p l y  see t h a t  my ( s o l i t a r y )  u s e s  a r e  m o s t l y  c o r r e c t .  A s  F o g e l i n  
s u g g e s t s  ( F o g e l i n  1987,  p . 1 8 0 ) ,  w e  s h o u l d  r e s p e c t  W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s  own 
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maxim h e r e :  "To u s e  a word w i t h o u t  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  d o e s  n o t  mean t o  
u s e  it w i t h o u t  r i g h t n  ( W i t t g e n s t e i n  1958,  5 2 8 9 ) .  Thus,  a l t h o u g h  when 
s o l i t a r y  I c a n n o t  p o i n t  t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  which d i s t i n g u i s h e s  my 
m e r e l y  h a v i n g  a d i s p o s i t i o n  t o  u s e  a p r e d i c a t e  a n d  my h a v i n g  a n  
a b i l i t y  t o  u s e  it m o s t l y  c o r r e c t l y ,  I d o n ' t  h a v e  t o .  I t  i s  enough 
t h a t  I d o  make a d i s t i n c t i o n .  
I n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s ,  n o t e  f i r s t  t h a t  t h i s  maxim o f  
W i t t g e n s t e i n t s ,  a l t h o u g h  s u r e l y  c o r r e c t ,  d o e s  n o t  h e l p  t h e  
o b j e c t o r 3 6 .  F o r  it i s  s u r e l y  a l s o  c o r r e c t  t h a t  t o  u s e  a word 
w i t h o u t  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  d o e s  n o t  mean t o  u s e  it with r i g h t .  So, 
g i v e n  t h a t  s p e a k i n g  w i t h  o r  w i t h o u t  r i g h t  - i .e . ,  s p e a k i n g  
m e a n i n g f u l l y  o r  not-  i s  n o t  a  m a t t e r  o f  h a v i n g  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  o u r  
q u e s t i o n  h a s  b e e n ,  how c a n  o n e  t e l l  a p a r t  t h e  two c a s e s ?  To see more 
c l e a r l y  why t h e  r e p l y  t h a t  I s i m p l y  see t h e  d i f f e r e n c e ,  i s  
i n a d e q u a t e  h e r e ,  w h e r e a s  t h i s  was a n  a d e q u a t e  r e p l y  i n  s e c t i o n  11, 
compare t h e  scept ica l  p r o b l e m s  i n  t h e  two c a s e s .  I n  t h e  community 
case, common s e n s e  was i n v o k e d  i n  r e p l y  t o  a s c e p t i c  who x a i s e d  a  
c h a l l e n g e  t o  j u s t i f y  s o m e t h i n g  which,  i n  t h e  o r d i n a r y  c o u r s e  o f  
e v e n t s ,  w e  d o  n o t  h a v e  o c c a s i o n  t o  q u e s t i o n ,  v i z . ,  o u r  c o n v i c t i o n  
t h a t  w e  s i m p l y  p e r c e i v e  o n e  a n o t h e r  t o  be s p e a k i n g  m e a n i n g f u l l y .  As 
was t h e  c a s e  w i t h  ' e x t e r n a l  w o r l d f  s c e p t i c i s m ,  t h i s  c h a l l e n g e  a r o s e  
b e c a u s e  t h e  sceptic 's  a c c o u n t  o f  what w e  a r e  a b l e  t o  p e r c e i v e  
e n t a i l e d  t h a t  w e  d o  n o t  ' d i r e c t l y  p e r c e i v e r  what w e  n o r m a l l y  t a k e  
3 6 ~ i t t g e n s t e i n t s  p o i n t ,  I t a k e  it, i s  t h a t  o n e  n e e d n ' t  a l w a y s  
be a b l e  t o  j u s t i f y  u s i n g  a word as o n e  d o e s ,  i n  o r d e r  f o r  o n e ' s  u s e s  
t o  be m e a n i n g f u l .  When o n e  s a y s ,  f o r  example ,  ' T h i s  beer tas tes  
s o u r t ,  o n e  l i k e l y  w i l l  n o t  be a b l e  t o  g i v e  a n y  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
s a y i n g  t h i s .  Note ,  however,  t h a t  b e i n g  u n a b l e  t o  j u s t i f y  t h i s  
p a r t i c u l a r  c l a i m  i s  n o t  t h e  same a s  b e i n g  u n a b l e  t o  j u s t i f y  o n e ' s  
c l a i m  t o  know t h e  mean ing  o f  ' s o u r f .  One c o u l d  e a s i l y  j u s t i f y  t h i s  
l a t t e r  c l a i m  by p i c k i n g  o u t  t h i n g s  commonly a c c e p t e d  t o  b e  s o u r  ( a n d  
t h u s  showing  t h a t  o n e  i s  able t o  u s e  ' s o u r f  m o s t l y  c o r r e c t l y ) .  
o u r s e l v e s  t o  p e r c e i v e .  The common s e n s e  r e p l y  was t h a t  t h e  s c e p t i c ,  
i n  g e n e r a t i n g  h i s  t h e o r y ,  u s e s  t h e  r e l e v a n t  c o n c e p t s ,  s u c h  a s  
' p e r c e i v e ' ,  ' seer,  a n d  ' s e n s e ' ,  i n  ways which d i v e r g e  f rom t h e i r  
o r d i n a r y  u s e s ,  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  it i s  n o t  c l e a r  what  it i s  t h a t  
h i s  t h e o r y  i s  a t h e o r y  o f .  Given t h i s ,  o u r  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  w e  o f t e n  
s i m p l y  p e r c e i v e  t h a t  o u r  peers a r e  s p e a k l r ~ g  m e a n i n g f u l l y ,  was h e l d  
t o  b e  unimpugned.  I n  t h e  s o l i t a r y  case, by c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  c h a l l e n g e  
was t o  j u s t i f y  s o m e t h i n g  which w e  do  somet imes  h a v e  o c c a s i o n ,  i n  t h e  
o r d i n a r y  c o u r s e  o f  e v e n t s ,  t o  h a v e  t o  j u s t i f y ,  a n d  which,  i n  t h e  
p u b l i c  case, we know how t o  g o  a b o u t  j u s t i f y i n g .  We do,  i n  t h e  
o r d i n a r y  c o u r s e  o f  e v e n t s ,  somet imes  h a v e  t o  j u s t i f y  ( t o  o u r s e l v e s  
o r  o t h e r s )  t h a t  w e  know t h e  meaning o f  a n  e x p r e s s i o n ,  a n d  w e  do t h i s  
b y  c o m p a r i n g  t h e  way w e  would u s e  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  t o  t h e  way o t h e r s  
do ,  a n d  h e n c e  showing  o u r  u s e s  t o  b e  m o s t l y  i n  c o n f o r m i t y .  Thus t h e  
c h a l l e n g e  was n o t  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  a  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t h e o r y ,  b u t  
r a t h e r  o f  o u r  o r d i n a r y  p r a c t i c e  - in  o u r  o r d i n a r y  p r a c t i c e ,  w e  do  
h a v e  a  way o f  d r a w i n g  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between knowing a n d  n o t  
knowing t h e  mean ing  o f  a n  e x p r e s s i o n 3 ' .  What d i s t i n g u i s h e s  t h e  
s o l i t a r y  c a s e  f r o m  t h e  community case, i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no o r d i n a r y  
prac t ice  t o  a p p e a l  t o .  I t  s i m p l y  i s  n o t  a common p r a c t i c e  f o r  p e o p l e  
t o  i n v e n t  s o l i t a r y  l a n g u a g e s ,  a t  leas t  n o t  l a n g u a g e s  i n  t h e  normal  
s e n s e ,  w i t h  words  v ~ h i c h  c a n  b e  spoken  o r  w r i t t e n  a n d  c o m p o s i t i o n a l  
r u l e s .  A ' s o l i t a r y  l a n g u a g e f  i s  n o t ,  i n  t h e  way t h a t  a  p u b l i c  
3 7 ~ f .  A u s t i n ' s  comment, made i n  t h e  c o u r s e  of  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  
word ' rea l f  : 
"Of c o u r s e  . . . w e  make a d i s t i n c t i o n  be tween  'a r e a l  x t  a n d  
' n o t  a real  xt o n l y  if t h e r e  i s  a way o f  t e l l i n g  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  what i s  a r e a l  x a n d  what i s  n o t .  A 
d i s t i n c t i o n  which w e  a r e  n o t  i n  f a c t  a b l e  t o  draw i s  - t o  p u t  
it p o l i t e l y -  n o t  w o r t h  making" ( A u s t i n  1962,  p . 7 7 ) .  
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l anguage  is ,  a n  o r d i n a r y ,  unp rob lema t i c  o b j e c t  o f  common e x p e r i e n c e .  
I n  t h e  s o l i t a r y  c a s e ,  t h z n ,  t h e  f l a t - f o o t e d  r e p l y  t h a t  I s imply  see 
t h a t  my u s e s  a r e  m o s t l y  c o r r e c t ,  i s  n o t ,  a s  it i s  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  
c a s e ,  s imply  a n  a p p e a l  t o  what w e  normal ly  t a k e  t o  be t h e  c a s e .  For 
t h i s  r e a s o n ,  some accoun t  h a s  t o  be g i v e n  o f  why t h e  s o l i t a r y  c a s e  
i a  ana logous  i n  r e l e v a n t  ways t o  t h e  community c a s e .  And, a s  I have 
t r i e d  t o  show, t h i s  u n d e r t a k i n g  i s  u n s u c c e s s f u i .  
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